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The goal of this study is to explore the influence of the news media on the 
cyclical formation process of public opinion with the case of presidential approval 
rating from the last forty years. To explore this relationship empirically, this study 
investigates the historical fluctuations of presidential approval ratings, which have 
been regularly measured since the 1950s, and how the New York Times’ 
presentation of the ratings has itself influenced public opinion on presidential 
popularity for the last forty years.  
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To explore the causal relationship between the NYT and a series of 
presidential approval rates in two-ways, this study suggests two hypotheses of 
investigating the influence of convergence and change in presidential approval 
ratings on the NYT and two hypotheses of testing the additive/subtractive effect 
and volatility effect of the NYT reports on the following approval rating. The 
analysis of the relationship is conducted by using two statistical methods: First, in 
order to test the two hypotheses of investigating the influence of convergence and 
change in presidential approval rates on the NYT’s decision to report the approval 
rates, this study applies the quadratic regression model. Next, the influence of the 
NYT reports on the subsequent approval rates is investigated by applying time-
series models.  
The statistical tests confirm that there exists a reciprocal relation between 
the NYT reports and public evaluation of presidential performance, and the 
relation results in the intensification of majority opinion and the increased 
volatility of public opinion. The findings of this study show: first, media 
sensitivity to a given issue varies over time: the convergence and change in public 
opinion raise the salience of the given issue; second, news selection does matter: 
news media provide unambiguous information but they are not an exact sample of 
the population; third, a simple cue makes a difference in individual statistical 
sense of the climate of public opinion. This study concludes that public opinion 
influence media attention, which, in turn, affect public opinion at a later date. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction: Polls and Presidential Popularity 
 
 
The essential need…is the improvement of the methods and conditions of 
debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.  
– John Dewey, The Problem of the Public 
 
Having chosen a way of life which consults the mass of the people in the 
formation of policy, we must listen to what the people themselves to say, 
for public opinion can only be of service to democracy if it can be heard.  
– George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, The 
Pulse of Democracy 
 
Introduction 
Sometimes life changes dramatically. And so does news. On June 21, 
2001, the New York Times reported the results of a few polls which showed 
President Bush’s approval rating at around 50 percent. This was quite a surprising 
number in many ways, especially considering that it was “the lowest presidential 
approval rating in five years” (NYT, 6/29/2001). About three months later, the 
New York Times reported an even more striking poll result: President Bush’s 
approval rating was 90 percent, “the highest rating for a president ever recorded 
by the Gallup polling group” (NYT, 9/24/2001). These remarkable numbers and 
the dramatic changes they suggest raise two questions: first, what kind of magical 
 
feats did the president perform in those three months? Or did any such feats even 
matter?  
It is hard to contest the argument that the September 11th terrorist attack 
was the decisive factor in the dramatic rise in Bush’s popularity. In other words, 
almost no matter what the president did in those three months, his rating would 
arguably have increased given the occurrence of Americans’ most tragic 
experience ever. This phenomenon, the so called ‘rally effect,’ is hardly novel, 
based upon numerous studies of the presidency and public opinion (e.g., Mueller, 
1970, 1973; Brody & Shapiro, 1989, 1991; Parker, 1995; Baker & Oneal, 2001; 
Gronke & Brenhm, 2002). These studies showed that the president’s popularity 
ratings are greatly boosted in times of national crisis. In many polls about the 
president’s job performance at these times, citizens have avoided negative 
evaluations of the president, thereby producing a rapid increase in presidential 
popularity during times of national crisis (Parker, 1995).   
If this is the case, then we should ask: what did the popularity ratings 
actually measure? And why should the media and the public pay attention to those 
numbers? For example, did the previously mentioned polls really indicate 
Americans’ approval of President Bush’s handling of the crisis, or did they show 
Americans’ own kind of emotional solidarity? Numbers do not speak for 
themselves. In fact, previous studies have found that the president’s popularity 
does not simply represent public opinion of presidential performance; instead 
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other factors such as economic condition/expectation, the length of the president’s 
incumbency, respondents’ idiosyncratic characteristics, and even the way of 
asking questions are also significant indicators of the president’s popularity (e.g., 
Mueller, 1970, 1973; Crespi, 1980a; Brody & Shapiro, 1989, 1991; Parker, 1995). 
Given this complicated meaning of the presidential popularity rating, its 
interpretation always contains a risk of oversimplification, at best, or ideological 
intervention when the news media present the results of polls without enough 
contextual information. However, in contemporary journalism, numbers are often 
presented as a synonym for “public opinion” (Herbst, 1993; Lewis, 1999; Lipari, 
1999). In the case of presidential approval polls, no matter how imperfect the 
measure, the numbers are even more newsworthy to the news media particularly 
because they are, in effect, believed by journalists and the public to reveal the 
winner of the next presidential election and to indicate a “pseudo-parliamentary 
situation” whereby the president is judged from the imaginary electorate pointing 
to the political situation of the nation (Crespi, 1980a). The news media believe 
that the numbers provide readers with “objective” meanings about communal 
issues: they are used to represent the public’s view of certain problems. In other 
words, the numbers become news because they are believed to show public 
opinion “objectively” (see Gallup & Rae, 1940; Verba, 1996). 
 This assumption of “objectivity” in the news media and social science has 
represented public opinion polls as a dimension independent from the ongoing 
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process of the construction of public opinion. But, in contrast to this assumption 
of objectivity, the industry of public opinion polls cannot, in nature, even be 
imagined as independent from the news media which are the key part of the 
formation of public opinion. Most public opinion polls have been conducted 
under contract to the news media since the early rise of scientific opinion polls, 
and, today, more and more polls are conducted directly by the news media 
themselves (Gollin, 1980; Crespi, 1980b). While many studies show that the 
number of public opinion polls reported by the news media has been increasing, it 
is somewhat surprising to note that relatively only a few studies attempted to 
explore the influence of published opinion polls on public opinion. It is possible 
that the myth of “objectivity” has led researchers to overlook the subjective 
influence of published opinion polls on the already objectified world of public 
opinions. Whether intended or not, the lack of interest in the effect of published 
polls on public opinion helps the news media to naturalize themselves as an 
invisible hand in the markets of public issues.  
While there have not been many studies examining the influence of 
opinion polls, it is undisputable that some previous studies provide a good 
theoretical orientation for this project. Especially, Ginsberg’s (1986) and Herbst’s 
(1993) qualitative explorations of the ideological impact of opinion polls on 
public opinion both provide theoretical frameworks for this study by arguing that 
the public opinion poll is a symbolic tool for constructing a specific sense of the 
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public. In addition, Lewis’ (1999, 2001) and Lipari’s (1999, 2000, 2001) 
examinations of poll discourses should be noted for showing that the pollsters’ 
way of framing questions serve to reify elitist ways of thinking about the issues. 
Also, early ‘bandwagon’ studies (e.g., Atkin, 1969; Mendelsohn & Crespi, 1970; 
see Allport, 1940) and, more recently, Noelle-Neumann’s (1993) analysis of 
public opinion documented good empirical cases showing that aggregated public 
opinion is moved by the media’s presentation of majority/minority opinions.  
OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
 
The principal purpose of this study is to explore the influence of the news 
media on the cyclical formation process of public opinion. This study will show 
that published opinion polls cannot simply be detached from the on-going process 
of shaping public opinion because they are one of the main forces constructing 
public opinion itself. To explore this relationship empirically, this study 
investigates the historical fluctuations of presidential approval ratings, which have 
been regularly measured since the 1950s, and how the presentation of the ratings 
by the New York Times has itself influenced public opinion on presidential 
popularity for the last forty years. One of the expectations from theory and 
previous studies on public opinion is that the responsiveness of the public to “a 
large number of others acting in the same direction” leads to a “bandwagon 
effect” (Allport, 1940, p.250). As Allport (1940) noted, perhaps this “bandwagon 
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effect” is “as old as the game of politics” (p.250), but one difference that public 
opinion polls make is that the statistical precision of polls replaces our 
unscientific sense of “impression” in being aware of public opinions. ” Noelle-
Neumann (1993) advances this old notion of the “bandwagon” effect with more 
sophisticated concepts of “the climate of opinion” and “the fear of isolation.” 
According to her, we, as social beings, are afraid of being isolated from our 
environment, and thus we constantly observe our environments in order to avoid 
becoming isolated.  As a part of the environmental conditions, “the climate of 
the opinion” leads to “polarization” of public opinion by discouraging the 
expression of minority opinions and encouraging the social desirability of 
expressing majority opinions (Noelle-Neumann, 1993).  
The main goal of this study is not simply to explore the effect of the news 
frames in presenting the poll on public opinion; instead what this study wants to 
demonstrate, with this case of presidential approval rates, is the spiral process of 
forming public opinion, whereby we can identify the way that the news media 
reflect public opinion, and the presentation of the public opinion by the news 
media, in turn, moves the public opinion in a certain direction. If the overall 
process of forming public opinion follows the spiral of silence hypothesis, the 
investigation of the reciprocal relationship will demonstrate the significance of 
media’s effect on public opinion in two ways. First, this study will investigate 
whether the media have significant effect in making public opinion more 
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changeable; that is, if the media make public opinion more static rather than more 
volatile, it is hard to argue that the overall spiral process of forming opinion is 
associated with the media. Second, if the overall process follows the spiral of 
silence, the media effect of making public opinion volatile must have directional 
tendencies of conforming with the public opinion they are representing; in other 
words, unless the media make the strong opinion even stronger and the minor 
opinion even weaker, the association between the media and public opinion will 
not result in the spiral of silence.  
In this sense, expecting that the overall process of the public opinion on 
the presidential job performance follows a spiral process, this study investigates 
the media’s effect on the presidential approval rates in two senses: volatility 
(changing variances) and additive/subtractive impact. One of the methodological 
challenges of this study is to show the existence of the additive/subtractive 
(polarization) effect of the publication of presidential approval ratings while 
controlling other rallying or diminishing factors on these ratings. Prior studies 
found that public opinion on presidential popularity is, to a large extent, 
determined by several factors such as economic expectation/condition, 
international conflicts, media coverage of rally events, personal scandals, duration 
in incumbency and others (Mueller, 1970, 1973, 1993; Crespi, 1980a; Brody & 
Shapiro, 1989, 1991; Parker, 1995; Baker & Oneal, 2001; and Gronke & Brehm, 
2002, among others). After controlling for the influence of these factors, showing 
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that the ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ presentation of presidential ratings by the news 
media boosts or lowers the ratings will confirm the existence of the “polarization 
effect” of the media presentation of public opinion. 
As for volatility, this study hypothesizes that the increased publication of 
presidential approval ratings by the news media is one of the critical factors 
explaining the increase of the volatility of the public’s opinion on presidential 
approval; to put it another way, as the media coverage of approval ratings has 
increased, the volatility of the presidential approval rates has also increased. 
Speaking of methodology, it is not easy to measure the effect of one variable on 
the dependent variable’s changing variances while controlling its own and other 
third variables’ directional impact on the dependent variable. Because of the 
difficulty, a conventional approach of comparing of standard deviations to 
document the changes of volatility is not much applicable to this study and a more 
innovative approach to measure volatility is demanded. Recently, Gronke and 
Brehm’s study (2002) shows through a time-series data analysis (a modified 
ARCH model) that the range of fluctuation of presidential ratings has increased 
over the last forty years, while controlling other variables’ impact on the mean 
level change of the ratings.  
A specific goal of this study is to draw attention to the usefulness of a 
recently developed time-series method (ARCH and ARCH-m) for analyzing 
nonstationary data and its application to the empirical problem of tracing long 
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term fluctuation of public opinion. This study will apply the ARCH-m model to 
explore the association of the increased media presentations of presidential 
approval rates and the increased volatility of the approval rates.   
 
Public Opinion 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF “THE PUBLIC” AND “PUBLIC OPINION”  
 
 The fundamental assumption behind using opinion polls lies in the belief 
that ‘democracy’ is a form of political decision-making through which the public 
can decide its own good. Even though now this belief is so natural that it seems 
needless to speak of the association of “the public” and “democracy,” it is 
instructive to review the historical thoughts on the association for the purpose of 
the conceptual clarity of this study. As shown in the fact that the word, “public 
opinion,” meaning civil judgments independent of the state first appeared during 
the Enlightenment era (Price, 1992), the conceptual development of “publicness” 
and “public opinion” is often ascribed to the philosophical framework of some 
Enlightenment thinkers, such as Locke, Rousseau, and Hobbes, in many senses 
(Palmer, 1936; Price, 1992; Fuse, 2000). It is not incidental that the concept of 
“public opinion” was born around the Enlightenment, when the monopolization of 
“natural rights” by lords and kings began to be disintegrated into “contracts” 
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among equal individuals. That is, the fact that a new demand emerged to refer to a 
word meaning ‘aggregated will,’ independently of authoritative figures during the 
Enlightenment, testifies to the fact that “public opinion” cannot even be imagined 
without its relation to democracy. In this study, it is important to note that the 
public opinion poll is just a tool for expressing public opinion in a broad historical 
scope of public opinion (see Price, 1992; Fuse, 2000). Here this study identifies ‘a 
numerical conception of publicness’ in the news media applying opinion polls 
within an overall review of public opinion and aims to show that this numerical 
conception is not best served for realizing the ideal we intend with democracy.   
DECIDING PUBLIC GOOD IN DEMOCRACY: HABERMAS’S CONCEPTION OF 
THE PUBLIC 
 
 The distinction between “public” and “private” is traced back to ancient 
Greece where the public sphere, “polis,” was distinct from the private sphere, 
“oikos” (Habermas, 1989; Peters, 1995). As Habermas and other political 
theorists point out, the city-states of Greece presented the basic idea of “the 
public” made up of those who were individuals as well as citizens deliberating 
together in the market and other open spaces. Yet not all earlier philosophies of 
ancient Greece held a positive concept of the public sphere. In Plato’s Republic, 
for example, he disparaged a collective decision-making by the large number of 
people, believing that only philosophy was the right source of deciding on human 
affairs (Price, 1992; Fuse, 2000). Like Plato, Roman authors of the classical era 
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often linked public opinion to the vulgus (Palmer, 1936, Fuse, 2000). Greco-
Roman philosophy, in general1, referred to public opinion as doxa, which means a 
realm of prejudice, emotion, probability and authority, as opposed to episteme—
knowledge, or science (Peters, 1995).   
 Having deep roots in Western political thought, this classic conception of 
“publicness” has changed significantly from one historical era to another. During 
the Middle Ages, the classical concept of publicness was replaced by the authority 
of public figures—kings, lords, and priests—and God. Public opinions were 
hardly a matter of deciding one’s good and just, whereby only God and public 
figures representing God can present the universal context for one’s existence. 
The idea of “publicness,” in medieval thought, was completely missing, and only 
feudal lords, kings, and priests stood for what Habermas (1989) calls the 
“representative public sphere” (see Haas, 2000, Peters, 1995). This feudal 
representation does not mean that the public figures represented the people in any 
political decision-making process; rather it means that the public figures 
constituted their “publicness” by representing their bodies before the people in a 
visual and ritual way. That is, the feudal way of “representation” meant a realm of 
spectacle where individuals were not members of the public but rather simply part 
of the audience (Peters, 1995).  
                                                 
1 It should be noted that Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, took a more favorable view of public 
opinion. Aristotle believed that practical wisdom, phronesis, accumulated from multiple 
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 Habermas (1989) argues that this publicness represented by the public 
authority had been sustained until the classical conception of publicness was 
revived through “the liberal bourgeois public sphere” in the early modern era. 
According to Habermas (1989), the development of a capitalist economy in the 
16th century along with the transformation of political and institutional power 
enabled a new way of “publicness,” the bourgeois public sphere, in the early 
modern era. In addition, previous studies of public opinion often point out that 
newly emerged thoughts on the “social contract” in the 18th century contributed to 
the development of the modern concept of “publicness” (e.g., Palmer, 1936; Price, 
1992). For example, introducing the concept of “general will,” Rousseau argued 
that the common good or “general will” is only discernible through direct and 
continuous participation of free individuals (Price, 1992, p.11)2. Locke, in the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, identified three general classes of laws: 
the divine law, the civil law, and the law of “opinion and reputation” (quoted in 
Palmer, 1936, p.234). That is, by the middle of the 18th century, the classical 
concept of “publicness” changed from the classical meaning of the vulgar and 
irrational to the modern meaning of a sphere independent of the coercive power of 
the state.    
                                                                                                                                     
experiences of the many is an element of truth, in addition to episteme (see, Palmer, 1936; Peters, 
1995).   
2 Palmer (1936) pointed out that Rousseau himself did not indicate specifically the relationship of 
public opinion to the general will: rather what Rousseau emphasized is that law can be effective 
only when it is based on public opinion.  
 12
 
Even though the public sphere of the Enlightenment was neither “open to 
all” nor “unconstrained” in principle, the emergence of the public sphere provided 
social space for people to gather and have conversation independent of the state as 
well as about private interests of their own. As Habermas’s later linguistic 
analysis of communicative action (1987, 1998) shows, the theoretical 
underpinning for his theory on the public sphere is based on “social pragmatism,” 
which distinctively separates him from other postmodernists’ relativism in regard 
to problems concerning truth, rationality and, most importantly, democracy. Here 
an important point Habermas (1989, 1987) and Dewey (1927) emphasize is that 
the importance of the deliberation process in communal space is not rested on the 
fact that the deliberation can guarantee discovering the ultimate truth 
(universality); but it is valuable because participating members in the public life 
can produce a tentative truth (discursive universality) for facing an undetermined 
future in the process of sharing one’s experiences and interacting with one 
another.  In other words, the public sphere is an indispensable element of 
democracy in that citizens become aware of others’ existences in a concrete way 
by looking, touching, listening, and talking to them so that the public sphere can 
put back their private interests behind consensual “public opinions.” 
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 Introducing his theory of the public sphere to the center of on-going 
debates on the crisis of democracy3, one of the most important points Habermas 
wants to raise is that the public sphere, i.e. social space for communicative 
actions, is the ground for “publicness” and the “publicness” is the most important 
element for sustaining the modern ideals we imagine with democracy (see 
Goodnight & Hingstman, 1997). That is, contrary to some postmodernists who 
suspect and attack all universal claims of truth in favor of particular experiences 
and local articulation (e.g. Lyotard, 1984), Habermas (1989, 1987) reemphasizes 
that accomplishing a sense of “publicness” from the private domain of civil 
society is necessary for sustaining democracy. Habermas claims this optimistic 
conception of “publicness,” in his word “universal pragmatism,” particularly 
because of his belief in the nature of speech actions. According to Habermas 
(1987, 1998), the built-in nature of speech actions make it possible for the public 
to share a certain value of a social order universally. He argues that people’s 
everyday linguistic actions always raise a matter of validity claims which a hearer 
is supposed to judge with a yes/no response: since speech acts always include 
more than one of three validity claims—1) speech itself, 2) the normative context 
of the speech, and 3) the intention of the speaker, they make it possible to bring 
                                                 
3 For in-depth discussions on Habermas’s view of the historical formation of the public sphere, see 
Calhoun (1992), Habermas and the Public Sphere; Goodnight and Hingstman (1997), Studies in 
the Public Sphere.  
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pragmatic universality4. In other words, Habermas claims that validity and 
justification are necessary pragmatic notions, supposing that validity and 
justification can neither rest on conditions before speech acts nor they can be 
explicated independently of discursive process. As Habermas (1987, 1996, 1998) 
emphasizes, if democracy is about making decisions for the public good in a 
political community, the validity and justification of the public good cannot be 
separated from the communicative process among the members of the community 
because the validity and justification of public good are not fixed on the 
prepositional component, but are located in the process of deliberation itself.  
MODERN PUBLIC AND PUBLIC OPINION: CORROSION OF PUBLICNESS 
 
 According to Habermas (1989), the rise of the liberal bourgeois public 
sphere was enabled by two historical developments during the early modern era. 
The first development was the emergence of various public spaces for sociability, 
such as coffee houses and salons in early modern Europe. The other development 
was the growth of the literary media, particularly the critical journals and moral 
weeklies, which began to appear during the late 17th and 18th centuries. These 
                                                 
4 Habermas (1990) offers four presuppositions of protecting the field of communication for 
deliberative democracy: 1) universal access, 2) reversibility of arguments, 3) entering into the 
conversation not by self-interest (without pre-decided conclusions), and 4) judging the validity of 




developments provided a center for public deliberation where citizens5 could 
interact with one another.        
 Yet this modern embodiment of “publicness” that resulted from the 
historical developments disintegrated as the early Enlightenment moved to 
industrialized modern society. Habermas (1989) finds the reasons of the 
disintegration of the public sphere came mainly from the development of the 
welfare state and industrialization of media industries. That is, the distinction 
between civil society and the state, which once had created the social space for 
the liberal bourgeois public sphere to emerge, began to disintegrate as the state 
expanded its role to the welfare of citizens. Habermas (1987) explains this 
paradoxical disintegration process with his own concept of a “colonization of the 
life world” by the system world. Similar to Weber’s criticism of modernity6, 
Habermas argues that the rapid “rationalization” process of the life world in 
contemporary society has facilitated a process of systematic rationalization and 
differentiation which becomes ironically autonomous and colonizes the life world 
(Bowring, 1996). He finds contemporary problems of democratic society from 
this colonization of the life world by the system, whereby the imperatives of 
                                                 
5 Habermas (1989) notes that the liberal bourgeois public sphere was not open to all citizens in 
practice, instead “education” and “property” were the criteria for admission.  
6 Herbst (1993) explains Weber’s criticism on rationalization as a process “in which individuals 
are increasingly drawn to means/ends thinking and action.”  “Rationalization,” she continues, “is 
manifested in the escalating importance of technical proficiency, precision, and specialization” 
(p.16).    
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systematic (instrumental) rationality dominate communicative rationality created 
by the inter-subjective transactions (see Herbst, 1993).  
 As Habermas (1989) argues, this rapid “rationalization” process of public 
opinion has been conducted mainly by two big forces during the 20th century: big 
business and big government. First, critical scholars emphasize often that the 
systematic imperatives of the industrialized and commercialized institutions, 
especially media and public opinion institutions, have been main forces of 
disintegrating the public sphere (e.g. Hallin, 1985). Historians of public opinion 
stress that the early decades of the twentieth century hosted a rapid change in the 
way public opinions are formulated, expressed and distributed. Childs (1965), for 
example, points out that the decade 1900-1910 witnessed “the end of the field of 
political writers and the beginning of a broad frontal attack on the subject by 
social scientist generally,” noting that during this period, the school of journalism 
began to study the press more scientifically as an element of public opinion, and 
also advertising agencies and marketing research began to rise (p.31). In 
journalism, the industrialization of the press was not just a professionalizing press 
whereby college-educated reporters began to work on salary, but it also was a 
transformation of the way they report: new journalism was distinguished from old 
mostly because it began to be differentiated from politics (Schudson, 1998). 
Modern mass-circulated newspapers could no more rely on parochial repertoire 
appealing only to readers of a specific political spectrum; naturally their attention 
 17
 
shifted from local audiences to a national one, seeking for more profits (Beniger 
& Herbst, 1990). Secondly, along with the increase and diversification of the role 
of governments7, the experience of the World War stimulated governments to host 
professionals who specialized in formulating public opinion (Childs, 1965). The 
development of propaganda during the war and a tremendous growth in 
governmental activity, such as the New Deal, drove governments to concern 
themselves with public opinion, especially controlling public opinion. During the 
war, psychologists and other specialists in public opinion were called upon to test 
and apply their scientific studies on soldiers (Childs, 1965). The processes of 
monopolization of communication by industries and governments intensified the 
de-politicization process whereby political action is reduced to occasional 
electoral decisions. This de-politicization process is also augmented by a welfare 
state providing bureaucratic provisions for life (Bowring, 1996).     
 As journalists, politicians and other researchers realized the significance of 
public opinions, the technology of measuring public opinion, polling and survey 
research became increasingly attractive to them (Herbst & Beniger, 1994). As 
Carey (1992) states that the “decline and dismissal of the public sphere, 
paradoxically, corresponded to the emergence of public opinion and the apparatus 
of the polling industry” (p.11), the introduction of scientific technology of 
                                                 
7 Childs (1965) argues that the regaining of political leadership by the Democratic Party was one 




measuring public opinion significantly changed the way we perceive of the 
public. Certainly the rise of the scientific surveys cannot be separated from the 
motives of big business and government: their aspirations to influence purchasing 
of goods and casting of votes, to legitimate and maintain their decisions, or to 
control certain complaints and demands was the main engine to developing this 
new technology (Beniger & Herbst, 1990).  
In scientific surveys, the definition of “the public” is a population of 
individuals, often described as residents of a geographic space, and it is 
operationalized as a certain number of samples of this larger population (Miller, 
1995). These scientific surveys and polls8 create a concrete image of 
“publicncess” with numbers (Herbst, 1993). Since the way we conceive the public 
with numbers, which is often called the aggregate model of public opinion, 
replaced the way we conceive the public with interactions, the association 
between the public and democracy has significantly changed. As many critics 
note (e.g., Carey, 1995; Gans, 2003), today the public has been replaced by the 
interest group as the key part of the political system, and democracy has reduced 
itself to a political game in which different actors compete for more media 
attention. Public opinion, in the contemporary democracy, matters only when it is 
useful as a part of this game by supporting a certain agenda of an interest group 
                                                 
8 Beniger & Herbst (1990) point out that modern survey research derived from the technological 
innovation of Morris Hansen, a statistician at the U.S. Census Bureau. Hansen’s new theory and 
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or/and attracting a large amount of audience attention. Critics often argue that in a 
sharp contrast to deliberative democracy, contemporary representative democracy 
alienates the public in the name of public opinion9. 
JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC OPINION POLLS 
 
The use of public opinion polls in the media is closely related to the rise of 
“objectivity” in American journalism. The rise of journalistic objectivity was not 
founded on a naïve idea that humans could get an absolutely neutral position in 
perceiving realities; rather, the development of journalistic objectivity has been 
based on a realization of the modern skepticism developed by Decartes, Locke, 
Hume, Compte and other modern philosophers (Streckfuss, 1990). This modern 
skepticism shows that sensory experiences do not always correspond to the 
realities of the world, and thus one cannot achieve certain knowledge of general 
truth only by sensory experiences (see Pojman, 2001). The rapid 
professionalization in journalism, in this sense, was a reaction to this realization 
of the possible errors that individual subjectivity may have. Streckfuss (1990) 
argues that reacting to this realization, the advocates of objectivity in the 1920s 
(e.g., Lippmann) proposed “the rigors of the scientific method” to journalism in 
                                                                                                                                     
method reduced the sample sizes while maintaining the same level of accuracy so that made 
economically possible following public opinion surveys by Gallup and Roper in 1935 (p.219). 
9 For detailed discusson on deliberative democracy, see J. Bohman, Public Deliberation 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1996); J. Elster, Deliberative Democracy (New York: Cambridge 
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order to compensate for the limitations of individual journalists. It is not 
accidental that journalism became closely linked to the scientific method during 
the early era of modernity; rather, science was seen as a way to provide genuine 
knowledge, to control subjectivity. As Wiebe (1967) points out, scientific 
methods provided comforting control in a number of social fields in the early 20th 
century.  
 The key characteristic of the scientific method is to employ precise, 
disciplined procedures for separating subjective values from objective facts. 
Journalistic objectivity shares this key characteristic with science in that it relies 
on a sharp distinction between objective realities and journalists’ subjective 
values. In order to minimize the intervention of one’s subjective influence in 
acquiring objective facts, both science and objective journalism rely on 
standardized procedures: that is, the rules and procedures of the institutional 
sphere substitute for individual judgments and, thus, narrow the playing field of 
individual’s subjectivity (Megill, 1994, Stoker, 1995). In a similar sense, Reese 
(1990) finds that both science and journalism share the ideology of objectivity, 
arguing that:  
Both science and journalism are empirical information-gathering activities 
that have developed learnable routines for their praticitioners. Both 
scientists and journalists are presumed to be dispassionate observers of the 
world, guided primarily by their observations…both science and 
                                                                                                                                     
Univ. press, 1998) D’entreves, Democracy as Public Deliberation (New York: Manchestor Univ. 
press, 2002).  
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journalism are guided by a positivist faith in empiricism, the belief that the 
external world can be successfully perceived and understood (pp.392-393) 
 
 Megill (1994) identifies philosophical senses of objectivity into four 
different categories: absolute objectivity that seeks universal criteria of truth; 
disciplinary objectivity in which community standards serve as a basis for judging 
truth; procedural objectivity in which procedural rules provide alternatives to 
subjective judgment; and dialectical objectivity that is created in the process of 
inter-subjective action. Among these categories, journalistic objectivity can be 
placed in the framework of procedural and disciplinary objectivity. As Zelizer 
(1993a, 1993b) indicates, journalists and scientists use shared interpretive 
frameworks, objective journalism or scientism, to establish an “objective” 
standard of judging truth. As a result, they use the process of constructing 
objective knowledge as a way of legitimating their specific way of experiences 
before their own audience (see also, Overington, 1977). The common interpretive 
framework is shared in the process of social gathering. Zelizer (1993a) argues,  
Journalists, in this view, create community through discourse that 
proliferates in informal talks, professional meetings and trade reviews, 
memoirs, interviews on talk shows, and media retrospectives. Through 
discourse, journalists create shared interpretations that make their 
professional lives meaningful; that is, they use stories about the past to 
address dilemmas that present themselves while covering news (p.84).  
 
In addition, disciplinary objectivity is invoked in the practices of training 
journalists and scientists. The academic and practical training process for 
scientists and journalists provide them with standards of how to acquire their 
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authority in claiming truth by teaching what authority they can utilize and what 
rhetorical devices they need. These regulative ideals of journalism are often 
formatted in the professional code or journalistic routines, which, in turn, act as 
substitutes for any personal judgment (Gynn, 1995).  
Some critics are concerned with these regulative practices, especially their 
heavy reliance on authoritative information sources (e.g., Cook, 1998; Friedman, 
1998; Gans, 1979; Hackett, 1984; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978). 
Journalists rely on the views and activities of the officials and other established 
information sources for acquiring the right version of truth claims on a given 
topic, assuming that those groups of people can represent the social consensus on 
the topic. The critics, however, argue that the views and activities of the officials 
and other established information sources do not necessarily reflect the consensus 
of all social members, instead they tend to show only the consensus among the 
elites and bureaucratic efficiencies. Hackett (1984) claims that journalistic 
practices of objectivity ensure that the information flows only from bureaucracies 
to the public, resulting in the exclusion of minority positions and the forgoing 
historical context around the media. Critics often link journalists’ heavy reliance 
on official information sources to their concerns with the hegemonic influence of 
journalism on the other parts of society. Hackett (1984) argues that journalistic 
routines tend to naturalize the views of the dominant by accepting and reinforcing 
the definitions of issues which are already prevailed in the current domain. Hall 
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(1985) and Tuchman (1978) also point out that objectivity in news coverage leads 
to bias in the sense that powerful sources are presented as primary information 
sources. Reese’s study of MacDougall’s case (1990) shows that when a 
journalist’s practice violates the hegemonic consensus of the journalistic 
community, his practices are distanced and marginalized from the normal 
practices of journalists to protect “normal” objective values from the violation.   
 While many critics shed light on the hegemonic influence of objective 
journalism, some critics are more concerned with the centrifugal effect of 
journalistic objectivity (e.g., Durham, 1998; Glasser, 1984; Stocker, 1995). 
Durham (1998) points out that recently journalistic objectivity has evolved to the 
concept of “impartiality”, which is by and large consonant with political 
pluralism. Some critics, including herself, argue that the journalistic practices of 
impartiality lead journalists to a subservient spectator role in serving public 
interests, while dismissing their moral and political responsibilities as citizens 
(Glasser, 1984; Stocker, 1995). As Durham (1998) notes, one of the biggest 
concerns about objective journalism is that it “stymies” the public’s inquiry on a 
truth claim at a relativist standpoint which she calls an “intellectual dead end,” 
leading to solipsistic relativism. As inter-subjectivists claim, the best version of 
truth cannot be acquired by just showing “differences” among the public, rather it 
can be produced when those “differences” are brought into the conversational 
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arena (Carey, 1989; Young, 1996). Contrasting objectivity to intersubjectivity, 
Brummet (1976) states: 
Intersubjectivity holds that the discovery of reality and the testing of it is 
never independent of people but take place through people. Yet this reality 
is found through communication between people if humanity is to escape 
solipsism. Reality is meaning yet meaning is something created and 
discovered in communication (p.30).  
   
In this intersubjectivist sense, taking journalism into only objective territory is 
disguising the roles and responsibilities journalists take and demand to take. It is a 
simple myth or an ideological imagination that the new media can deliver 
objective truth without journalists’ subjective roles and responsibilities. Christians 
et al (1993), in this sense, insist that journalism must recast objectivity in terms of 
subjective involvement so that journalists can realize their ethical responsibilities 
in producing knowledge and can passionately participate in the conversational 
arena of truth claims.   
The use of scientific polls was another important addition to the 
professional ethic of objectivity. American journalism has used polls as a tool for 
presenting public opinion since the 1820s (Crespi, 1980b; Smith, 1990, Fuse, 
2000).10 Since the birth of opinion polls, the news media have spent special effort, 
                                                 
10 Smith (1990) states that the first straw polls began to appear in the 1824 presidential election. 
He argues that the change of American party system and its nomination process influenced the 
emergence of straw polls. While these polls were not conducted nor sponsored by the press, some 
newspapers including the Carolina Observer and the Star and North Carolina Gazette reported 
and updated them regularly. Also, Tankard (1972) notes that the Pennsylvanian report on July 17, 
1824 that Jackson received more Fourth of July toasts at public meeting than any other 
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time and money to present poll results. In the 19th century, opinion polls were 
mainly conducted by ordinary citizens, and the news media simply reported the 
results. According to Fuse (2000), straw polls were initially conducted by party 
workers and other individuals, but soon later newspapers began to conduct and 
utilize them as “ideological weapons” (p. 44). Some large-scale straw polls had 
successfully predicted the winner in national elections, but the 1936 Literary 
Digest fiasco triggered severe criticism of the unscientific sampling method of 
straw polls (Crespi, 1980b; Fuse, 2000). After the 1930s, the Gallup Poll and the 
Roper Poll introduced the sampling survey, which made those syndicated research 
institutes major sources of poll data. As Fuse (2000) notes, the 1930s witnessed 
the formation of a “scientific community” of professional pollsters and academics 
whose refined techniques finally superceded unscientific straw polls. 
Since the 1960s and 1970s, as the use of polls has rapidly expanded, more 
and more news media as well as syndicated research institutes have established 
and used their own in-house organizations to gain polling data (Crespi, 1980b; 
Gollin, 1987). As the number of polls presented in the news media keeps growing, 
some advocates of opinion polls argue that opinion polls can be a crucial tool to 
bridge the gap in the American representative democratic system. Voting once 
every four years, scholars argue, cannot be a sufficient channel for laypeople’s 
participation in political decisions. Gallup and Rae (1940) point out that in the 
                                                                                                                                     
presidential candidate may be one of the earliest uses of public opinion in an “unobtrusive” way 
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contemporary representative democracy in the U.S., the only opportunity for 
citizens to participate in political decisions is by voting in elections. However, the 
votes cast not only represent people’s opinions of the candidates’ policies but also 
reflect their evaluation of the candidates’ images. Indeed, election results clearly 
do not provide the best representation of public deliberation on candidates’ 
policies and political ideologies. Gallup and Rae (1940) insist that since elections 
should never be the sole method for expressing public opinion, representative 
democracy needs a channel to link the representatives with public opinion. 
Opinion polls, at least when conducted scientifically, can offer a valuable tool to 
resolve this problem of representative democracy, especially because of their 
objectivity (Gallup & Rae, 1940; Verba, 1996). Verba (1996) emphasizes that 
other citizen-participation models of democracy cannot be fair because 
participation depends on resource, and resources are unequally distributed. But, 
scientific polls are “rigorously egalitarian” because they are designed so that each 
individual has an equal chance to express himself or herself (p. 3).  
In fact, since its birth in ancient Greece, democracy has been based on the 
fundamental belief that public determination is the best way to solve communal 
problems. However, for long as this belief has been sustained, democracy has 
been confronted with the problem of gathering and listening to people’s voices. 
Even in ancient Greece, the number of people with access to the public arena was 
                                                                                                                                     
(p.363).   
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limited, and the number of those who could express their opinions even more 
limited (Peters, 1999). In modern democracy, the news media have replaced the 
public arena as the primary source for gathering and exchanging public opinions 
on given issues.  
Advocates of opinion polls, however, note that modern democracy is in 
danger because the opinions expressed and exchanged in the news media do not 
necessarily correlate with actual public opinions.11 The intervention of the news 
media inevitably introduced new problems in gathering and communicating the 
voices of the public. For example, Lippmann (1922) argued that the news media 
in modern democracy cannot be an efficient tool for democracy because of the 
stereotypical ways individuals process information. There are also innate 
limitations of the news media, often expressed through censorship and other time 
and space constraints. For these reasons, Lippman was skeptical about the 
concepts of “public opinion” and “public determination” in modern democracy 
and believed that the power of the average citizen should be limited only to votes 
in elections. Because of the serious doubts over the capacity of the average citizen 
to engage in rational public deliberation, Lippmann advocated a turn to 
positivistic science, “not just for journalism, but for the practice of democracy as 
a whole” (Bybee, 1999, p. 32). Much like Lippmann, many advocates of opinion 
                                                 
11 See Gallup and Rae (1940) pp. 34-55, and Meyer (2002). Through the concept of “precision 
journalism,” Meyer (2002) asked journalists to develop scientific skills to obtain genuine public 
opinions under an inundation of false opinions. See also Lippmann (1922).  
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polls believe that scientific methods of gathering individual opinions can provide 
the only way to access actual public opinion and thereby realize and sustain a 
modern democracy.  
CRITICS OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLS 
 
Critics of this viewpoint express misgivings about the functionalistic 
optimism of opinion poll advocates (e.g., Blumer, 1948; Bourdieu, 1978; 
Habermas, 1989; Herbst, 1993). While the views of these critics differ in many 
ways, their views are generally premised on the idea that opinion polls cannot 
correctly measure public opinion. As Blumer (1948) contended, the formation of 
public opinion is an ongoing process of interaction in which one view responds to 
and influences other views. He emphasized that the public is not just the sum of 
discrete individuals. The formation of public opinion reflects the shifting 
composition and organization of society on given issues.12 Since people are by no 
means discrete with their pre-determined opinions, any given social arrangement 
(e.g., occupation, economic class, region, gender, political membership, family, 
etc.) plays a crucial role in determining individual opinions. Also, since everyone 
does not have equal ability to influence others in given social arrangements, we 
can hardly expect a snapshot of their opinions in a poll to show correctly the 
ongoing formation of public opinion. In a similar sense, Bourdieu (1978) also 
                                                 
12 For more details, see Blumer (1948), pp. 72-73. 
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argued that the power of one’s opinion on others varies according to one’s 
“political competence” and “class ethos” (p. 126).13 Bourdieu believed that since 
opinions are forces that keep moving in the midst of conflicting forces, “public 
opinion” as such does not exist.  
In a simplistic sense, these criticisms of opinion polls pose a challenge to 
the validity of survey methods. However, the more important implication of these 
critiques can be found in their philosophical challenge to the functional and 
realistic approach to “objectivity” represented in opinion polls. Gallup and other 
advocates of opinion polls treated public opinion as already objectified, that is, 
constituted by already existing realities before its appearance in opinion polls. In 
this view, polls by the news media or other research institutes are just tools for 
measuring these independent realities.  
Contrary to this functional and realistic approach, many critical observers 
(e.g. Bourdieu, Carey, Herbst, Lipari, etc.) viewed the investigation and 
distribution of others’ opinions as a key component in constructing public opinion 
(Glynn, Ostman, & McDonald, 1995). As the constructivist view of reality 
implies,14 people behave on the basis of their perception of context, and the 
perception of context cannot be separated from the ways of presenting the 
context. In this sense, scholars critical of polls are concerned that the ways of 
                                                 
13 Bourdieu (1978) believes that education and economic inclination are the primary conditions 
for the production of opinions.  
14 For more details, see Berger & Luckmann (1967). 
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presenting contextual realities can be the deciding component of individual 
opinion formation. For example, Noelle-Neumann’s (1984) spiral of silence 
theory suggested that the distribution of public opinion motivates or discourages 
one’s willingness to express one’s opinions. Critics do not consider opinion polls 
simply to be objective tools; instead they pay close attention to the meaning-
producing process around opinion polls. That is, critics believe that polls have 
more than a simple meaning-expression function. Noelle-Neumann and other 
media scholars have studied how the perception of public opinion influences 
one’s behaviors and attitudes. Herbst (1993) argued that the quantitative 
expression of opinion polls functions as a symbol of public opinion. Since 
numbers are easily believed to be objective, precise and scientific by the news 
media, the quantitative expression of polls leads people to believe that such polls 
are the legitimate expression of general public sentiment.  
Fuse (2000), in summarizing these critiques on opinion polls, notes the 
consequences of the domination of scientific opinion polls in four points. First, all 
activities involved in opinion polls tend to be simply equated with the definition 
of public opinion. While the aggregation model of public opinion, which 
scientific opinion polls are theoretically based on, is one of many approaches to 
defining public opinion, “opinion quantification buries various theoretical issues 
that other definitions of public opinion have engendered” (Fuse, 2000, p.113). 
Second, in the same sense, the objective assumption of public opinion polls tend 
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to suppress other types of rationality while raising instrumental rationality. Even 
though the development of scientific techniques has helped public opinion polls 
improve the degree of representation of the target population, the representation 
cannot be the only necessity when a democratic society seeks its goals. Rather, as 
Habermas and others emphasize, “communicative rationality,” which is earned in 
the deliberation process of defining and acquiring the goals, is the most 
fundamental part for democracy, but the incessant pursuit of modern society for 
efficiency tends to restrain communicative actions within the boundary of 
instrumental reason. Third, since quantitative techniques involve rigid 
categorization, public opinion polls applying these techniques tend to simplify the 
complexity of the world into a limited number of categories. As Fuse (2000) 
notes, the scheme of categorization already has a “frame of reference” so that it 
tends to legitimate the status quo (p.116). Fourth, in a related sense to the third 
problem, the domination of the statistical sense of public opinion engenders 
“unwitting biases” in that it tends to legitimate a majoritarian public opinion as 
“normal.”  Since polls are often used to indicate aggregate mass opinion or 
“average men’s opinion,” minor opinions tend to be trivialized or judged as “not 




An Outline of the Project 
The problem raised in this project is the effect of published opinion polls 
on the process of shaping public opinion. Through an empirical analysis of the 
publication of presidential approval ratings by the news media, this project aims 
to reveal the cyclical relationship between news media coverage of “public 
opinion” and public opinion itself, which this study expects to follow a spiral 
process of forming public opinion. Discussing the influence of the published 
opinion polls is not easy, and it is challenging to demonstrate it in a systematic 
and empirical way. While numerous previous studies (e.g., Bourdieu, 1972; 
Herbst, 1993; Lipari, 1999; Fuse, 2000; Igo, 2001) tackled the assumption of 
objectivity of opinion polls and effectively pointed out its causal influence in 
constructing public opinion itself, their methods were limited in qualitative and 
symptomatic readings, and their interests were more focused on opinion polls in a 
cultural domain. This study wants to replicate and generalize the argument of the 
previous studies by showing the falsity of objectivism in opinion polls in an 
empirical and systematic way. Using presidential approval poll data, this study 
expects to expand the findings of previous studies to a political domain, and so to 
show how our subjectivity in dealing with political decisions has transformed 
under the influence of the news media. It is no less important to show the falsity 
of objectivism in a political domain than in a cultural domain, particularly given 
that our decisions on politics are increasingly dominated by the efficiency/utility-
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oriented information presented by the news media (see Iyengar, 1991; Patterson, 
1994; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). In this sense, this study proposes that 
presidential approval rates are not simple records of American sentiment 
regarding presidents; instead, they are both indicators of the American public’s 
response to politics and the public’s reactions to others’ opinions. 
Given the empirical research questions, literature pertinent to this project 
is reviewed in two main sources. First, it is necessary to understand the current 
views on the formation of public opinion and the influence of the media on it. 
Second, a review of previous studies on presidential approval ratings is necessary. 
To provide an understanding of current views on journalistic objectivity and 
presidential approval ratings, Chapter Two reviews pertinent literature in 
journalism, politics and other fields. Based on theoretical discussion and previous 
literature reviews, Chapter Three introduces the main variables this study 
observes and puts the associations among those variables into the four hypotheses 
of this study. Given that this study wants to explore the relations between the 
media and public opinion in a reciprocal way, the methodological techniques in 
this study are double folded and somewhat complicated. First, to investigate the 
casual relationship of public opinion to the media, this study applies a quadratic 
regression analysis, which is often used to study a curvilinear relation between 
variables. Second, the causal association of the media to following public opinion 
 34
 
is explored through a time-series analysis. In Chapter Four, the methodological 
considerations of this study are explicated.  
Chapter Five shows the results of the empirical analysis through the 
quadratic regression analysis and the time-series analysis. The results of both 
methods will document that news reportage of public opinion is not independent 
of the formation of public opinion itself, in that it empowers or precludes certain 
attributes of the public opinion. Next, in Chapter Six, this research will synthesize 
the results of the empirical analysis and summarize the implications of those 
results in both communication-theoretical sense and sociological sense. A 
discussion will follow on which tenets journalists need to keep in order to make 





Chapter 2.  The Spiral Formation of Public Opinion: the 
Cyclical Relationship between the Media and the Public 
 
If we understand the force of public opinion, we shall not delude 
ourselves that we can be “good” citizens, completely independent 
of the pressure of public opinion. And we shall be slower to judge 
others who, at certain times and under certain circumstances, must 
come to terms with public opinion. – Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, 
The Spiral of Silence  
 
 
The Formation of Public Opinion and Media as a “Pseudo-
Environment” of Reality  
COMMUNICATION RESEARCHES ON THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION  
 
Public opinion, in any modern sense, is generally regarded as aggregated 
individual opinions. There, however, is little doubt about that public opinion is 
not a simple collection of individual opinions; instead, it is distinct from the 
statistical aggregations, as they are integrated and have significance beyond the 
level of individual opinions (Crespi, 1997). Since the integration is by no means 
possible without communication of opinions among institutions, organizations, 
and individuals, the integrating process of individual opinions into a collective 
opinion has been one of the main concerns of communication scholars since the 
birth of the discipline.  
 36
 
While the origin of public opinion research is sometimes found at the 
Chicago School of Sociology around the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
more common belief is that the formal study of public opinion and 
communication started with the Lazarsfeldian research tradition (i.e., social 
science approach) and other “founding fathers” including Harold Lasswell, Kurt 
Lewin, and Carl Hovland around the 1940s (Schramm, 1980; Peters, 1989; Fuse, 
2000). Of course, even before those “founding fathers,” there were insightful 
analysts of the process by which the public forms a collective opinion on a certain 
event, such as Walter Lippmann and John Dewey. Lippmann’s Public Opinion, 
which remains one of the most influential books in communication15, provided a 
very pessimistic view on the nature of public opinion, claiming that because of 
epistemological problems it is hardly imaginable that a rational will is formulated 
from the mess of individual opinions (Peters, 1989; Bybee, 1999). Regardless of 
Dewey’s concern with the bureaucratization and impersonalization of the newly 
emerged modern society, he was more optimistic on communicative activities and 
the formation of a collective will, while Lippmann doubted the existence of the 
public itself owing to the epistemological limits of individuals. Our access to the 
truth, according to Lippmann, is not only precluded by some external factors such 
as censorship, the limitations of social contract, the shortage of time available, but 
also by our own “pictures in our heads.” As the “pictures in our heads” often lead 
                                                 
15 Carey (1982) suggests that Public Opinion is the founding book of American media studies. 
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us to misperceive the others and the real world outside, the common will 
formulated by collective deliberation can hardly exist. Instead only existing public 
opinion is an illusory consent which is manufactured by the elites. That is to say, 
it is elite-supplied stereotypes that are most influential in shaping public opinion 
of an event. Perhaps this grave and also simplistic view of the formation of public 
opinion is a reflection of the then-current fear of the mass society and the 
simplified understanding of the effect of the mass media, so-called “the 
hypodermic needle model.”16 But, it is hard to contest the fact that his attempt to 
explain the effect of the media regarding the formation of public opinion with 
epistemological points, which influenced later developments of public opinion 
research such as agenda-setting and framing, is still insightful.       
While the earlier works of the Chicago School, Lippmann and Dewey had 
been close to a sociological approach in the understanding of public opinion, the 
later students of public opinion and communication research paid much more 
attention to psychological explanations. In fact, according to Beniger & Gusek 
(1995), the early pioneers were themselves social psychologists: Allport, 
Hovland, Katz, Lewin, Newcomb, Osgood and others were all trained in 
psychology (p.219). As they were applying psychological concepts such as 
‘attitude,’ ‘motivation,’ and ‘personality,’ the focus of understanding of the 
                                                 
16 As many communication historians have noted (cf. Delia, 1982), the evidence of for any 
pervasive belief in a ‘grand effects’ or ‘hypopdermic needle’ theory is somewhat insufficient, a 
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formation of public opinion moved from the direct of effect of the mass media to 
how an individual incorporates the information from the mass media to his/her 
own personal opinion. Locating the concept of ‘attitude,’ which is often believed 
to be more consistent and stable than other personal dispositions, the studies that 
applied a psychological approach did not document the powerful media effect on 
shaping public opinion, as the earlier critics were concerned. But still some 
psychological works provided good evidence for arguing that a personal opinion 
tends to follow group conformity, which is often called a ‘mainstreaming effect’ 
(see, Price & Oshagan, 1995).      
Perhaps the most known psychological study demonstrating social 
conformity is Solomon Asch’s studies (1952, 1956). Asch’s experiments showed 
that when asked to find the longest or shortest line among clearly varying lengths 
of lines, the subjects grouped with experimental participants tended to discard 
their own judgments and follow the participants’ agreed responses. Asch 
suggested that our tendency to avoid social isolation is the motive to lead the 
subjects to the wrong decisions. In a broader context than Asch’s experimental 
small groups, this finding is easily translated to an importance of reference groups 
in shaping one’s opinion of an event. That is, if one’s opinion on an issue is 
decided by the information available on the issue and one’s own existing attitude, 
the newly available information is not incorporated from the information source 
                                                                                                                                     
fiction created more or less by Katz and Lazarsfeld and give currency by DeFleur’s various 
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to one’s opinion; instead, the information ‘from the outside’ is processed only 
with other considerations like ‘opinions of other members of the reference group,’ 
and ‘comparison of one’s own opinion with the other opinions’. Also, as 
individual personality differs from others’, one’s status and role in incorporating 
information into a group does not equal others’ status and role That is, according 
to personal characteristics, some individuals, i.e., opinion leaders, may be more 
active in accessing news and delivering it to the others (e.g., Newcomb, 1946). 
In the studies of media effect, the findings of interpersonal influences on 
processing information led to the specification of the process by which the media 
affect individual information to “two-step flow of communication.” The idea is 
that a media message does not directly reach an individual audience; rather, it first 
reaches opinion leaders of a social group, and the leaders of the social group pass 
on the information to their followers. In Lazarsfeld’s 1940 presidential election 
study, he found that the effect of the mass media is weaker than personal 
influence in making one’s voting decision. Lazarsfeld (1948) suggested that one’s 
voting decision is mostly influenced by group norms and group pressure. A group 
tends to have “opinion leaders” who expose themselves to the mass media more 
frequently than the rest of the group does.  
As many psychological studies confirmed that one’s personality traits, 
such as neuroticism, extroversion, openness, agreeableness, and 
                                                                                                                                     
editions of Mass Communication Theory.  
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conscientiousness, are most important explanations in formulating personal 
opinion, the earlier interest in the media effect became redefined to the question 
of how the audience use the mass media for their own gratifications (Katz, 
Blumer, & Gurevitch, 1974).  
As the mainstream paradigm moved into the “limited-effect model” in 
specifying the role of the media in shaping public opinion, communication 
research came to lose its interest in the effect of the mass media and marked a 
decline in the developing communication discipline especially for the period from 
the mid-1960s to the 1970s (Beniger & Gusek, 1995). That is, while the “limited-
effect model,” including the uses and gratifications approach, brought a 
theoretical development in identifying the relationship between individual 
characteristics and the media, it has been often criticized for placing too much 
emphasis on individual differences, which makes it hard to understand the 
relationship between the public and the media beyond the individual level 
(Ruggiero, 2000). Methodologically, a problem of the psychological approach to 
public opinion is that the studies tend to focus too much on micro-level data such 
as attitude, knowledge, or behavior in explaining the shift of public opinion. One 
of the reasons of this overindulgence in those micro-level analyses is that it is 
relatively difficult to find any longitudinal data in public opinion research. As a 
result, the analysis of the long-term fluctuation of public opinion on a certain 
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issue is less often taken, and the psychological experiment is used more often for 
explaining the fluctuation (see Wu et al., 2002). 
  Since the 1970s, this mainstream paradigm has been challenged in two 
main perspectives. First, a new trend in finding the effect of the media in terms of 
cognitive changes has shifted the focus of communication research from looking 
for attitudinal/behavioral change to finding the media effect at the change in 
people’s perceptions. That is, as earlier thinkers like Lippmann and Dewey did, 
new communication researchers, including McCombs & Shaw (1972) of “agenda 
setting” research, Gerbner & Gross (1976) of “cultivation” analysis, and Noelle-
Neuman (1974) of “spiral of silence” research, attempted to explain the influence 
of the media on shaping public opinion by focusing on epistemological functions 
of the media and public opinion. Another challenge to the “limited-effect” model 
is the emergence of constructionist view of reality. As the constructionist view 
challenges the positivistic view of meaning, it suggests that meaning of the 
everyday reality is not located in the reality itself; rather the meaning is 
constructed by the process of inter-subjective interactions among social agents 
who may have different interpretations of the reality (see Burger & Luckmann, 
1967). In communication research, the introduction of the constructionist view 
brought a new way of analyzing the effect of the media: that is, instead of 
analyzing the media effect only in terms of attitudinal/behavioral changes, the 
view attempts to identify the media as a part of a social process by which a 
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meaning is defined and maintained as the dominant meaning. While the 
mainstream paradigm tended to limit the effect of the media within an 
attitudinal/behavioral change in a short period of time, communication studies in 
the constructionist view are more likely to focus on maintaining the function of 
the media in a relatively long period of time.  
The following discussion will review three theoretical perspectives, which 
are more closely related to the research hypotheses of this study, on the media’s 
effect in shaping public opinion. The three perspectives, the spiral of silence, 
agenda setting, and framing, are not equal to each other in explaining the way the 
media influence public opinion. But, they share a general view of looking at the 
media’s effect on public opinion in terms of cognitive influence and public 
opinion as a series of dynamic relation between the media and the public. This 
study suggests that each of these theoretical perspectives compensate for each 
other in explaining the multi-level dynamic of shaping public opinion.       
 
THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE: UNFINISHED PROJECT  
The Assumptions of the Spiral of Silence 
 
The basic idea of the spiral of silence is that people who believe their 
private opinions are on the majority side or are on the rise in public opinion will 
be more likely to speak out publicly, and people who perceive themselves to be in 
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the minority or in the decrease of public opinion will remain silent (Noelle-
Neumann, 1974, 1984). Given the findings of previous studies in psychological 
traditions, it is not surprising to document in the spiral of silence that one’s 
opinion on a given issue is determined not just by one’s perception of the issue 
but also by his/her perception of the other’s opinions (see, Glynn et al., 1995). 
But, the beauty of the spiral of silence is that while it attempts to explicate the 
process of shaping public opinion with some psychological concepts of explaining 
individual propensities, such as “the fear of isolation,” “outspokenness,” and 
“quasi-statistical sense” (Noelle-Neumann ,1984, p. 6.; 1977, p.145), it broadens 
its analysis to elucidate the overall process of shaping public opinion beyond the 
individual or small group level of analysis. That is to say, it is fruitful to 
document in the spiral of silence that one’s perception of the other’s opinion 
motivates one’s willingness to express his/her own opinions on a given issue, and 
so that results in the overall trend of the spiral of silence in which public opinion 
functions as “social skin” forcing the members of a society to follow “majority 
rules” (Noelle-Neumann, 1984; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). This view of public 
opinion as “social control,” in a sense, casts doubt to the modern belief of public 
opinion as a collective rational decision. That is, if public opinion, as the spiral of 
silence proposes, always has the tendency to follow the majority rule, it is hard to 
believe that a general will of the public is constructed by the rational deliberation 
process itself.  
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Since Noelle-Neumann (1974) introduced main concepts of the spiral of 
silence, a number of communication studies have tested the spiral of silence 
hypotheses with various methods including experimental designs and survey 
researches. As a meta-analysis over 20 previous survey studies on the spiral of 
silence confirmed that there exist a small but significant correlation between 
perceptions of majority opinion and one’s willingness to express his/her own 
opinion (Glynn et al., 1997), the survey studies, in general, have confirmed the 
existence of a tendency that Noelle-Neumann called a spiral of silence (e.g., 
Taylor, 1982; Glynn & McLeod, 1984a; Gonzenbach & Stevenson, 1994; 
McDonald et al, 2001). On the other hand, when its microscopic assumptions 
were tested by experimental methods, the hypothesis of the spiral silence was 
often criticized for its lack of clear explication of main concepts, its inattention to 
mediating variables, and its lack of detailed explanations from empirical evidence 
to theoretical conclusion (see, Scheufele & Moy, 2000).  
Critiques of the Spiral of Silence 
 
One of the most often criticized concepts in the spiral of silence is “the 
fear of isolation,” which Noelle-Neumann presupposed on the basis of Asch’s 
experimental evidences. For example, Glynn & McLeod (1984b) pointed out that 
“the fear of isolation is set forth in too simple and sovereign a fashion” (p. 60), 
and also suggested to treat it as a variable rather than as a constant. Salmon & 
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Kline (1984) argued that there is a “conceptual leap” in the idea of the fear of 
isolation from small group face-to-face condition, from which the principal 
assumptions of the spiral of silence came, to a public opinion setting, to which the 
theory is applied. In fact, some researchers have questioned through empirical 
studies whether “the fear of isolation” is the single most important motive for the 
spiral of silence. Lasorsa (1991), for instance, showed through his survey research 
that, in addition to one’s perception of the climate of opinion, other factors such 
as demographic characteristics, political interests, the obtrusiveness of issues, the 
extent of media use, and the certainty of one’s own views are significant 
indicators of explaining the level of one’s outspokenness. Similarly, Salmon and 
Neuwirth (1990) found that knowledge of the issue and personal concern about 
the issue are also significant factors in determining one’s willingness to speak out 
in public. Also, Oshagan (1996) found that when the opinion of a reference group 
is not consonant with the social majority opinion and both are equally apparent, 
the opinion of reference group tends to become a more important influence. These 
studies, in general, can be summarized into two questions regarding the theory of 
spiral of silence: first, if there could be more variables, in addition to the fear of 
isolation, influencing one’s willingness to express his/her opinion, such as one’s 
social/demographical characteristics, the nature of the issue, and the issue’s 
salience to the public (Jeffres et al., 1999); second, the spiral of silence puts its 
basis on the earlier studies on the impact of reference groups and other dynamics 
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in small group situations, whether the dynamics of small group situations (i.e., the 
fear of isolation) could be applied to public opinion situations without additional 
considerations (Price & Allen, 1990; Scheufele & Moy, 2000).  
Another important question to the theory of the spiral of silence is on its 
assumption of a “quasi-statistical” sense of people. One assumption of the spiral 
of silence is that individuals constantly scan their environment in order to assess 
the climate of opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1977; Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Noelle-
Neumann (1977) describes: 
In order to avoid becoming isolated and in order not to lose popularity and 
esteem, people constantly observe their environment very closely. They 
try to find out which opinions and modes of behavior are prevalent, and 
which opinions and modes of behavior are popular. They behave and 
express themselves accordingly in public (p.144).   
 
That is to say, people’s quasi-statistical sense is assumed as a constant rather than 
a variable in Noelle-Neumann’s theory. However, given that the world consists of 
innumerable series of events in incessantly changing social contexts, and we have 
varying degrees of concerns on those events and issues, it is very unlikely that we 
have a constant ability of monitoring others’ opinions with a certain degree of 
statistical confidence across difference events and issues. While Noelle-Neumann, 
in her later revision (1993), explains that the “quasi-statistical sense” is 
maintained by two main sources: perceptions of reality through the mass media, 
and interpersonal communication and observation, her analysis of the spiral 
process hardly explicates how individuals get their perception of the reality and 
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especially how their perception is related to the mass media. In fact, Noelle-
Neumann tends to oversimplify media contexts across different agendas and 
different social contexts (at least, not in a German context), proposing that when 
individuals look to the media for the opinion environment, they encounter a 
consonant representation of the reality in the media. Consequently, how 
individuals acquire information to develop their perceptions of the climate of 
opinion has been less explored in the literature of the spiral of silence (Rimmer & 
Howard, 1990).  
Noelle-Neuman posits that since people in modern society perceive public 
opinion through the media of mass communication, the media can serve as the 
principal force for the social pressure of conformity (Price & Allen, 1990). While 
not many previous studies had explored the relationship between the media and 
individual opinions, a few studies which explored the relationship found that the 
relationship is not so much direct and simple, as Noelle-Neumann implied earlier. 
While some studies confirmed that our perceptions of the climate of opinion are 
formed under the influence of the media (e.g., Eveland et al., 1995), many studies 
confirmed that the influence of the media on our perceptions of the climate of 
opinion is no more direct and powerful, at least in terms of accuracy, than other 
factors such as our personal “conviction” (Gonzenbach & Stevenson, 1994; 
Rimmer & Howard, 1990). While these findings are not entirely consistent with 
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Noelle-Neumann’s expectations (Rimmer & Howard, 1990), earlier works of 
psychology do well to justify these findings.  
Earlier psychological studies suggested that our statistical sense in 
perceiving other’s opinions is not likely to be accurate in that it is so vulnerable to 
simple heuristic information and our own biases (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Fields & Schuman, 1976; see, Kennamer, 
1990). One of the better-known explanations is the “looking glass perception” 
hypothesis: which suggests that individuals tend to project their own opinion onto 
the others so that they overestimate the support to their opinion and underestimate 
other competing opinions (Fields & Schuman, 1976). Another important 
explanation is the impact of heuristics on our ability to perceive reality accurately, 
which develops to “framing” studies later. Kahneman and Tversky, who are 
arguably the most important contributors in cognitive psychology, documented in 
their experimental works that our statistical sense can be easily led to non-rational 
conclusions when the information is provided with a simple heuristic cue 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1980).    
In sum, while the basic idea of the spiral of silence has been confirmed in 
a good number of studies showing that our perception of others’ opinions is 
influential in forming our own opinion on a given issue, there are a lot of 
questions left unanswered on how this individual tendency is aggregated and so 
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resulted in the macro social process of the spiral of silence. Even though we may 
suspect that the mass media play an important function in replicating the 
individual tendency into the public tendency, there have been only a limited 
number of studies, and the findings of the previous studies have provided mixed 
conclusions on the relationship. Given those mixed findings, Glynn & McLeod 
(1985) and Rimmer & Howard (1990) even concluded that the spiral of silence is 
only an issue-specific tendency. Given those inconsistent findings, it is hard to 
generalize the relation between the media and one’s accurate perception and 
expression of opinions. But the finding of Rimmer & Howard’s study (1990) is 
still noteworthy: Even though one’s use of the media is not much related to the 
accuracy of one’s perception of others’ opinions, the degree of salience one feels 
on a given issue is a powerful predictor of expression. That is, the result implies 
that, if the media have any significant influence on the process of the spiral of 
silence, the impact would not be making the climate of opinion more accurate or 
clearer; instead, there is something else that the media function in the process of 
the spiral of silence. Here, two important approaches to the media effect may help 
explain how the media affect one’s perception of the climate of opinion: agenda-






AGENDA-SETTING: CHANGING SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE PUBLIC 
Basic Idea of Agenda-Setting 
 
 Agenda-setting studies have approached the study of the media effect in a 
whole new way. As Cohen (1963) argued, although “it [the media] may not be 
successful much of the time in telling what to think, it is stunningly successful in 
telling its readers what to think about” (p.13), agenda-setting studies have 
attempted to measure the media effect in terms of people’s changing susceptibility 
to a certain agenda, instead of people’s changing opinion. That is, unlike Noelle-
Neumann’s conceptualization of the spiral of silence (where she believes that we 
are constantly observing the climate of opinion), agenda-setting studies assume 
that a society consists of innumerable issues and that our ability to concern with 
those issues is limited to a certain degree; that means, agenda-setting is a “zero-
sum game” where we have a varying degree of susceptibility to a certain agenda, 
and a new agenda must suppress another agenda to come to attention (Dearing & 
Rogers, 1992).  
The Chapel Hill study (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) was one of the earliest 
works that empirically tested the media agenda-public agenda relationship. In 
their study, McCombs & Shaw explored the role of mass media in the 1968 
presidential campaign in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Their hypothesis is 
succinctly summarized: “while the mass media may have little influence on the 
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direction or intensity of attitudes, it is hypothesized that the mass media set the 
agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward 
the political issues” (p.18). Combining two quantitative methods—content 
analysis of the media coverage and survey interviews of 100 undecided voters—, 
McCombs and Shaw found that there is a very strong relationship between the 
campaign issues emphasized by the media and the judgment of voters as to the 
salience and importance of various campaign issues.  
 As Dearing and Rogers (1992) described later, the real contribution of this 
study is in laying out the agenda-setting hypothesis, in calling the media-public 
agenda relationship “agenda-setting,” and in suggesting a paradigm for further 
research. Later more than 200 studies have not only confirmed the agenda-setting 
effect that McCombs and Shaw’s study (1972) implied, but also conceptually 
detailed the way the media influence the public perception of a certain issue 
(Dearing & Rogers, 1992). For example, Iyengar & Kinder (1982)’s study with 
experimental methods found that subjects who are exposed to the news media 
coverage of the US defense not only changed their perception of the importance 
of the issue, but also altered their evaluation of President Carter’s performance in 
office. That is, as the media salience of the US defense is transferred to the 
subject’s perceived importance of the agenda, the agenda also has a priming 
influence on the subject’s perception, becoming a more important criterion for 
evaluating the President.  
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 Since McCombs and Shaw’s seminal Chapel Hill study (1972), one of the 
most important questions for mass communication scholars has been “who sets 
the media agenda?” That is, information sources’ influences on media content 
have been an important question in agenda-setting studies (Gandy, 1982). 
Researchers have explored the influence of a variety of the information sources on 
the media agenda, including advertisers, public relations agents, the President, 
wire services, other media and government officials (e.g., Gilberg et al., 1980; 
Reese & Danielian, 1989; Turk, 1986). For example, Turk’s research (1986) 
documented that more than half of the public information officers’ (PIO) 
information handouts in a local government were used in local newspapers, 
arguing that governmental PIO, as an official information source, 
straightforwardly affects the agenda of the media.   
However, one problem with these studies is that while they attempted to 
define the influence of these information sources on the media agenda in terms of 
the effect of “information subsidy,” these studies tended to oversimplify the 
process of deciding media agenda into a one-way procedure from “information 
sources” through the media to the public. As Gandy (1982)’s definition of the 
“information subsidy” as “an attempt to produce influence over the actions of 
others by controlling their access to and use of information relevant to those 
actions” (p.61) shows, these studies on the effect of “information subsidy” only 
documented the power of formal institutions over journalists by controlling 
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available information. While it is hard to contest that journalists are, to some 
extent, influenced by these social institutions, it is not very persuasive to argue 
that the media’s agenda is mainly decided by those information subsidies, given 
that deciding the media agenda takes a much more complex process where the 
professional value of journalists in the media and social conditions outside the 
media simultaneously affect the media agenda (see, Gans, 1979; Shoemaker & 
Reese, 1996)17. Considering that journalists are not simple machinery controlled 
by other social institutions, we need a more expanded exploration of how the 
media agenda is decided not simply in terms of being controlled by “information 
subsidies” but in terms of the changing susceptibility of journalists.  
In this sense, Smith (1987)’s cyclical approach to the relationship between 
the media agenda and the public agenda needs to be noted. Smith (1987) suggests 
that media coverage of an agenda influences public concern, and the public, in 
turn, influence the media coverage; that is, feedback loops, as a part of a general 
social system, exist between media coverage and public concern over time. 
According to her analysis, the cross correlation of some agendas—education, 
economic development, crime—indicates that the media agenda and the public 
agenda mutually influence each other, and more importantly Smith’s Granger 
causality tests show that the lagged value of each other (media agenda and public 
                                                 
17 Gans (1979) comments on the relationship between the media and information sources, stating 
that “although it takes two to tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, 
sources do the leading” (p.116).  
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agenda) adds to the variance accounted for the past histories. That is, interestingly, 
the mutual influence between the media agenda and the public agenda tends to 
result in the “amplification” or “control” of some agendas. While the study has 
some methodological limitations, the findings of her analysis have a great 
implication not just for the agenda-setting theory but also for the spiral of silence 
theory. Even though the fact that the susceptibility of both journalists and the 
public to a certain agenda is changing under the influence of each other does not 
tell whether there is any proportional shift in opinion majority/minority in 
accordance with the changing susceptibility, it is still imaginable that the 
increased susceptibility of both the media and the public is a key element in the 
overall process of the spiral of silence, given that our concern on a certain agenda 
is varying over time, not only in terms of the degrees of susceptibility but also in 
terms of attributes. Recent theoretical developments, second-level agenda setting 
and framing studies, document that our concern on a certain issue is greatly 
influenced by the media and the media cue us how to think about the issue. 
Second Level Agenda-Setting 
 
The theoretical development of second-level agenda setting has provided 
researchers a refined way to explore the media-public relationships. In addition to 
its original argument of the transfer of issue salience, recent agenda setting 
research suggests that attributes shift salience to “the sets of perspectives or 
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frames that journalists and the public employ to think about each object” 
(Ghanem, 1997, p.5). In other words, the second level of agenda setting suggests 
that the media affect the public’s how-to-think-about an issue, as well as what to 
think about an issue (Ghanem, 1997).  
In the second-level agenda-setting research, the conceptualization of 
‘attributes,’ which is the unit of observation in the second-level agenda-setting 
study, has continuously evolved, and is still developing. Generally, the concept of 
‘attributes’ refers to the ‘characteristics and properties’ of objects, which are 
issues, events, candidates, etc. (McCombs & Ghanem, 1998). In the early thought 
of attribute agenda-setting studies, ‘attributes’ were mostly conceptualized as the 
‘sub-topics’ of an issue. Becker and McCombs (1978) treated the concept of 
‘attributes’ as specific information about political candidates, such as ‘geographic 
origins,’ ‘occupations,’ or ‘issue stands’ of the candidates. In Takeshita and 
Mikami’s current study (1995), ‘attributes’ were conceptualized as ‘sub-issues,’ 
such as ‘political reform issues,’ and ‘system-related issues.’ In the meantime, 
some researchers recently began to conceive of ‘attributes’ as multi-dimensional 
concepts. Some scholars maintained that media-image agenda-setting effects 
work along two dimensions: affective and substantive dimensions. Lopez-Escobar 
et al. (1997, 1998) divided the concept of ‘attributes’ into the ‘affective 
dimension,’ which refers to emotional images of political candidates (e.g., 
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positive, negative, or neutral), and the ‘substantive dimension,’ which refers to 
specific information about political candidates. 
Ghanem (1997) further divided the concept of ‘attributes’ into four 
dimensions: subtopics—information attributes within a particular issue; framing 
mechanisms—the ways of presentation such as size and placement; affective 
elements—the public’s emotional responses to media coverage; and cognitive 
elements—categories on whether the media and audience are thinking the same 
way. Takeshita (1997) defined the concept of ‘attributes’ in four dimensions with 
a different perspective. He defined ‘attributed agenda’ as: (1) ‘problem 
definition,’ which refers to “accounts of what a causal agent is doing with what 
effect”; (2) ‘attributed causes,’ which means “specifying the forces that create the 
problem”; (3) ‘moral judgment or evaluation,’ which means “evaluations about 
causal agents and their effects”; and (4) ‘proposed remedies,’ which refers to 
“presentation of solutions to the problem” (p.25). McCombs and Ghanem (1998) 
synthesized the concept of ‘attributes.’ In their discussion of the range of 
‘attributes,’ they, at first, separated the “attributes of presentations,” which refer 
to rhetorical mechanisms, and “attributes of objects,” which refer to the selection 
of attributes. Next, they provided two attributes dimensions for “attribute of 
objects”—cognitive attributes and affective attributes. Through these previous 
discussions, generally the attributes on news content are summarized by the two 
dimensions of ‘substantial or cognitive’ and ‘affective.’ 
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The second-level agenda setting theory has been empirically demonstrated 
in various settings. King (1997) conducted a study about candidate images and 
voter perception during the 1994 Taipei mayoral election. The survey results 
showed that Taipei voters consider “ability” the most salient attribute for the three 
candidates. Voters’ evaluation scores of candidates in terms of ability worked as a 
good predictor of the election outcome. His study supports that salient candidate 
attributes in the press came to be salient elements in the perceived images of the 
voters. From the perspective of the stimulus-determined thesis, it appears that the 
media determined which attributes the voters thought about when they thought of 
a particular candidate. In the Japanese general election, Takeshita and Mikami 
(1995) showed that the media’s emphasis on particular sub-issues of political 
reform affects the public’s perception of the importance of that same sub-issue. In 
the Spanish regional and municipal elections, Lopez-Escobar et al. (1997) showed 
that news and political advertisements’ emphases on certain images of the 
political candidates affect voters’ images of the candidates in two different 
dimensions: substantive and affective attributes. Ghanem (1996) found the second 
level of agenda-setting effect in more detailed attribute dimensions. She showed 
that Texas media coverage of crime influenced public concern over crime in the 
attribute dimensions of ‘sub-topics,’ ‘framing mechanisms,’ ‘affective elements,’ 
and ‘cognitive elements.’  
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In sum, given that every agenda consists of multiple attibutes, these 
studies on attibutes imply that media emphasis on a certain attibute of an agenda 
tends to be causally associated with the increased susceptiblity of the public to the 
attibute. In this sense, journalist’s practices of emphasizing or marginalizing  a 
certain attribute of an agenda is enormously important in setting how the public 
perceives the agenda cognitively and affectively. Recently, an increasingly large 
number of studies are focusing on those practices of emphasis and the 
marginalization of a certain attribute of an issue and the cognitive and affective 




When Goffman (1974) first introduced the concept of “primary 
frameworks,” his point was that people tend to perceive events (realities) through 
primary frames, which make social interaction more likely. Borrowing Goffman’s 
primary conceptualization, a wide range of communication scholars, from 
cognitive psychological schools to critical constructionists’ perspectives, used 
framing to observe practices of journalism with awareness of a duality of 
everyday reality and textual rearrangement of the reality. Framing has become 
one of the most fashionable terms. Furthermore, the term has been widely used 
for describing not only the influence of news media on public opinions but also 
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the overall process of mass communication itself. This increasing popularity of 
framing perspective is in no way limited to media research, instead the concept 
has gained flourishing trendiness among a wide range of fields, including 
sociology and political science, since the 1980s (Benford, 1997). While the 
perspective has made significant contributions to each of those fields (Benford, 
1997; Benford & Snow, 2000; Reese, 2001), the “scattered conceptualization” of 
framing (Entman, 1993) has been noted as a predicament for attracting generative 
academic discussions (Scheufele, 1999).  
As Entman (1993) noted earlier that the lack of disciplinary status of 
communication may turn to a strength of synthesizing the concept’s fragmented 
applications, communication scholars have continuously been attracted to the 
challenging goal of integrating a wide range of framing studies in regard to mass 
media (e.g. Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999). As the previous efforts noted (e.g. 
Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Benford, 1997), the applications of the concept in media 
studies are categorized in two different approaches: the cognitive (media-centric) 
approach and the constructive approach18. While constructionists’ approaches 
have highlighted the process of meaning construction through various social 
                                                 
18 Benford (1997) notes that “the ambiguity of the framing concepts stems in part from the fact 
that “frame” has two different implications as a metaphor. On the one hand, it is used as a 
grammar—“a structure in which meaning is contained in and conveyed by the relationships among 
the elements.” On the other hand, frame metaphors are used in a contextual or idenxical sense. 




interactions around mass media, cognitive approaches mainly have focused on the 
relation between media content and audience interpretations.    
Given the recent increasing number of framing studies, it is surprising to 
find that there have been few attempts to explore framing perspective in the 
broader context of the paradigm of sociology or communication studies. In fact, 
as Benford (1997) argues, framing perspectives emerged as some scholars 
challenged previous rational choice perspectives and structural determinism:   
Scholars operating within the source mobilization and rational choice perspectives 
ruled hegemonically. However, in the 1980s, a spate of reviews critical of 
structural determinism and crass utilitarianism began to appear, thereby providing 
an opening in the field’s opportunity structure for those interested in movement-
reality construction and communication processes (Benford, 1997, p.409). 
Rational choice perspectives assume that people are rational and base their 
actions on what they perceive to be the most effective means to achieving their 
goals. While rational choice perspectives or structural determinism lead to 
unrealistic dominance of structure over human agency or vice versa, symbolic 
interactionism, which the concept of framing stems from, views meanings as 
social products created from the interactions between structural forces and 
individual interpretations (Gamson, 1992; see Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 
2000, p.614). As Gamson (1992) points out that “on the one hand, events and 
experiences are framed; on the other hand, we frame events and experiences” 
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(p.384). Framing perspectives stress the interactive meaning constructions 
between structural forces and audience agency.  
 On the other hand, the concept of framing is located in the broad context 
of the media effect paradigm in communication studies (see Scheufele, 1999, 
pp.104-105). Following previous propaganda, strong media effects, limited effects, 
and new strong media effects paradigms, the framing became a recent fashion of 
media effect paradigms finding media effect in their devices to restrict audience’s 
cognitive ability (Scheufele, 1999). Pan & Kosicki (1993) point out that; 
Framing analysis is not constrained within the content-free structuralist 
approach of news discourse. Rather, it accepts both the assumption of the 
rule-governed nature of text formation and the multi-dimensional 
conception of news texts that will allow for cognitive shortcuts in both 
news production and consumption (p. 58). 
 
The concept of framing has implications not only of elaborating previous 
mythical belief in media effects of changing audience’s attitude and behavior by 
turning focus on cognitive process; but also of challenging previous reckless 
overemphasis on the active interpretation by the audience. Confronting “active 
audience” or “uses & gratifications” perspectives, which argue that individuals 
can construct their own meanings from media messages or other cultural products, 
(see Seaman, 1992), framing concept tends to elucidate the cognitive limits of 
“active audience.”  
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Defining Framing: Two Approaches of Framing 
 
According to Shoemaker & Reese (1996), most communication research 
deals with the process through which the audience receives media content or with 
the effect of content on the audience (Fig. 1). They name research on the first part 
of this process “content influence studies” and research on the latter part “process 


















Process and Effects Studies Content Influence Studies
Effects of 
mass media 
on people and 
society 
In general, the concept of framing describes a line of relations from everyday 
realities through media to public perceptions. While both approaches—cognitive 
(media-centric) approaches and constructionist approaches—include this overall 
relation from realties through media to audience, they vary in presenting the 
concept of framing as research problems according to their primary interests. 
First, cognitive approaches put their initial interests in the relation between media 
and audience, thus concentrate on analyzing media texts as psychological stimuli, 
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which restricts the audience’s interpretations of the texts. Unlike cognitive 
approaches, constructionist approaches attempt to shed light on the social 
interactive process from reality to media, thus analyzing media texts as the 
consequences of interactions among social institutions. In Shoemaker & Reese’s 
study, cognitive approaches apply the concept of framing for “process and effects 
studies” and constructionist approaches mainly use the concept for “content 
influence studies.” 
Constructionists Approaches 
Constructionist approaches argue that meanings stem from social 
interactions and are subject to various interpretations. For constructionists, 
meaning itself is problematic; “it does not spring from the object of attention into 
the actor’s head, because objects have no meaning. Rather meaning is negotiated, 
contested, modified, articulated, and rearticulated. In short, meaning is socially 
constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed” (Benford, 1997, p.410). In this 
sense, constructionists attempt to explore the process in which a specific meaning 
is created from social interactions through the concept of framing.  
While constructionist views of framing include and presuppose a certain 
pattern of individual audience’s mental processing of media contents, they tend to 
differentiate their concept of the collective action frame from the cognitive 
concept of “schemata ” (e.g., Gamson et. al., 1992; Benford, 1997; Benford & 
Snow, 2000). For example, Gamson (1992) argues that the collective action frame 
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is distinguished from other cognitive concepts in that “[c]ollective action frames 
are not merely aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but also the 
outcome of negotiating shared meaning” (p.111). That is, constructionists 
highlight that the social implication of a frame is not just a consequence of a 
cognitive restriction of an individual level, which cognitive approach emphasizes, 
but also it is the result of a negotiation in social collectivities. Thus, in 
constructionist approaches, the media become “general audience media” (Gamson 
& Modigliani, 1989): a site in which symbolic competitions over the definition 
and construction of social reality carry out among contesting social forces of 
meaning (Gamson et. al., 1992). For example, in their study of media discourse on 
nuclear power, Gamson & Modigliani (1989) suppose that media discourse on 
nuclear power has included the competing discourses of specialists, officials, and 
challengers. As the consequence of the competitions among those social 
discourses, Gamson & Modigliani (1989) insist, media discourse has turned to “a 
set of interpretive packages,” or a frame, that gives a certain meaning to the issue 
of nuclear power.  
The primary tasks of collective action frames—the constructionist concept 
of frames—include problem identifications and direction of attribution (Benford 
& Snow, 2000). First, collective action frames attempt to identify which condition 
or situation is problematic or in need of change. Gamson (1992) calls this core 
task the injustice component, which refers to “the moral indignation expressed in 
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this form of political consciousness” (p.7). The second task is to make attributions 
regarding who or what is responsible for social problems. Iyengar’s experimental 
study on television news (1991) soundly documents this attribution task of frames 
in spite of its overall cognitive approach to frames. His experiments show that 
people who are exposed to episodic framed news stories are more likely to 
consider individuals responsible for various social problems, including 
unemployment and poverty, while people who are exposed to thematically framed 
news stories are more likely to attribute the cause and the solutions to social 
institutions and government policies beyond the individual’s responsibility.  
While the approaches appropriately focus on “content influence” process, 
they have not suggested any empirical explanation of the process through which 
media content directly or indirectly restricts audience perception of social realities. 
In addition, the approaches tend to overlook the significance of  journalists’ 
practices and activities by supposing media content as the consequence of 
interaction among other social discourses. Compared to this constructionist 
approaches, research in cognitive approaches are more likely to concentrate on the 
empirical process through which media content restricts audience’s psychological 
reception and emphasize the implication of journalists’ professional practices of 
inclusion and exclusion (Durham, 1998).     
 66
 
Cognitive (Media-Centric) Approaches 
Contrary to Pan & Kosicki’s (1993) assessment of framing analysis that 
“unlike the traditional approach to content analysis, framing analysis does not 
conceive news texts as psychological stimuli with objectively identifiable 
meanings; rather, it views news texts as consisting of organized symbolic devices 
that will interact with individual agents’ memory for meaning construction” (p. 
58), much research in framing studies rests on the simple equation of media texts 
with psychological stimuli, which leads to a certain pattern of audience response.   
Entman (1993) provides a famous definition of framing as following: 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (p.52). 
 
That is, framing is a set of journalists’ practices of selecting and emphasizing a 
certain part of social reality in order to promote public opinion in a specific way. 
Similarly to Entman’s definition, Gitlin (1980) proposes the concept of frames as 
“persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, 
emphasis, exclusion, by which journalists routinely organize discourse, whether 
verbal or visual” (p.7). Cognitive approaches propose that these frames work at 
two levels: as rhetorical devices and as mentally storied principles for information 
processing (Entman, 1991; Thorton & Shah, 1996). First, at the rhetorical level 
(textual level), “news frames are constructed from and embodied in the keywords, 
metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images emphasized in a news narrative” 
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(Entman, 1991, p.7). Second, the mental string process can be explained as 
“schema”, i.e., an understanding of the reality guides the audience’s interpretation 
of initial information and their processing of all related information (Entman, 
1991). More specifically, cognitive approaches explicate “schema” through the 
mental process of activating previous knowledge in the interpreters’ memory. 
That is, news texts, which are constructed from journalists’ practices of selection 
and emphasis, activate only a restricted range of working memory; thus leading to 
a mental picture or discourse of actors, events, settings and consequences 
(Iyengar. 1991; Rhee. 1997).   
 Many studies using this cognitive concept of framing rest their theoretical 
ground on Tversky & Kahneman’s empirical study (1980). In their experiment, 
Tversky & Kahenman (1980) demonstrated that a slight descriptive variation 
could lead to a significant change in participants’ evaluation of a phenomenon.19 
That is, the descriptive variation calls interpreters’ attention to particular aspects 
of the reality and activate a specific set of previous knowledge related to the 
reality (Entman, 1993). Based on this theoretical conceptualization, many studies 
applying the cognitive concept of framing tend to highlight journalists’ work of 
selection, emphasis, and description as the primary source of frame at the expense 
of questions on the relation between media and other social institutions as 
                                                 
19 For example, when Tversky & Kahneman (1980) ask participants to choose a US policy to 
save people, their responses significantly vary according to a way of describing the efficacy of the 
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meaning producers (e.g. Iyengar, 1991; Entman, 1991; Entman, & Rojecki, 1993; 
Solomon, 1992; Rhee, 1997; Liebes, 2000). For example, Entman & Rojecki 
(1993) argue in their analysis of media framing of the U.S. anti-nuclear movement 
as following:  
[w]e find that several kinds of judgments apparently made by journalists 
that filter into the news and, in turn, likely affect the movement’s ability to 
build consensus and mobilize participation. These we call journalists’ 
framing judgments, which journalists make in the course of selecting and 
conveying information about the movement. The judgments, we believe, 
are heavily influenced by elite sources and, it appears, by an underlying 
professional ideology ambivalent toward public participation (p.155). 
    
Following this logic, many studies in the cognitive approaches attempt to 
find the normative implications from problematizing journalists’ practices, which 
are embedded in journalists’ professional routines20. Cognitive approaches, which 
look news media as journalists’ meaning production, often create the somewhat 
simplified21 notion of media hegemony, which refers to the process of producing 
dominant power through media (Durham, 2001). For example, based on his 
definition, Gitlin (1980), in his analysis of mainstream news coverage of the New 
Left and the student movement of the 1960s, illuminates the frame as the site 
where dominant social power is produced. His analysis shows that media frames 
                                                                                                                                     
policy: “200 people will be saved” among 600 people (72% favor) or “400 people will die” among 
600 people (22% favor).  
20 In his comparative study, Entman (1991) problematize the role of journalists as “judging 
elites” and points out that “when newsmaking elites offer scant challenge to a dominant frame, an 
authorized position tends to permeate the news texts” (p.24).  
21 Their notion of hegemony is, to some extent, oversimplified in that they often simply identify 
journalists with ruling class.   
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in covering Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) trivialize, marginalize and 
polarize the effectiveness of SDS and emphasize the negative facet of the 
movement. Hallin (1986) also shows that the media coverage functioned to 
establish the order of the Cold War through the exclusion of alternative voices 
from Central America in his study of the media coverage of Central America in 
the 1980s.   
 
In summation, framing has been a useful tool for communication 
researchers to observe the practices of journalism and the influence of the 
practices on audience’s perception of the world within the duality of everyday 
reality and the textual rearrangement of reality. Both constructionist and cognitive 
approaches to framing share the same concern that our perception, whether it is 
individual or collective, of reality does not always follow a rational model; that is, 
a slight modification in presenting a reality may result in a significantly irrational 
conclusion in shaping our opinion on the given reality. While the cognitive 
approach emphasizes irrationality as a limit of individual cognitive ability , the 
constructionist approach argues that this irrationality is a result of the interactions 
among various social groups.    
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 Polls and Presidential Popularity  
 
 Since the beginning of modern polling in 1935, the news media have 
always paid more attention to political polls than other polling topics. While 
human interest topics and others have been increasingly polled, the great success 
of the Gallup Poll and other polling agencies could be achieved only through 
election-related questions (Crespi, 1980a). Given that American politics cycles 
every four years with the presidential election, it was necessary for the polling 
agencies to come up with political questions to fill the non-election years in 
between. Since the Gallup Poll first asked the presidential approval question in 
July 1939, this question became more frequent and soon one of the most 
important topics for the polling agencies to measure regularly (Crespi, 1980a)22. 
As the presidential performance poll was conducted more frequently, its political 
importance became so significant that even some scholars call it “a part of 
America’s unwritten constitution” (de Sola Pool, 1980, p.48) or “the perpetual 
election” (Hodgson, 1980, p.220). The importance of the presidential performance 
polls can be noted in three specific senses: first, evaluations of presidential 
performance influence voters choices in both presidential and congressional 
elections; second, approving ratings influence the behavior of presidents such as 
                                                 
22 According to Crespi (1980a), the frequency increased since the first poll and questions about 
presidential approval became a regular feature of the Gallup Poll in 1951 (p.30).  
 71
 
boldness of legislative agenda or decisions to use military force; and finally, the 
rating number is used as a rhetorical device for persuading other political actors 
(Simon & Ostrom, 1989; Baker & Oneal, 2001).    
From the early era of president approval polls, social scientists noted that 
public assessment of the president is not so directly affected by the president’s 
acts as by other symbolic events the public experienced, or, as Lippmann (1922) 
described them, the “pictures in our heads” (e.g., Mueller, 1970, 1973; Brody & 
Page, 1976; MacKuen, 1983). Mueller (1970, 1973) first described the symbolic 
events affecting presidential popularity as “rally events,” measuring the 
relationship between international events involving the U.S. and the variance of 
presidential ratings. Mueller (1973), more specifically, developed four variables 
in an attempt to predict presidential approval ratings: the four variables were “ the 
length of time the incumbent has been in office as well as variables that attempt to 
estimate the influence on his rating of major international events, economic 
slump, and war” (p.197). He, in this seminal study, identifies a couple of 
important trends in tracing the fluctuation of presidential popularity : “coalition of 
minorities” and “rally around the flag.” First, “coalition of minorities” represents 
a trend in which those who are alienated by presidential action on given issues 
would accumulate over presidential incumbency so that presidential popularity 
tends to move down by the disapproval of those minorities over the presidential 
term. Second, “rally around the flag” is defined as a trend in which crises in 
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international politics tend to promote public support for the president. Mueller 
(1993) explains that “ in general, a rally point must be associated with an event 
which (1) is international and (2) involves the United States and particularly the 
president directly, and it must be (3) specific, dramatic, and sharply focused” 
(p.209). Mueller argues that the combination of these trends, “coalition of 
minorities” and “rally around the flag,” creates a steady decline in popularity over 
long period of time, which is often interrupted by a rapid rise of popularity 
created by international crisis.  
Many relevant studies followed Mueller (e.g., Kernell, 1978; Brody & 
Shapiro, 1989, 1991; Parker, 1995; Baker & Oneal, 2001; Gronke & Brenhm, 
2002) and confirmed that some dramatic international events directly involving 
the U.S. have an effect of uniting the nation as a whole, and so boost presidential 
popularity for a relatively short period of time. As Baker and Oneal (2001) 
described, the nature and origin of the rally effect has been studied in two 
different theoretical approaches. The first approach is what Brody (1991) called 
the “patriotism” explanation: in times of international crisis, the public “focus 
uncritically on and unite behind the commander-in-chief in a show of patriotic 
support” (Baker & Oneal, 2001, p.667). The second approach is so called the 
“opinion leadership” explanation: in times of crisis, the public is unable to access 
various information sources, which were available in normal times, to make 
judgment, and the president can enjoy more information access that other political 
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actors are denied.  Showing the rally effect, previous studies showed more 
interest in analyzing the influence of wars, among many international events, 
involving the U.S. and the number of casualties during the wars on the ratings.23 
In analyzing the impact of rally events, Brody & Page (1975), Simon & Ostrom 
(1989), and Baker & Oneal (2001) found that news media coverage of the rally 
events is one of the significant factors influencing the variance of rally effects on 
presidential popularity. For example, Baker & Oneal (2001), in their analysis of 
the New York Times, showed that when a MID (Militarized Interstate Dispute) is 
reported in a New York Times front page headline (i.e., presumably the most 
important story of the day) the rally effect of the MID is greater than those that 
appeared elsewhere. That is, the way the news media present the rally event is 
deeply related to the magnitude of the rally effect on presidential popularity.  
While most relevant studies following Mueller (1971, 1973) found that 
significant international events involving the United States tend to raise, albeit for 
a short period, presidential approval rating, some studies (e.g., Brody & Shapiro, 
1989; Edwards, 1990; James & Oneal, 1991; James & Rioux, 1998) have cast 
doubt on the significance of the rally effect in explaining presidential popularity 
(Baker & Oneal, 2001). For example, Brody and Shapiro (1989), in their analysis 
of 45 situations expected to show a rally effect, found that the rise in presidential 
                                                 
23 According to Mueller (1970, 1973), an international event can generate a rally effect only when 
it satisfies three criteria: “(1) it must be international in nature; (2) it must involve the United 
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approval rating produced by the situations, on average, was less than 3%, and 
20% of the events actually led to a drop in the rating. James and Rioux (1998) 
also found only small and short-lived rally effects of between 3% and 4% on 
average when a president met an international crisis. In a similar sense, Kernell 
(1978) found that while there exist significant correlations between rally events 
and presidential approval rating, the strengths of these correlations varied to a 
large degree, depending on the incumbent’s previous popularity and the perceived 
political importance of the given rally events.  
Of course, the symbolic experiences of the public cannot explain all of the 
variance of presidential popularity. The effect of economic factors, such as 
unemployment, inflation, and economic expectations, on presidential ratings has 
drawn considerable attention from social scientists. For example, the findings of 
Mueller (1970, 1973), Hibbs (1979), Stimson (1976), MacKuen (1983), Norporth 
(1996), and Gronke & Brehm (2002) confirmed that there is a clear relationship 
between economic conditions and the public assessment of the president. Given 
those findings, Kinder (1981) investigated the effect of economic conditions on 
presidential popularity in two different senses. Distinguishing personal experience 
and public experience of economic conditions, Kinder found that citizens’ 
assessment of economic condition as part of the greater public—“a sociotropic 
assessment”—is more powerfully related to their evaluation of the incumbent 
                                                                                                                                     
States and the president directly; and (3) it must be specific, dramatic, and sharply focused” 
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president than their feelings as private individuals.24 Given that public assessment 
of the economy must, to a large extent, rely on media presentation of others’ 
experience (see, Wu et al., 2002; Hibbs, 1979), this finding implies that looking at 
economic conditions as a non-symbolic (objective) factor influencing popularity 
could be, at best, an oversimplified explanation of the relationship or even a 
misconceptualization of the causal direction of the relationship. In fact, Kinder’s 
analysis showed that citizens’ public sociotropic assessment of economic 
condition both causes and is affected by presidential popularity 25(see also 
Norporth, 1996).    
In addition to economic factors, one of the most important findings about 
presidential ratings is that presidential approval rates tend to decrease over the 
period of presidential incumbency. This so-called “natural erosion” hypothesis 
has been supported by many previous studies (e.g., Mueller, 1970, 1973, Stimson, 
1976; Tatalovitch & Gitelson, 1990; Baker & Oneal, 2001). As discussed, 
Mueller (1970) attributed this tendency to a “coalition of minorities” impact; 
minor voter blocs, who once supported the president, become less supportive of 
the president as he makes more decisions during his time in office. Even though 
each decision the President makes may gain acceptance from the majority, each 
                                                                                                                                     
(Baker & Oneal, 2001, p. 664).  
24 Political research, broadly speaking, agrees that “sociotropic” assessments carry more 
significant weight for electoral decisions (Norpoth, 1996, p. 780).  
25 Kinder (1981) found that a president’s supporters tend to keep more optimistic expectation on 
economic conditions than do presidential critics.  
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decision is also likely to dissatisfy at least a small group of people (Sigelman & 
Knight, 1983). Following Mueller, Tedin (1986) and Tatalovich and Gitelson 
(1990) found that party identification is the most decisive factor to explain a 
“coalition of minorities” effect. Unlike core supporters, the supporters who favor 
the opposition party over the presidential party are unstable in their rating of the 
president. For example, when a Republican candidate is elected president, he 
tends to receive support from Democrats during the early term around his 
inauguration, but the support is more likely to become unstable and decline over 
the president’s term. On the other hand, Stimson (1976) and Sigelman & Knight 
(1983) attempted to find the reason for “natural erosion” in the “inevitable 
disjuncture between presidential promise and performance” (Sigelman & Knight, 
p. 312). They argued that it is inevitable that the lack of fulfillment of promises 
that the president made during the campaign and inauguration will later produce 
disaffection from “once bemused supporters” (Mueller, 1973, p. 206). Stimson 
(1976) implied that this natural erosion resulting from voters’ 
“expectation/disillusion” demonstrates that the American public is ill-informed on 
politics and does not have well-developed policy preferences. This lack of 
information and preferences results in the increasing influence of strategic events 
by political actors.    
Almost all relevant studies considered both the effect of rally events and 
these economic and/or “natural erosion factors” in their investigations of 
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presidential popularity ratings. For example, Mackuen (1983)’s analysis of the 
dynamics of presidential popularity from 1963 to 1980 showed that both 
economic components and political events are valid factors in the movement of 
presidential popularity. His empirical model demonstrated that each component 
has different levels of weight and duration in influencing public assessment of the 
president. However, it is important to point out that most of the previous research 
on presidential approval ratings, with only a few exceptions, have overlooked the 
constructive nature of presidential popularity ratings as both cause and effect, 
attempting to explore the ratings only within “objective” relationships among 
given factors. But, as some studies implied, for ordinary citizens to be aware of 
the current status of presidential popularity means more than simply knowing how 
others have judged the president (e.g., Kinder, 1983). If presidential popularity 
has a symbolic connection to presidential power, it is no wonder that presidential 
popularity ratings are not just a mechanistic reflection of given factors (such as 
unemployment, inflation, GNP growth, etc.), but instead are a constructive force 
in the performance of further political action. By the same token, if the rating 
numbers have symbolic meaning, it is no wonder that citizens’ exposure to the 
numbers, in turn, affects their assessment of the president and his political actions.  
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Chapter 3.  Hypotheses and Variables 
 
Noelle-Neumann’s theory of the spiral of silence suggests our society is 
engaged in a dynamic system by which the public tends to move to the majority 
opinion while minority opinions remain unheard. However, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, later studies found that there are a couple of necessary pre-
conditions for the spiral of silence to operate. One of the most important pre-
conditions is that there needs to be enough media attention to an agenda, and, 
thus, people’s interest of the agenda becomes intense enough for them to be aware 
of differences of opinions (see, Jeffres et al. 1999). In addition, this study suggests 
that it is necessary that the media presentation of an agenda is informative enough 
to provide information cues that show which opinion is on the rise and which 
opinion is not. Since previous studies have shown that our statistical sense can be 
easily messed up by any nuance in the way media present reality, the way media 
present the climate of opinion is another ingredient of importance in the process 
of the spiral of silence. In this sense, the previous chapter discussed that the spiral 
of silence process can best be researched when the active function of the media in 
the formation of the public opinion is also significantly considered in terms of the 
agenda-setting and media framing.     
The principal purpose of this study is to explore the influence of the news 
media on the cyclical formation process of public opinion with the case of 
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presidential approval rates from the last forty years. To explore this relationship 
empirically, this study investigates the historical fluctuations of presidential 
approval ratings, which have been regularly measured since the 1950s, and how 
the New York Times’ presentation of the ratings has itself influenced public 
opinion on presidential popularity for the last forty years. The presidential 
approval rates of the last forty years provide a good case of exploring the spiral of 
silence process with consideration of the active function of the media. Over the 
past forty years, media attention to the presidential approval rates has been varied, 
thus assuring us that the public exposure and interest to the rates also has 
fluctuated with the varying degree of the media attention. Also, since the media 
coverage of the presidential approval rates includes both raw information of the 
opinion polls (i.e., percentages of approval) and their own informative cues in 
regard to the raw numbers, another ingredient is also present.    
As argued, the main goal of this study is not simply to explore the effect of 
the news frames in presenting the poll on public opinion; instead what this study 
wants to demonstrate with this case of presidential approval rates is the spiral 
process of forming public opinion, whereby we can identify the way that the news 
media reflect public opinion, and the presentation of the public opinion by the 
news media, in turn, move public opinion in a certain direction. Identifying the 
reciprocal relationship, if the overall process of forming public opinion follows 
the spiral of silence theory, the investigation of the relationship will demonstrate 
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the significance of the causal association between the media coverage and public 
opinion not just in one way but in both ways, from public opinion to the media 
and from the media to the following public opinion. In this sense, the hypotheses 
of this study consist of the tentative arguments on the causal associations between 
the media coverage and public opinion in two directions.  
 
Hypotheses 
HYPOTHESES A: THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC ON THE COVERAGE OF THE MEDIA 
 
 The evidence from previous studies suggests that media coverage of an 
issue cause an increase in the number of people concerned about an issue; and at 
the same time the amount of coverage media devoted to an issue is influenced by 
the public (see Smith, 1987). However, the question how the public affects news-
making decisions has been asked less frequently in the studies of public opinion. 
When the news media cover the public opinion on a given issue, news making 
involves two separate kinds of activities: gathering public opinion and deciding 
on the newsworthiness of given public opinion. Journalists apply various methods 
to gather public opinion. They have interviewed people on the street, at bars, and 
in many other public spaces to gather public opinion since the early era of 
journalism, but recently journalists are increasingly making use of public opinion 
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surveys in representing public opinion on any given issue (Crespi, 1980b; Smith, 
1987;Carey, 1995; Fuse, 2000). And more importantly, when public opinion on a 
given topic is available, journalists do not automatically translate the public 
opinion to their news coverage; rather, it is the decision of journalists to determine 
the news value of the public opinion. That is, as more and more information from 
public opinion surveys become available, journalists’ decisions on the 
newsworthiness of a survey result is increasingly important. In the case of public 
opinion on presidential performance, a recent study showed that some news media 
are more likely to report public opinion on the presidential approval when the 
opinion poll indicates that the approval rate is declining (Groeling & Kernell, 
1998).  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the theoretical problems with 
the spiral of silence is that it assumes we have a constant level of susceptibility to 
the climate of opinion; and the media are always paying a good amount of 
attention to the given issue so that we can be aware of the climate of opinion. 
Unlike this assumption, the agenda-setting approach suggests that our world 
consists of innumerable agendas and that we can be aware of only a limited 
number of agendas in a given moment. Even in the case of usual agendas such as 
economy, education, environment, taxation, crime and others, agenda-setting 
research suggests that the degree of media attention to those agendas is varying in 
accordance with the certain condition of a given moment. Then, what makes some 
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agendas more salient than others and the media be more attentive to those 
agendas? Obviously, the salience of an agenda to the media is a combination of 
various factors such as “timeliness,” “expected consequence,” “proximity,” 
“relevance,” and other propensities of the agenda. This study expects that two 
important attributes—convergence and change—in public opinion have an effect 
of making the news media report the public opinion more likely.     
 
H A-1. Convergence Hypothesis:  
The lower/higher than intermediate level a presidential approval rate 
is, the more the NYT is likely to report the approval rate  
 
 With the hypothesis H A-1, this study argues that convergence of public 
opinion is an important factor of raising the salience of the presidential approval 
rate to the media. An approval rating represents an unusual news item in that 
while the polling agencies continuously update public evaluation of the 
president’s performance, the evaluations are occasionally delivered to the public 
only when the news media find it newsworthy (Groeling and Kernell, 1998). This 
study expects that the convergence of public opinion, whether from the approving 
side or disapproving side, has made the New York Times be more attentive to the 
current rate of public evaluation of presidential performance itself. More 
specifically, given that the average presidential approval rates are in the mid-50 
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percentile and the “no opinion” response has been consistent at 13 percent for the 
last forty years of presidential approval series, this study hypothetically argues 
that the NYT has been more likely to report a presidential approval rate when the 
poll number indicates the existence of a clear opinion majority either approving or 
disapproving the presidential performance than it indicates public opinion 
normally divided around 50 percent in a given month. The null hypothesis holds 
simply that no relationship exists between the president’s approval ratings and the 
number of the NYT articles reporting presidential approval rates in a given month. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected with a statistical confidence, this study projects a 
U-shaped line across the range of presidential approval rate showing that the 
number of the NYT articles reporting the rates are maximized in both ends of the 
range and bottoms out at the intermediate range of the presidential rate. By using 
a quadratic regression analysis, this study will test this U-shaped relation between 
the presidential approval rate and the number of NYT articles reporting public 
opinion on the presidential performance in a given month.  
 
H A-2. Change Hypothesis:  
The more a presidential approval rate changes since its previous 
month, the more the NYT is likely to report the approval rate. 
 With the hypothesis H A-2, this study tests the relationship between the 
magnitude of change in the presidential approval rate and the number of the NYT 
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articles reporting public opinion on the presidential performance. While the first 
hypothesis focuses on the convergent status of public opinion, (i.e., indication of 
opinion majority), the hypothesis H A-2 predicts that the margin of change, either 
increasing or decreasing, influences the NYT’s decision to report the presidential 
approval rate in a given month. As in the case of the first hypothesis, this study 
expects also that there exists a U-shaped relation between the margin of change 
and the number of NYT articles, showing that the number of NYT stories is 
maximized when the presidential rate has rapidly changed since the previous time 
and the number is minimized when the rate has not changed at all.   
 For the test of both hypotheses, it is important to note that the salience of 
the presidential approval rate to the media is not solely decided by the attribute 
differences of the presidential approval rates themselves; rather, as shown in the 
previous chapter, other factors may influence the salience of the agenda such as 
the occurrence of important political events, the duration of incumbency or 
economic status of the given moment. For example, presumably journalists are 
more interested in public opinion on the presidential performance before the 
second-term presidential election than the approval rate of a president in his 
second term. In this sense, the tests of both hypotheses should be accompanied 
with controls of these extra variables, most notably 1) the occurrence of political 
events, 2) economic status, 3) duration of incumbency, and 4) first term/second 
term. Only then, after controlling the effect of these variables on the number of 
NYT articles, the tests will indicate that the U-shaped relations exists between the 




HYPOTHESES B: THE EFFECT OF THE MEDIA ON PUBLIC OPINION 
 
While this study explores the reciprocal interactions between public 
opinion and the media, the most important goal of this study is to find the effect 
of the media on the formation of public opinion. This study investigates the 
significance of media’s effect on public opinion in two ways. First, this study 
attempts to find that the media have the significant effect of making public 
opinion more changeable; that is, if the media affect public opinion by making it 
more static rather than making it more volatile, it is hard to argue that the overall 
spiral process of forming opinion is associated with the media. Second, if the 
overall process follows the spiral of silence, the media effect of making public 
opinion volatile must have directional tendencies of conforming with the public 
opinion they are representing; in other words, unless the media have the effect of 
making the strong opinion stronger and the minor opinion weaker, the association 
between the media and public opinion will not result in the spiral of silence.  
Given the diversity and complex contextual relations of opinion polls, it is 
not surprising that many previous studies on public opinion did not find a 
conclusive effect or a unidirectional influence of publicized polls on public 
opinion (De Vreese & Semetko, 2002). However, numerous studies on the effect 
of polls on voters’ decision-making process proposed that there exists a general 
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trend – the bandwagon effect of polls – in political campaigns (e.g., Atkin, 1969; 
Ceci & Kain, 1982, Glynn & McLeod, 1982). These studies generally reported 
that the information that one candidate or issue is supported by a majority causes 
voters to shift support to the more popular candidate or issue. As Atkin (1969) 
notes, “majority” should not be defined as simply a bigger number among 
comparable groups; instead a relative majority is perceived by the public when 
they find a perceptual discrepancy between their previous estimate and new 
information on a given opinion configuration. In other words, a temporary 
concept of majority produced by rising opinions or declining opinions, as 
compared to previous estimates, should be considered a critical component of the 
bandwagon effect. 
Noelle-Neumann (1993), in her advanced explanation of the spiral of 
silence, argued that the major motive of this bandwagon effect is the ‘fear of 
isolation:’ most people do not follow the majority opinion for the purpose of 
winning power by being on the winning side; rather the force to make a 
majoritarian opinion appear to be the winning side is people’s desire to avoid 
isolating themselves from the majority. According to her, it is our social nature as 
human beings to fear isolation from our fellow humans and this nature contributes 
to successful social life (pp.39-41). But, in a conflicted situation, this nature turns 
a main motive to make it hard for different groups of a society to communicate 
with each other so that may result in a misguided perception of the climate of 
 87
 
opinion. As Noelle-Neumann noted, early Asch’s length-of-line experimental 
study (1952) effectively demonstrated that our fear of isolation may influence our 
ability to perceive and judge even in a relatively clear situation. Noelle-Neumann 
(1977, 1993) argued that this fear of isolation, in general, results in a spiral 
process in which people feel the need to observe and follow the changes of public 
opinion so that a majority opinion prevails while other opinions are silenced. This 
spiral of silence process, Noelle-Neumann (1977) argued, may explain some 
patterned misjudgments of public opinion by the public such as “pluralistic 
ignorance”: especially in a dual-opinion situation (such as a two-party system), 
this spiral of silence process may result in polarization of opposing opinions so 
that members in one opinion group over-evaluate their opinion while being 
ignorant of the opposing opinion (p.144).     
 
H B-1. Additive/Subtractive Effect Hypothesis: 
When other things are controlled, the publication of presidential 
approval rates by the NYT has an additive/subtractive effect on the 
subsequent approval rates. 
 
Drawing on the previous findings, this study expects that the news media’s 
reports of presidential approval rates influence the public to favor the inclining 
opinion, thus amplifying the inclining/declining tendency. Given that a number of 
factors influence public opinion, the bandwagon effect of polls cannot be 
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expected to cause a large-scale shift (Traugott, 1992; De Vereese & Semetko, 
2002, p. 368). Instead, it is more reasonable to expect that the effect will be 
observed in an “additive/subtractive” way; that is, while not causing a directional 
change in public opinion, the media reports of polls lead to small (but patterned) 
additions to the given majority. Here it is important to note that the media report 
of presidential approval rates may indicate two different senses of opinion 
majority; when the media report the rating number, the media not only offer a raw 
number of the presidential approval but also indicate how much it has changed 
since the previous poll. That is, in usual cases, the media indicate both majority, 
the simple number of the approval rate, and relative majority, the additional 
information on the change of the approval rate.  
Obviously, indicating relative majority demands a process of interpreting 
the meaning of the raw number of current approval rating and it is not as simple 
and apparent as delivering the raw number of the public opinion poll. For 
example, when a public opinion poll shows the current presidential approval rate 
has increased by 2 percent since the previous poll, the meaning of the 2 percent 
increase may be framed into a “stable” approval rate or an “inclining” trend by the 
news media. This study, applying a content analysis, identifies how the news 
media present certain rating numbers to create an inclining or a declining meaning 
from those numbers and analyzes whether the indication of relative majority 
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along with the indication of simple majority by the NYT has an 
additive/subtractive influence on the subsequent approval rates.   
 
H B-2. Volatility Effect Hypothesis:  
The frequent publication of presidential rating polls by the news 
media has caused the public opinion on presidential approval to 
become more volatile.  
 
In financial economics, ‘volatility’ often refers to uncertainty or risk of a 
market. Given the importance of predicting the volatility of a market, volatility 
has drawn great interest from researchers (e.g., French et al., 1987; Engle & Ng, 
1993). While it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss volatility in financial 
economics, it is generally assumed that the volatility of a market changes over 
time, and the change is, to some degree, positively related to the amount of 
information available to the market, which often includes the change of the future 
market (see Engle & Ng, 1993). Some communication studies imply that certain 
economic news reports are important factors in the change of economic reality by 
influencing public evaluation of the economic reality. For example, Wu et al. 
(2000)’s study of economic news shows that people are more likely to be 
influenced by certain information (recession news) under given circumstances 
(economic recession). Their study demonstrates that, while controlling for 
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economic reality, media coverage of the economy is a good predictor of the 
public evaluation of the economy, especially during the downturn period. Also, 
Stevenson et al.’s (1994) time-series analysis of media coverage of economic 
recession suggests that a cyclical model may offer the best explanation of the 
relationship between public opinion on economic reality and media coverage of 
the economic reality; that is, while public evaluation of the economy is a stronger 
predictor of media coverage of the economy, media coverage of the economy, in 
turn, picks up public concern and influence on public evaluation at a later date.         
 In a similar sense, some researchers in political science use ‘volatility’ to 
refer to “rapid and extreme change in political processes or behavior” (Maestas & 
Preuhs, 2000, p. 95). For example, volatility in presidential approval rates 
illustrates the degree of uncertainty of an aggregate approval rate from a poll to 
the next poll, as a function of other conditional changes. In their analysis of 
presidential approval ratings from Eisenhower to Reagan, Edwards and Gallup 
(1990) note that presidential ratings are relatively less volatile, compared to the 
changes of other social indexes. Public evaluation of the presidents, they argue, is 
generally not subject to sharp changes, since it tends to be mediated by other more 
stable factors regarding politics (most notably, by party identification). That is to 
say, presidents, in general, receive high support from the members of their fellow 
partisans and this support tends to be stable over time (Edwards & Gallup, 1990). 
Edwards and Gallup (1990), however, show that while the approval ratings have 
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been mostly consistent with party identification throughout the researched period, 
the standard deviation of the ratings has not been stable throughout different 
administrative terms. Their analysis shows that the standard deviation of the 
ratings in the 1960s and 70s (i.e., Kennedy-Johnson, 13.5; Nixon-Carter, 12.2) is 
larger than previous terms (Eisenhower, 6.9), while the standard deviation of the 
1980s decreased to the level of the 1950s (Reagan, 7.7). Edwards & Gallup 
(1990) argue that this instability is mostly related to the decrease of party 
identification, but it is obvious that we need more explanation especially when we 
consider that the change of the presidential approval ratings is much sharper than 
the decrease of party identification. Moreover, while Edwards and Gallup (1990) 
analyzed the standard deviation of the approval ratings for the purpose of 
discussing volatility, whether the simple analysis of the standard deviation is 
appropriate in showing the change of volatility is arguable in that the method 
cannot control the impact of other contextual variables on the approval ratings.  
One of the primary interests of this study is to link increased volatility and 
publicized polls. Although few studies have yet investigated the effect of the news 
media on volatility, previous studies suggest the possibility that publicized polls 
influence volatility. It is especially noteworthy that relevant studies on financial 
economics often attribute unexpected change in markets to the availability of new 
information (see Engle & Ng, 1993). As for political volatility, we can expect 
from previous communication studies that at least two social tendencies are 
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related to the dynamic of volatility. First, the loss of deliberation in the political 
decision-making process can be related to the increased volatility (Gronke & 
Brehm, 2002). Second, the increased sensitivity of the public to political 
information, especially campaign information framed in a “horse race” manner, is 
also related to the dynamic of volatility. In both ways, it is reasonable to expect 
that frequent news media reports of publicized polls are tied with greater volatility 
in presidential approval rates.     
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Chapter 4.  Method of Analysis  
 
One factor missing in many previous studies on public opinion is that the 
measurement of opinion change per se; most studies on the subject are limited to 
either a single time point measurement or an experiment of individuals’ 
psychological changes. Since it is hard to capture the shift of public opinion in 
any dynamic way by using this cross-sectional approach, many studies do not 
offer evidence of a significant change in public opinion taking place (Katz & 
Balsassare, 1994). In media studies, most research found that media effects can be 
explored on the main variables such as “real-world conditions,” “media 
representation of the real world” and “public perceptions of the world,” but the 
difficulty is that the relationships among those three variables are not fixed in one 
direction; rather they may have a causal influence on others in simultaneous ways 
(see, Smith, 1987; Blood & Phillips, 1997). In this sense, some previous studies 
called for more analyses with longitudinal data so that we can trace the dynamic 
of public opinion in its formation and fluctuation (Smith, 1987). Especially, time-
series data are useful in identifying the association of related variables in the 
dynamic of public opinion in that the variables influence each other 
simultaneously and the causal association among the variables can most often be 
identified only with some lag period.  
Despite its necessity, not many studies have applied time-series data for 
their investigation of public opinion. One of the reasons is that it is relatively hard 
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to acquire time-series data that fit their research interests; it takes extraordinary 
effort and financial resources to keep a record for a series on a regular base for a 
long period of time. Another problem is that empirical investigation of time-series 
data demands a sophisticated statistical skill for dealing with the special 
characteristics of time-series data. Since many time-series data have distinct 
characteristics that make themselves non-stationary for a long-range of period 
time, simple cross-sectional statistics cannot be applied. For example, the time-
series of presidential approval rates have the tendency to wander around as if they 
had no-fixed mean, while the current level is depending on the previous level of 
public opinion. This non-stationary and auto-correlated characteristic demands an 
innovative approach to explain the dynamic of the time-series.  
While the goal of this study is to explore the cyclical process of the 
formation of public opinion, a methodologically specific aim of this study is to 
draw attention to the usefulness of a recently introduced time-series method for 
analyzing nonstationary data and its application to the empirical problem of 
detecting the effect of media on public opinion. More specifically, the 
methodological goal of this study is to find a better model for forecasting 
presidential approval rates and so, too, measure the additive/substractive effect of 
the publicized opinion polls accurately within the model. Recently, Maestas and 
Preuhs (2000) and Gronke and Brehm (2002) introduced a statistical method, 
ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedacity) model, to examine a time-
series data and suggested how the model can be useful in modeling the 
“volatility” of political processes. Furthermore, Gronke and Brehm’s method 
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(2002), based on some studies in the field of econometrics, suggested that the 
causal association between the “volatility” and other variables can be identified 
with a modified ARCH model (ARCH-m). This study argues that this ARCH-m, 
more specifically a mean model with ARCH error—
, will provide useful insights to explore the effect 
of the media on the dynamics of the presidential approval ratings.  
1/2
0 1 1 t t(v h )t t tY X Yβ β ρ −= + + +
Before analyzing the effect of the media on public opinion with time-
series models, this study examines two important hypotheses testing how 
convergence and margin of change in public opinion polls affect the news media 
to report the public opinion polls. As this expects that the relation between those 
two testing variables and the number of the NYT have a curvilinear relation, this 
study applies a quadratic regression analysis method, which is useful in 
identifying a U-shaped curvilinear relation among variables. For both statistical 
techniques, each variable is measured and transformed to a monthly time-series 
data from the last forty years. Two software packages, SPSS 11.0 and EVIEWS 
3.1, are used for identifying quadratic regression models and time-series models, 
respectively.   
 
Variables and Data 
 
 For both quadratic regression analysis and time-series analysis, this study 
draws on three primary sources of monthly time-series data: (1) a content analysis 
of the New York Times from 1963 to 2002; (2) Gallup presidential approval polls 
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from 1963 to 2002; and (3) other sources of controlling variables (political events, 
economic status variables and others). Even though the presidential approval rates 
have been regularly investigated by the Gallup and other polling agencies since 
the early 1950s, the New York Times paid almost no attention to the poll results 
until the mid 60s. Since there were almost no NYT articles reporting presidential 
approval rates until the mid 1960s26, this study limits the analyzing period to the 
last forty years from Jan. 1963 to Dec. 2002. Each series of the analyzing period 
comprised 480 observations, and the time unit of analysis was 1 month. How each 
variable was retrieved is detailed in the following section.  
 CONTENT ANALYSIS: MEDIA COVERAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL RATINGS 
  
In order to retrieve media coverage of presidential approval rates, this 
study applies a content analysis exploring how a leading newspaper, the New York 
Times (NYT), has covered opinion polls on presidential approval rates for the last 
forty years. The main advantage of the content analysis is that the method enables 
researchers to analyze trends over a long period of time by making a large amount 
of messages more accessible. In this project, the content analysis covers the whole 
phase of the presidential rates series from 1963 to 2002. For the proposed period 
of news coverage (1963-2002), this study uses the New York Times Index 
(“______administration” under “public opinion”) to retrieve relevant NYT news 
                                                 
26 Only 2 relevant articles are identified in the period. 
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stories. Among the articles indexed in the category, articles that do not cite 
specific poll results on presidential approval ratings or cite only a specific 
dimension of presidential approval (e.g., approval of president’s handling of 
foreign policy) are excluded for the consistency of data collection. Also, news 
stories that do not pertain to the incumbent president are also excluded. This 
filtering process produces 447 NYT news stories, and this study transforms these 
stories into a monthly series.  
While the content analysis has an advantage of investigating a large 
amount of data, it has a disadvantage in that the method is more vulnerable to 
researchers’ personal values and preferences. That is, it has a risk of being 
affected by researchers’ bias, when the data are manually coded. Even though the 
risk can be reduced by using multiple coders and being more careful with inter-
coder reliability, it is integral to construct more specified coding categories to 
reduce coders’ bias. In other words, identification and categorization of the 
variable is the most important part of the content analysis. In this study, the 
content analysis of the coverage of presidential approval rates and exploration of 
the visibility of polls investigates several aspects of the news coverage: (1) the 
frequency of the coverage in a month, (2) the reported presidential approval rates 
and (3) the frames of the coverage (among inclining/remaining 
high/unchanged/remaining low/declining frames)27.  
                                                 
27 For details, see Appendix A.  
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As for frames, news media present an occurrence into a news story, which 
then influences the public definition of the occurrence. Especially, as this study 
expects that the nuanced meaning in presenting the rates brings significant 
differences for the public to perceive relative majority in the climate of opinion, 
identifying news frames is one of the most important parts of this project. For 
example, when a presidential approval poll indicates a small margin of change 
since the previous month, whether the news media present it as a meaningful 
change or as a non-signifcant change (or unchanged at all), it may have different 
effect on the public’s perception of how the climate of opinion is changing. Many 
communication studies have increasingly applied the concept of frame to show 
that the news media highlight certain points of an event while marginalizing the 
others, defining the event and explaining how it is to be understood (see Gitlin, 
1980; Entman, 1991; Iyengar, 1991; Gamson, 1992; Scheufele, 1999). Based on 
this theoretical conceptualization, this study expects that the way the news media 
present certain rating numbers likely affect readers’ interpretation of those 
numbers.  
In this study, the content analysis identifies how the NYT articles present 
certain rating numbers with one of five presenting frames; inclining/remaining 
high/unchanged/remaining low/declining. Analysis of how the media have framed 
certain rating numbers can be systematically constructed by using multiple coders 
and showing inter-coder reliability. Different coders are asked to identify the 
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overall meaning of a story as an inclining or a declining frame by focusing on 1) 
the uses of comparisons between previous rating numbers and current ratings, and 
2) the uses of specific words such as “rise,” “climb,” “go up,” “fall,” “descend,” 
“collapse” and others in a story28. While this study, for the analysis of frames, 
attempts to address the uses of certain key words, the coding unit is an article: 
even though the uses of a certain word or a phrase could be critical in deciding the 
overall tone of a story, this study expects to capture the overall meaning of a story 
by paying attention to the overall tone of a story itself rather than dissecting a 
story into multiple parts.  
This study used two additional trained coders29 in the coding process. Both 
coders are provided the same instruction regarding the defintions of different 
frames and other protocols of the coding scheme and trained to apply those 
definitions to the NYT news stories before coding them. As described earlier, 
testing the inter-coder reliability is the most important process in a content 
analysis (Riffe et al., 1998). In order to test the inter-coder reliablity, coders 
content-analyzed 45 news stories (about 10% of the entire news stories) which are 
randomly selected among the total 447 NYT news stories. Using Scott’s Pi test30, 
which is one of the most frequently used in content anlysis stuides (Riffe et al., 
                                                 
28 For the selection of the key words, this study uses a thesaurus dictionary, “Merriam-Webster 
Online Thesaurus” (http://www.m-w.com/). For details, see Appendix A.  
29 Both are doctoral candidates in the school of journalism in the Univ. of Texas at Austin.  
30 Pi = (OA-EA)/(1-EA), when OA = the percentage of observed agreement, EA = the percentage 
of expected agreement.  
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1998), this study confirmed that the inter-coder reliability rests in the acceptable 
range: the inter-coder reliability between the principal coder and coder A is .84 
(20/23, and EA= .20) and the reliability between the principal coder and coder B 
is .82 (18/22 and EA=.20).  
 
GALLUP POLLS: THE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL RATES, 1963-2002 
 
One of the main variables of this study is the Gallup Poll ratings of 
presidential popularity, which have been conducted regularly since the 1950s. 
These time-series data have been used for almost all relevant studies of 
presidential popularity, particularly because the Gallup Poll has a high level of 
reliability since it regularly asks the same question: “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way ___________ is handling his job as president?” While the 
Gallup organization did not limit the presidential performance question to one use 
per month and it also occasionally skips a month, most relevant studies of 
presidential popularity used the month as a unit of analysis. The monthly approval 
ratings are collected from the Gallup Monthly. Following previous studies, when 
the ratings were collected more than once per month, this study chooses the first 
ratings observed in a month; and when a month was skipped, the rating of the 
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month is interpolated by regressing to the best fitting line31 (see, Gronke & 
Brehm, 2002).  
















In order to observe the effect of the testing variables (NYT news stories 
and Presidential approval rates) on each other, this study needs to control other 
variables which might have influenced public assessment of presidential 
popularity and the NYT’s decision to report the approval rates. Previous studies on 
presidential popularity have identified that economic conditions and political 
                                                 
31 22 cases are interpolated by regressing to the best fitting line.   
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events (such as scandals) along with time (often modeled as duration in 
incumbency) are the main factors that explain variance in the ratings. For the 
variables of economic conditions, this study uses monthly unemployment rates 
and Consumer Price Index (CPI) data32.  
 










































































                                                 
32 CPI index, reported by the Labor Department, is widely used for gauging inflation, measuring 










































































 As for political events, the conventional coding scheme has developed 
incrementally (Gronke & Brehm, 2002). The first approach (Mueller, 1970, 1973) 
was to consider only “rally” events, which supposedly boost presidential 
popularity. This approach was made more specific by Kernell (1978), who 
attempted to identify these “rally” events. Brace and Hinckley’s approach (1991) 
later provided a more comprehensive list of political events by including 
“negative” events in addition to “positive” events. While previous studies 
consider only the inclining influence of political events, it is meaningful that 
Brace and Hinckley’s study began to consider the declining impact of political 
events on presidential popularity too (see Gronke & Brehm, 2002, p. 435). 
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Following Brace and Hinckley’s approach, later studies even specified the events 
according to diverse characteristics such as ‘foreign/domestic, president personal, 
US initiated/enemy initiated,’ while, in general, categorizing the events into 
“positive” and “negative” (e.g., Brody & Shapiro, 1991; Marra et al., 1990; 
Gronke & Brehm, 2002). This study uses the list of political events provided by 
Brace and Hinckley (1991) and later studies, and extends the list to the present 
time.33 
                                                 






This study proposes a quadratic regression model and a time-series model 
with some secondary data in order to examine the cyclical formation of public 
opinion on presidential performance. If the news media reports of polling 
numbers are simply reporting without any influence on public opinion at all (i.e., 
being independent from the on-going process of public opinion formation), then 
the reports would not bring any systematic change on subsequent public 
assessments of presidents. However, as many previous studies imply, this study 
suspects that news media reports of polling numbers cannot be purely objective 
(i.e., detached from the shaping of public opinion) in that the reports are one of 
the key movers of public opinion by showing dominant opinions and minor 
opinions. Although the objective assumption in the news media reports of opinion 
polls is far more complex than an empirical model can identify, the proposed 
quadratic regression model and time-series model, nonetheless, attempt to 
delineate the reciprocal relation between the news media reports of presidential 
approval ratings and the cyclical formation of public opinion in the process.   
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QUADRATIC REGRESSION NOTES: MEASURING THE EFFECT OF 
CONVERGENCE AND MARGIN OF CHANGE IN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE 
MEDIA  
 
Before investigating the effect of the NYT reports on the subsequent public 
opinion, this study needs to explore how the convergence and the margin of 
change in public opinion affect the NYT in the first place. As this study expects 
that the relationship between the convergence and the margin of change of the 
approval rates and the number of NYT news stories reporting the rate dependent 
variable is more complex than a simple linear form, it is necessary to apply an 
innovative approach to identify a curvilinear relationship.  
This study uses the quadratic regression model for estimating the factors 
which influence the NYT decision to report a presidential approval rate. The 
quadratic regression model is often used to identify a U-shaped curvilinear 
relationship with an intermediate optimum (which may be a maximum or a 
minimum depending upon the relationship). The quadratic model equation is 
identified by including a squared term of an independent variable: 
2
1 2o tY X Xα α α= + + + ε , where oα = the constant term, 1α = the 
coefficient of the linear term, and 2α = the coefficient of the quadratic 
term. .  
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By regressing to both linear term and quadratic term, a quadratic model has an 
advantage of accounting for a complex pattern between dependent and 
independent variables. That is, while the overall relation between the variables is 
surely non-linear, it can provide information on the linear relation as well. This 
advantage makes the quadratic regression model most useful for this study. Using 
the quadratic model, this study can identify not only a U-shaped relation but also 
an overall trend between two independent variables (convergence and margin of 
difference) and the dependent variable (the number of the NYT news stories).   
Using the quadratic regression models, this study investigates the effect of 
two independent variables: the convergence of public opinion and the margin of 
change in public opinion. First, this expects that in a given month the NYT present 
more reports on presidential rates when the public opinion on presidential 
approval is convergent either in approval or disapproval than when it is not 
convergent (i.e. evenly divided). That is to say, a very low presidential approval 
rate has a high probability of being reported by the news media; on the contrary, 
presidential approval rates in the intermediate (average) level have a low 
probability of being reported; and, presidential approval rates in the very high 
level again have a higher probability of being reported by the news media. Thus, a 
quadratic relationship between the approval rate and the number of the NYT 
stories is expected to exist, with an intermediate (minimum) optimum approval 
rate at which the number of the NYT stories is minimized. Next, as for the margin 
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of change, this study also expects that a quadratic relationship between the margin 
of change and the number of the NYT articles exist with an optimum (expectedly, 
when non-changed at all) level of margin of change at which the number of the 
NYT news stories is minimized.   
TIME-SERIES NOTES: MEASURING THE EFFECT OF THE MEDIA ON 
SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC OPINION 
 
Conventional approaches to presidential approval rates have used 
aggregate data of monthly presidential support ratings to investigate the 
fluctuation of the mean level of the ratings within their relationships to other 
extraneous variables and, most importantly, to time (e.g., Mueller, 1970; Stimson, 
1976; Kernell, 1978; Ostrom & Simon, 1985; Brace & Hinckley, 1991: Norpoth, 
1996). The biggest benefit of the time-bounded approach is that it allows us to 
observe and understand the descriptive features of the data in a more accurate 
way, and we can plot and describe a long range of data in a model. However, as 
Brody (1991) and Brace and Hinckley (1991) point out34, time itself is a 
confounding variable in that it is not unimaginable that any systematic effect of 
unobserved variables (such as the length of incumbency, the age of the president, 
or the developments of political events) is diluted in the name of time. For 
                                                 
34 Brody (1991) argues that “ ‘time’ is not an explanation because any series monotonic with time 
(e.g., cumulative casualties, the cost of living index, the length of time the president in office, or 
even the age of the president) could be a causal factor but undetectable—or indistinguishable from 
any other factor with time—when “time” is entered into the equation” (p.104).  
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presidential approval series, the variation is, to a large degree, dominated by a 
cyclical feature because American politics revolves around quadrennial 
presidential elections. Considering this cyclical variation, a relatively simple time 
bounded model can measure the impacts of other independent variables on public 
assessment of presidents, even among different presidential terms. That is, time-
bounded analysis enables researchers to make a stochastic model, through which 
future values of the series can be forecasted with limited input process while 
controlling unobserved input variables in the name of time.35  
Previous studies have applied two different approaches in considering the 
effect of time on the change of the presidential rating: a cross-sectional regression 
approach and a time-series regression approach. First, the cross-sectional 
regression approach Mueller (1970), Stimson (1976), and Brace and Hinckley 
(1991) applied, whereby time is entered into the equation as a causal factor, risks 
misidentifying the complex relation between the public evaluation of the 
presidents and other observable variables representing the effect of time, while it 
has an advantage of identifying the patterned influence of time. That is, the 
theoretical meaning of time could be overemphasized while it is hard to integrate 
a new variable into a given cross-sectional regression model. That is, statistically, 
the collinearity between time and other variables may preclude researchers to 
count those variables into the equation (i.e., when the impact of an observed 
                                                 
35 For general discussions of time-series analysis, see Chatfield (1975) & Greene (2000).  
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variable is systematic but not big enough). Arguably, this explains why previous 
studies have not explored many other variables beyond political events and 
economic conditions in their simple regression models. 
 In this sense, the introduction of a time-series regression analysis in later 
relevant studies is not a meaningless contribution to the studies of president 
approval ratings. In a time-series regression approach, time itself is no more a 
causal variable that has theoretical significance; instead, it is replaced by a 
measure of past popularity (i.e., the rating of the previous month) whereby time is 
considered only for the practical importance of explaining the dynamic of the 
rating. The underlying logic of the time-series model is not without problems, 
especially when we consider that past approval rating also does not have any 
theoretical significance and that it is hard to explain the cyclical change of the 
rating in a theoretical sense in a time-series model. But, the benefit of the time-
series model is that it raises the plausibility of the model in explaining the 
fluctuation of the rating with other controllable variables by dropping out the 
overly confounding meaning of time. Since time per se is not usually what a 
researcher intends to identify in his/her study, an overly determined conclusion 
like, “it is inevitable to decline over time,” is not what most researchers want to 
show as their most conclusive result in their studies of the presidential approval 




MEASURING THE ADDITIVE/SUBTRACTIVE EFFECT: ARMA MODEL 
 
  In a simple regression analysis, the regression model needs to meet three 
assumptions: (a) the error term has a mean of zero, (b) the error term has a 
constant variance over all the observations, and (c) the error terms corresponding 
to different points in time are not correlated. And, among these three assumptions, 
the third assumption is often most important (Ostrom, 1990). When the third 
assumption is violated, the model often provides an underestimation of the 
variance and standard deviation and thus results in inaccurate tests of hypotheses. 
(Ostrom, 1990; Gonzenbach & McGavin, 1997). While the misspecfication of a 
model by violating the third assumption provides relatively unbiased coefficients, 
it tends to underestimate the variance and standard deviation and thus results in an 
overestimation of the statistical significance of the coefficients. The accurate 
estimation of the coefficients of independent variables is very important, in 
particular the coefficients that are used in testing the significance of hypotheses, 
computing t ratios. In this sense, given that most time-series methods in the social 
sciences have first-order auto-regressive tendency (Gonzenbach & McGavin, 
1997), it is critical for a time-series analysis to control the auto-correlation in the 
model in order to conduct accurate tests of hypotheses.     
ARMA (auto-regression, moving average) model is one the most common 
time-series models for analyzing a time-series that does not fit the assumptions of 
a cross-sectional regression model. ARMA models allow one to analyze the 
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relations among time-series variables by adding endogenous variables at the mean 
level to adjust the auto-regressive residual to “white noise” (i.e., randomly 
fluctuating residuals). Tests of the ARMA model surrounding the relationships 
between the independent variables as control and the dependent variable reveal 
that a model with the first-order autoregressive term and the first-order moving 
average term, i.e., ARMA(1,1), need to be applied for the analysis. A usual 
ARMA model is: 
01 1ot t t tY X Y 1tα α β ε θε− −= + + + − ,  
where oα  represents an intercept, 1 tXα  represents the influence of the 
independent variable, 0 1tYβ −  represents AR(1) term, and 1tθε −  represents MA(1) 
term. The parameter of AR(1), 0β , describes the magnitude of the correlation 
between the current observation of Y and its previous observation. As we expect 
that the dependent variable is not simply random, the parameter, 0β , must be 
contained in the interval –1< 0β <1. The parameter of MA(1), θ , describes 
mathematical approximation of random disturbance for controlling the auto-






MEASURING VOLATILITY: ARCH MODEL 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, volatility in political phenomena raises 
important issues not only in terms of substantive political aspects but also in terms 
of methodological aspects in studying a longitudinal data (see Maestas & Preus, 
2000). There have been only a few previous attempts to explore the volatility of 
the series of the presidential approval rates. For example, one of the most notable 
attempts was Edwards and Gallup (1990) study investigating the standard 
deviation of the approval ratings for the purpose of discussing volatility. As they 
applied the method, one of the simplest approaches to explore the volatility is to 
compare the standard deviations and the degrees of kurtosis across different 
periods. But, the method of using simply the standard deviations and the degrees 
of kurtosis has a problem in showing the volatility of the presidential approval 
series. Since the different political or economic context is causally associated with 
the series of the approval rates, any test of volatility without considering these 
contexts makes it difficult to provide any more than a simple trend on the 
volatility. That is, without considering the effect of contextual variables, such as 
economic conditions and political events, on presidential approval rates in 
different periods, the standard deviations of the series of the approval rates cannot 
tell any more than a simple trend of the volatility. In this sense, another approach 
to exploring the volatility can be to measure the variances of the residuals in a 
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regression model in different periods. While this method enables one to count in 
the influences of contextual variables in measuring volatility, a problem in this 
approach of using the variances of the residuals is that the method cannot control 
the problem of auto-correlation among the volatility terms over time.  
Recently, these problems have been noticed by a few political scientists, 
and they introduced an innovative approach to measure volatility in a more 
accurate way, by applying the ARCH model from econometrics (Maestas & 
Prehus, 2000; Gronke & Brehm, 2002). Engel (1982) proposes in his seminal 
work, for a time-series which has a propensity of AR(1), the volatility of the time-
series needs to be measured by identifying the error variance ( 2σ ) conditioned on 
the time series since the variances of the time-series tend to be auto-correlated 
over time. He argues that we cannot measure the volatility accurately simply by 
measuring the variances of the residuals in the conventional time-series model. 
Since the conventional time-series model operates under an assumption that the 
rates have the same conditional variance across different time points of 
observation, this assumption is hardly applicable to some time-series data that 
have an auto-correlative tendency. That is, conventional time-series analysis 
presupposes that after considering the mean level of change from extraneous and 
endogenous variables, the time series exhibits constant variances over a long 
period of time. However, it is plausible that changes of each variable are serially 
correlated with each other (i.e., a volatile observation in a variable is occurring 
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together with other volatile observations especially for a short period of time) so 
that the volatility may not be constant for a short period of time. For example, in 
this study we may expect that when an unpredictable political event causes a 
sharp decline in presidential approval rates, the public becomes more sensitive to 
subsequent news related to those rates, so that a minor political event following 
the sharp decline can cause the public evaluation of the president to change more 
dramatically (see Maestas & Preuhus, 2000).  
In that sense, Engle (1982) proposes in his seminal work, for a time-series 
which has a propensity of auto-regressive tendency, the volatility of the time-
series needs to be measured by identifying the error variance conditioned on the 
time series (ARCH), since the variances of the time-series tend to be auto-
correlated over time. Recently, a few scholars in political science (e.g., Maestas & 
Preuhus, 2000; Gronke & Brehm, 2002) attempted to identify this volatility issue 
in political time series by using the ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity) model, which was originally developed by economists to 
explain volatility in markets (e.g., Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). This model 
explores short run volatility as an autoregressive process in the variance, while the 
long run variance is constant. As Maestas and Preuhus (2000) pointed out, while 
mean models can tell us how much individual events (which are often modeled 
with dummy variables) affect political processes, it is hard to expect them to tell 
whether the way individual events influence the system is constant across 
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different points in time (p. 98). Variance models, on the other hand, have the 
advantage of capturing contextual changes that kindle political volatility by 
looking at the heteroskedastic disturbance of data as a dynamic of theoretical 
relevant variables and the autoregressive process.  
Before investigating the reason for the incline in volatility, this study 
needs to confirm the fact that volatility has not been constant across different 
points of observation. The ARCH model provides a way to analyze time-series 
data with varying conditional heteroskedasticity across different points of 
observation (i.e., increasing/decreasing volatility across time). However, before 
introducing the ARCH model, this study needs to ask whether the volatility 
significantly changes from one point of observation to other points and whether 
the change has a linear trend of inclining over time. The Lagrange Multiplier test 
(LM), which examines the squared residuals on a lag of squared residuals of a 
mean model, is used to determine autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. If 
the score of LM ( , T = the number of observation) is big enough (on 2LM TR=
2χ distribution), and the autoregressive coefficient of ARCH has a positive value, 
the hypothesis that a series has an ARCH error is confirmed (see Engle, 1982; 
Maestas & Preuhs, 2000).    
Particularly given that the change in the short run variance, volatility, is 
one of the most important observations of this study, the variance model should 
not be overlooked in this study. Moreover, the methodological goal of this study 
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is to compare a time series model based on the mean of data with a time series 
model with the mean and variance of data. This study argues that the latter model, 
more specifically a mean model with ARCH error—
, will provide useful insights to explore the 
dynamics of volatility associated with the publicized polls as well as to improve 
the mean model.  
1/2
0 1 1 t t(v h )t t tY X Yβ β ρ −= + + +
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Chapter 5.  Results 
 
The previous chapters explored the relationship between the news media 
and public opinion and argued hypothetically in Chapter 3 that the relationship 
between the news media and public opinion is not one-way static—that is, the 
news media do not simply reflect contemporaneous public opinion—rather the 
relationship is two-way dynamic, thereby the news media are not only influenced 
by public opinion but also influences future public opinion by selecting, 
emphasizing, or marginalizing the certain attributes of contemporaneous public 
opinion. Chapter 2 explored this reciprocal nature between the news media and 
public opinion with previous studies on public opinion and argued, following 
Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence, that the reciprocal relation between the news 
media and public opinion will follow a cyclical process whereby the presence of 
major opinion causes the news media to represent it and the presentation by the 
news media, in turn, moves public opinion toward a polarization in that the 
majority opinion becomes even larger and the minority opinion becomes even 
smaller in the overall distribution of public opinion. 
 Based on the discussions and research schemes in the previous chapters, 
this chapter details the processes and results of testing these hypotheses. Before 
presenting the results of hypotheses tests, a descriptive result of the content 




Figure 5. Conceptualization of the Tests of Hypotheses 
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Aiming to explore empirically this cyclical formation of public opinion 
and the reciprocal relation between the news media and public opinion, this study, 
in Chapter 3, specified this cyclical formation of public opinion with the case of 
presidential approval rates and the NYT’s report of the rates. More specifically, 
Chapter 3 brought four hypotheses to test the reciprocal relationship between the 
NYT reports and a series of public opinion on presidential approval: two 
hypotheses testing the influence of public opinion on the NYT reports and two 
hypotheses testing the influence of the NYT reports on public opinion. 
H A-1.  The lower/higher than intermediate level a presidential approval 





H A-2. The more a presidential approval rate changes since its previous 
month, the more the NYT is likely to report the approval rate. 
 
H B-1. When other things are controlled, the publication of presidential 
approval rates by the NYT has an additive/subtractive effect on the 
subsequent approval rates. 
 
H B-2. The increasingly frequent publication of presidential approval 
rates by the NYT has caused the public opinion on presidential to become 
more volatile. 
 
Since the purpose of this study is to explore the causal relationship 
between the NYT and a series of presidential approval rates in two-ways, the 
analysis of the relationship is conducted by using two statistical methods. First, in 
order to test the two hypotheses of investigating the influence of presidential 
approval rates on the NYT’s decision to report the approval rates, this study 
applies the quadratic regression model by using SPSS 11.0. Next, the influence of 
the NYT reports on the subsequent approval rates is investigated by applying time-
series models by using EVIEWS 3.1. For both statistical methods, the results of 
the content analysis of the NYT are transformed to a series of monthly data.  
 
Descriptive Results of Content Analysis 
 Prior to testing hypotheses, this study briefly profiles the overall features 
of the NYT coverage of presidential approval rates from 1963 to 2002 by using the 
content analysis. Based on the findings of the content analysis, deeper analysis of 
 121
 
the relationship between the media coverage and public opinion will be addressed 
later in this chapter.  

















































The total number of articles in the New York Times is 447, based on the 
sampling scheme. Looking into the distribution over the years, there is an overall 
tendency that the number of the NYT stories reporting presidential approval rates 
has increased over the last forty years. As shown in Figure 6, the number was 
relatively high during the mid 70s, but decreased later in the 70s and peaked again 
during the early 90s. In general, the number varies significantly from year to year. 
That is, while the average number of stories is 11.2, the number has not been 
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consistent throughout the range of observation varying from none in 1964 to 26 
stories in 1991.    
The distribution over presidents’ terms confirms that the number of the 
NYT stories has increased, showing that the number was relatively low in 
Johnson’s and Ford’s administrative era compared to the number of news stories 
in other presidential periods in the 1980s and later. Given that the former 
President George Bush had only one administrative period, the result indicates 
that his approval rates were the most frequently covered by the NYT (82 news 
stories in 4 years). Figure 7 shows also that Reagan and Clinton’s approval rates 
drew almost equal numbers of the NYT news stories; 86 for Reagan and 89 for 
Clinton.   












Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan G.Bush Clinton W. Bush
  




Among the 447 stories, 130 news stories were reported on the front page 
of the NYT (29.1%). As the number of the NYT stories has increased over the last 
forty years, the number of the front-page stories has also increased proportionally. 
As shown in Figure 8, relatively large numbers of stories were presented on the 
front page during the late 80s and the early 90s.     

















































 Looking at the frames that the NYT stories have applied in their coverage 
of the presidential approval rates, the result shows that the “declining” frame 
comprises the vast majority among all stories. More than three out of ten (34.2%) 
stories presented the current approval rate as declining since the previous poll, 
closely followed by the “inclining” frame (28.4%). By contrast, other frames such 
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as “remaining high,” “unchanged,” and “remaining low” occupied a relatively 
small portion of the whole frame distribution.  
Table 1. Frames of the NYT Stories 
Frames Frequency Percent 
Inclining 127 28.4 
Remaining High 71 15.9 
Unchanged 54 12.1 
Remaining Low 42 9.4 
Declining 153 34.2 
Total 447 100.0 
 
 Table 2 shows how those frames have been distributed across different 
presidents. According to ANOVA test, the frames that the NYT have applied are 
not equally distributed across different presidents (F=5.569, P<.01). Most 
noticeably, the presidential approval rates of the former presidents Johnson and 
Carter were mostly presented as “declining,” while those of Reagan and Clinton 
were, to a large extent, framed as “inclining.” For the former President Nixon, it is 
interesting to note that almost equal numbers of “inclining” and “declining” 
frames were applied to the NYT reports, considering that his role in the Vietnam 
War and Watergate was mostly covered in a critical way by the news media.   
Table 2. Crosstab of Frames by Presidents 
Frames Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan G. Bush Clinton W. Bush
Inclining  6 21 6 8 37 15 30 4 
Remaining High  1 3  3 6 18 30 10 
Unchanged   10  11 18 5 8 2 
Remaining Low  2 11 3 3 6 10 7  
Declining 1 13 25 17 20 19 34 14 10 
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 Among the 447 stories, only 250 stories presented the possible reasons of 
change in the presidential approval rate. Table 3 reveals how the NYT stories 
attributed the changes to certain reasons. Among the attributions, “economic 
condition/economic policy” has been applied by the NYT more than any other 
explanation (26.8%). Next, “diplomatic performance” (14.3%) and “international 
conflict involving US” were given the second and third priority among those 
attributions. This result indicates that economy and international relationship are 
presented as the two most important categories of explaining the change in the 
presidential approval rates in the NYT coverage.   
Table 3. Attribution of Change in Presidential Approval Rates 
Attributions Frequency Percent
International conflicts involving US 32 11.4 
Diplomatic policy/ Summit meeting/ Trip to foreign countries 40 14.3 
Personal image/ leadership/ political scandal 17 6.1 
President’s health 3 1.1 
Domestic Issues (budget, crime, tax, environment, social security) 33 11.8 
Economic condition/ Economic policy 75 26.8 
Political procedures (midterm election/ national convention/ 
honeymoon) 8 2.8 
Watergate 12 4.3 
Sept. 11 7 2.5 
Energy Crisis (Oil price) 7 2.5 
Vietnam War 18 6.4 
Presidential Speech 8 2.8 
Others 20 7.2 




In sum, the results of the content analysis show that the NYT has not been 
consistent its coverage of presidential approval rates during the last forty years; 
rather it has varied significantly in terms of frequencies and tones. On the basis of 
these findings, the following section will reveal how these variances of the NYT 
coverage are causally associated with the presidential approval rates themselves 
as well as other variables.  
 
Analysis of the Effects of the Approval Rates on The NYT 
Since this study expects that the relationship between the approval rates 
and the dependent variable is more complex than a simple linear form, it is hard to 
find a curvilinear relationship with a simple multiple regression model. Instead, 
the quadratic regression model is used to estimate the factors that influence the 
NYT’s decision to report a presidential approval rate. As discussed earlier, the 
quadratic regression model is often used to identify a U-shaped curvilinear 
relationship with an intermediate optimum (which may be a maximum or a 
minimum depending upon the relationship). In this case, this study expects that 
very low presidential approval rates have a high probability of being reported by 
the news media; on the contrary, presidential approval rates in the intermediate 
(average) level have a low probability of being reported; and, presidential 
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approval rates in the very high level again have a higher probability of being 
reported by the news media. Thus, a quadratic relationship between the approval 
rate and the number of the NYT stories is expected to exist, with an intermediate 
(minimum) optimum approval rate at which the number of the NYT stories is 
minimized. The quadratic model equation is identified by including a squared 
term of an independent variable: 
2
1 2o tY X Xα α α= + + + ε  
where oα = constant, 1α = linear coefficient, and 2α = quadratic 
coefficient. 
The dependent variable, “NUMOFNYT” is the number of the NYT stories 
reporting presidential approval rates in a given month. For example, if the NYT 
presented a news story reporting presidential approval rates five times in a given 
month, NUMOFNYT in the month is coded to 5. Table 4 describes the main 
variables used in the quadratic regression. The two main independent variables, 
APPROVAL and APPCHANGE, are measured by using the monthly data of the 
Gallup poll. 
Table 4, in addition to the independent testing variables (APPROVAL and 
APPCHANGE) and the dependent variable (NUMOFNYT), includes six 
additional variables which are believed to influence the decision of reporting an 
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approval rate (POSTIVE, NEGATIVE, CPI, UNEMPLOY, INCUMBENCY, and 
SECOND). Since testing the main independent variables (APPROVAL and 
APPCHANGE) without consideration of these control variables may result in an 
overestimation of the effect of the testing variables on the dependent variable, it is 
important to include these variables before including the testing variables. 
Table 4. Description of Variables 
 Variables Variables Description N Mean S.D 
NUMOFNYT The number of the NYT stories reporting a 
presidential approval rate in a given 
month. 
480 .93 1.13 
APPROVAL The presidential approval rate in the 
month. 
480 54.24 11.89 
APPCHANGE The margin of the change of a 
presidential approval rate since previous 
month. 
480 -.025 5.21 
POSITIVE Whether an important political event, 
which is expected to move up a 
presidential approval rate, occurs in the 
month. YES=1, NO=0 
480 .09 .28 
NEGATIVE Whether an important political event, 
which is expected to move down a 
presidential approval rate, occurs in the 
month. YES=1, NO=0 
480 .15 .35 
CPI The changed Consumer Price Index since 
the first month of incumbency 
480 10.52 9.07 
UNEMPLOY The changed unemployment percentages 
since the first month of incumbency 
480 -.22 1.69 
INCUMBENCY Years a President in incumbency.  
Min= 1, Max= 4. 
480 2.46 1.15 
SECOND Whether a President in second term. 
YES=1, NO=0 
480 .24 .43 
  
While innumerable considerations may also influence reporting decisions, 
this study included those six variables, which are most commonly believed to 
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influence reporting decision. As previous studies indicate, the occurrence of 
important political events, either positive events such as international crises or 
negative events such as administrative scandals, brought rapid changes in public 
atmosphere including a quick shift of public opinion on presidential job 
performance (Mueller, 1973, Kernell, 1978).36 As the news media tend to use 
presidential approval rates as a “news peg” in presidential activity on substantive 
issues (Groeling and Kernell, 1998, p. 1072), it is reasonable to expect that the 
occurrence of an international crisis or other important event may enhance the 
chances of reporting the rates. Another important consideration is the influence of 
economic conditions on public atmosphere surrounding presidential approval 
rates. As discussed in a previous chapter, a good number of studies have 
confirmed that public perception of economic conditions is clearly related to the 
public assessment of president job handling (e.g., Hibbs, 1979; Stimson, 1976). If 
that economic situation is served as an important cue for public evaluations of the 
president’s performance is true, it is not unimaginable to expect that it may point 
the news media to report the presidential approval rate under certain conditions, 
too. In this model, economic condition is operationalized to CPI (inflation) and 
unemployment rates. Next, this model includes the years of presidential 
incumbency and the first/second term of presidency, believing that the duration of 
a president in office is an important factor in making the news media pay attention 
                                                 
36 For an empirical study of measuring rally events on reporting decisions, see Groeling & 
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to the presidential rate. Given that the rating number is often used to forecast the 
winner of the next presidential election (Crespi, 1980a), the years of incumbency 
and the first/second term of presidency may be important indicators of reporting 
the presidential rates.  
As Table 4 indicates, the monthly data of the last 40 years provided a good 
number of the sample size (n=480). Simple descriptive analysis shows several 
findings. First, the mean score (.93) of NUMOFNYT shows that the NYT 
presented almost one story reporting presidential approval rates in a month. The 
finding confirms that presidential approval rates are one of the most common 
topics for the news media to use frequently in order to indicate public atmosphere 
on the contemporary political situation. Also, Table 4 shows that as for the 
important political events that are expected to move presidential approval rates, 
negative events have been more frequent than positive events in the last 40 years. 
As only three Presidents completed their second term of presidency in the last 40 
years, Table 4 shows that the mean number of SECOND is relatively small (.24). 
APPROVAL RATES AND THE NYT STORIES 
 
The results from Table 5 indicate that the variance in the number of the 
NYT reports is significantly associated with each independent variable. Before 
investigating the main independent variables, the result from model 1 shows that 
                                                                                                                                     
Kernell (1998).  
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all individual variables this study assumed to be associated with the number of the 
NYT stories reporting presidential approval rates are statistically significant 
indicators, as expected. 
Table 5. Quadratic Regression Model 1& 2  
Dependent Variable= NUMOFNYT 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Beta T-test Beta T-test 
Constant 1.091 8.569*** 3.467 4.671*** 
POSITIVE .639 3.667*** .672 3.865*** 
NEGATIVE .545 3.828*** .527 3.730*** 
CPI .030 2.956*** .030 3.053*** 
UNEMPLOY .092 2.859*** .058 1.734* 
INOFFICE -.202 -3.604*** -.237 -4.110*** 
SECOND -.345 -1.695* -.401 -1.986** 
APPROVAL   -.076 -2.872*** 
APPROVAL2   .0006 2.499** 
F-test  8.846*** 8.312*** 
R2 .101 .124 
Adjusted R2 .089 .109 
Note. N=480, * p≤ .10, ** p≤.05, *** p≤.01 
 
As a political event occurs, the NYT is more likely to report presidential 
approval rates in that month. The coefficients on the POSITIVE and the 
NEGATIVE variables have a t-test statistic equal to 3.67 and 3.83 respectively, 
which are significant at the .001 level (99.9% confidence level). Also the result 
from Model 1 indicates that the number of the NYT stories are strongly associated 
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with economic variables. The model, in general, shows that when economic 
conditions are bad (i.e., inflation rate and unemployment rate are high), the NYT is 
more likely to report a presidential approval rate. Next, the model also shows that 
the duration of the president in office is negative associated with the number of 
the NYT reports. As expected, the NYT is less likely to pay attention to the 
approval rate as the incumbent period is getting longer and the incumbency moves 
into the second term. The coefficient of the INOFFICE variable is -.202 (p=.000), 
which means that as the incumbency increases one year, the NYT story, 
predictably, will present .2 fewer stories in a month. The coefficient on the 
SECOND variable has a t-test statistic equal to –1.67, which is marginally 
significant (p= .091), and means that, compared to the first term, we may expect -
.34 less stories reporting presidential rates in a month when a president in his 
second term. The overall model is significant at the .001 level according to the F-
test statistic. The adjusted R2 is .089. 
The result from model 2 shows strong evidence to support the first 
hypothesis; that is the results support the hypothetical argument that the 
convergence in public opinion raises the number of the media coverage of the 
public opinion through the case of presidential approval rates and the NYT reports. 
While the result shows that the control variables still have significant effects on 
the number of stories in the second model, it confirms that, as the linear term and 
the quadratic term are added to the first model, when other things are controlled, 
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the lower/higher than average a presidential approval rate is, the more the NYT is 
likely to report the approval rate. More specifically, the result from Model 2 
indicates that when other things are equal, there exists a curvilinear tendency in 
the relation between the presidential approval number and the number of the NYT 
stories. The coefficient on the APPROVAL variable is –.80, which is significant 
at .05 level (t= –2.87). That is, the overall tendency is that the higher the approval 
rate is, the less the NYT is likely to report the rate. But, this overall linear 
tendency is adjusted to a curvilinear relation, as the coefficient on the squared 
term of the APPROVAL has a t-test statistic equal to 2.50 which is significant at 
the .05 level.  
In Figure 9, this study plots the overall relationship between the number of 
news reports and the presidential approval rates. The relation plotted in Figure 9 
points strongly to the fact that there exists a quadratic relationship between the 
approval rate and the number of the NYT stories with an optimum (minimum) 
approval rate at which the number of the NYT stories is minimized. 
 134
 























Without Political Events With Positive Events With Negative Events
* Note: All variables except APPROVAL, APPROVAL2, POSITIVE, and 
NEGATIVE have been held at their mean values. Addition of POSITIVE or 
NEGATIVE presents an intercept change when a political event, which is 
expected to influence positively or negatively, occurs. 
 
Figure 9 shows that the number of the NYT stories is minimized when the 
approval rate stays at about 60, and the number of stories increases as the 
approval rate moves further from the optimum level. Turning back to the result 
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from Table 2, this study investigates the influence of political events on the 
number of stories for controlling variables. The result shows that while both 
positive events and negative events show statistical significance of raising the 
intercept of the curvilinear relationship, the coefficient of NEGATIVE (.527) is 
smaller than that of POSITIVE (.672). As shown in Figure 9, when a positive 
event occurs, we may expect more NYT reports on presidential approval rates 
across different levels of approval rates than otherwise. Among control variables 
in Model 2, the coefficient on the UNEMPLOY variable has a t-test statistic equal 
to 1.73, which is marginally significant at the .1 level (90% confidence level). The 
F-test statistic shows that the overall Model 2 is significant at the .001 level. And 














THE CHANGES IN APPROVAL RATINGS AND THE NYT STORIES 
 
Table 6. Quadratic Regression Model 3 
Dependent Variable= NUMOFNYT 
 Model 3 
Variables Beta T-test 
Constant 3.234 4.302*** 
POSITIVE .698 3.990*** 
NEGATIVE .452 3.121*** 
CPI .030 3.054*** 
UNEMPLOY .059 1.778* 
INOFFICE -.225 -3.891*** 
SECOND -.379 -1.879* 
APPROVAL -.071 -2.638** 
APPROVAL2 .0006 2.308** 
APPCHANGE -.025 -2.083** 
APPCHANGE2 .001 1.695* 
F-test  7.163*** 
R2 .133 
Adjusted R2 .114 
Note. N=480 * p≤ .10, ** p≤.05, *** p≤.01 
 
In order to test the second hypotheses, the new variable, APPCHANGE, is 
added to the previous model. The result from Table 6 shows an overall support to 
the second hypothesis; that is, the result supports the hypothetical argument that 
the margin of change in public opinion is positively related to the increase of the 
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media coverage of the public opinion through the case of presidential approval 
rates and the NYT coverage.  
As shown in the previous model, the result of Model 3 confirms that when 
other things are controlled, the more a presidential approval rate changes from the 
previous month, the more the NYT presents stories reporting presidential approval 
rates. More specifically, the result indicates that when other things are equal, there 
exists a curvilinear tendency in the relation between the changes in presidential 
approval and the number of the NYT stories. The coefficient on the APPCHANGE 
variable is –.025, which is significant at .05 level (t= –2.08). That is, the overall 
tendency is that the more the approval rate drops from its previous month, the 
more the NYT is likely to report the rate. But, this overall linear tendency is 
adjusted to a curvilinear relation, as the coefficient on the squared term of the 
APPCHANGE has a t-test statistic equal to 1.675, which is marginally significant 
at .1 level.  
Figure 10 plots the overall relationship between the number of news 
reports and the changes in presidential approval rates. As shown in Figure 2, the 
relation plotted in Figure 10 points to the fact that there exist a quadratic 
relationship between the changes in approval rate and the number of the NYT 
stories with an optimum (minimum) approval rate at which the number of the 
NYT stories is minimized. Interestingly, Figure 10 shows that the number of the 
NYT stories is minimized when the change in approval rate is about 10, that is, the 
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curve is not symmetrical with the lowest point at zero. Instead, the curve is 
asymmetrical across the declining changes and inclining changes in presidential 
approval. With this result, we may conclude that while the change in presidential 
approval ratings is a significant indicator of the number of stories, the strength of 
the changes on the NYT is bigger when the approval rate is declining from its 
previous month than when it is inclining. The result of Table 3 shows that while 
the control variables are still statistically significant, the coefficients on the 
UNEMPLOY variable and the SECOND variable are only marginally significant 
(p≤ .10) in Model 3. The F-test statistic shows that the overall Model 3 is 
significant at the .001 level. And the adjusted R2 of Model 3, compared to the 
second model, is improved from 109 to .114.  
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Figure 10. Relationship between the Number of the NYT Stories and 
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Without any Political Event With a Positive Event With a Negative Event
 
Note: All variables except APPCHANGE, APPCHANGE2, POSITIVE, and NEGATIVE 
have been held at their mean values. Addition of POSITIVE or NEGATIVE presents an 




In sum, the quadratic regression models show strong evidence of 
supporting the hypotheses. The consistently significant control variables in these 
models demonstrate that political events, economic condition, and the time spent 
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in office are validly included as controls in the analysis. After controlling these 
variables, the significance of testing variables (approval rates and approval 
changes) tells that the convergence and the change in public evaluation of the 
presidential performance have significant influence on the media sensitivity to the 
climate of public opinion. That is, given that the degree to which the news media, 
in this case the NYT, are paying attention to a specific public opinion is not 
constant but varies across different contexts, this study confirms two points: first, 
the attention that the news media are paying to public opinion on presidential 
approval increases significantly when the public opinion on presidential approval 
indicates the convergence in the opinion (indicating the majority evidently), 
compared to when public opinion is evenly divided; and second, the attention that 
the news media are paying to the public opinion on presidential approval 
increases significantly when public opinion indicates a rapid change (indicating 












Analysis of the Effect of the NYT Stories on the Approval Rates     
TEST OF THE ARMA MODEL 
 
 The equation model for a time-series record is different from a cross-
sectional model in that it cannot simply identify a value in the time-series as a 
combination of individual variables. Since each observation in the time-series is 
conditional on previous observations, using a simple cross-sectional model, which 
does not reflect this, it may result in a missspecified conclusion which 
overestimates the relation between individual variables and the time-series 
(Ostrom, 1990, Rhee, 1996, Gronke & Brehm, 2002). In the case of this study, 
identifying an approval rate as a simple product of exogenous variables, such as 
political events or economic condition, may result in a spurious association 
between the approval rate and the exogenous variables. Statistically, the 
misspecification of the association between variables without consideration of 
endogenous variables may violate the basic assumptions of the OLS (ordinary 
least-squares) regression: that is, the assumptions of homoskedacity (the error 
term is constant over all observations) and no autocorrelation (the error term is 
not correlated with its previous terms)37.  
                                                 




 Before testing the main variables, this study begins with a simple time-
series regression model and investigates whether it meets the basic assumptions in 
order to establish a basis for the appropriate model for estimating the association 
between testing variables and the presidential approval rates. The baseline model 
includes following principal independent variables as control:  
 
Table 7. Description of the Independent Variables in the Baseline Model 
Variables Description 
POSITIVE 
Whether an important political event, which is expected to 
move up a presidential approval rate, occurs in the month. 
YES=1, NO=0 
NEGATIVE 
Whether an important political event, which is expected to 
move down a presidential approval rate, occurs in the 
month. YES=1, NO=0 
CPI The changed Consumer Price Index since the fist month of incumbency 
UNEMPLOY The changed unemployment percentages since the first month of incumbency 
INAUGURATION A dummy for an inauguration of a new president in the month YES=1, NO=0 
SECOND Whether a President in second term. YES=1, NO=0 
WATERGATE A dummy for the one year before the resignation of Nixon 
9/11 A dummy for the one year from the terrorist attack 
 
Among the variables, the variables of representing the influence of political 
events (POSITIVE, NEGATIVE) are lagged from zero to four months and the 
variables of representing the influence of economic condition (CPI, UNEMPLOY) 
are lagged to one month in order to account for the delay before such information 
would be incorporated into the approval rate. In addition to these variables, two 
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dummy variables for the Watergate and the Sept. 11 are added to control the 
extraordinary occasions in the approval series.  
Table 8. Approval Rate as a Function of Control Variables (baseline model) 
Dependent Variable= APPROVAL 
 Baseline Model 
Variables Beta T-test 
Constant 56.336 71.949*** 
POSITIVE t 2.564 1.656* 
 t-1        4.290 2.757*** 
 t-2 2.961 1.904* 
 t-3 3.266 2.096** 
 t-4 2.265 1.448 
NEGATIVE t -2.019 -1.576 
 t-1        -1.297 -1.009 
 t-2 -2.181 -1.702* 
 t-3 -1.791 -1.381 
 t-4 -1.997 -1.544 
CPIt-1 -0.480 -6.882*** 
UNEMPLOYt-1 -0.498 -1.694* 
INAUGURATION 9.399 2.751*** 
SECOND 10.984 6.800*** 
WATERGATE -28.631 -8.742*** 
9/11 25.008 8.842*** 
F-test  18.310*** 
R2 .389 
Adjusted R2 .368 
Note. N=475, * p≤ .10, ** p≤.05, *** p≤.01 
 
 The result from Table 8 indicates that, as expected, almost all independent 
variables that this study includes as control are significantly associated with the 
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presidential approval rate. More specifically, the increases of two economic 
indexes are negatively associated with the approval rate (-.480 for CPI and –.498 
for UNEMPLOY). Also, the result shows that the occurrence of positive political 
events is a significant indicator of the approval rates of the following months. The 
coefficient of the POSITIVE t variable is 2.564 and the coefficient of the 
POSITIVE reaches to the peak one month after it happened. Meanwhile, Table 8 
shows that the effect of the occurrence of negative political event is only 
marginally significant. The coefficient of the NEGATIVE t is –2.019, which is 
marginal at .01 level, and the impact of the negative events reaches to the peak 
two months later.  
Next, the coefficients of both INAUGURATION and SECOND are also 
significant at .01 level respectively. The adjusted R2 of the baseline model is .389, 
and the F-test shows that the overall model is significant at .01 level. While the 
analysis of the baseline model shows interesting results, it is possible that the 
model is misspecified by missing endogenous variables in the model so that the 
model results in the spurious relations between those independent variables and 
the approval rate. That is, while the model could be useful to show the overall 
tendency between the independent variables and the approval rate, it should be 
noted that the misspecification could result in a wrong conclusion in testing 
hypotheses which demand a more accurate estimation of the association between 
variables.      
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Table 9. Autocorrelation and Partial Correlation of the Residual (baseline model) 
 Lag AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
1 0.857 0.857 351.86 0.000
2 0.767 0.122 634.31 0.000
3 0.703 0.082 872.27 0.000
4 0.617 -0.084 1055.8 0.000
5 0.565 0.068 1209.9 0.000
6 0.517 0.013 1339.4 0.000
7 0.483 0.058 1452.6 0.000
8 0.431 -0.077 1542.9 0.000
9 0.404 0.065 1622.2 0.000
10 0.361 -0.062 1685.9 0.000
11 0.325 0.023 1737.7 0.000
12 0.301 0.002 1782.2 0.000
 
Figure 11. Correlogram of Autocorrelations and Partial Correlations of the Residual 
(baseline model) 















 As expected, the autocorrelation analysis of the residuals of the baseline 
model shows that each observation of the residual strongly correlates with 
previous observations of the residual. Table 9 and Figure 11 show that while the 
autocorrelations are exponentially decreasing, the partial correlation is 
significantly cut-off after the first lag. That is, the results from Table 9 and Figure 
11 indicates that the model has a typical propensity of auto-regression at its first 
lag, i.e., AR(1). In order to control for contaminating effects of autoregressive 
tendency within these times series, this study applies the ARMA (auto-regression, 
moving average) modeling technique. ARMA is one of the most common 
approaches for the analysis of the association among stationary38 time-series with 
heteroskedacitic residuals. ARMA models allow one to analyze the relations 
among time-series variables by adding endogenous variables at the mean level to 
adjust the residual to “white noise” (i.e., randomly fluctuating residuals). 
Tests of the ARMA model surrounding the relationships between the 
independent variables as control and the dependent variable reveal that a model 
with the first-order autoregressive term and the first-order moving average term, 
i.e., ARMA(1,1), needs to be applied for the analysis39. The specified ARMA 
model is: 
                                                 
38 The ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller) test shows that the APPROVAL variable is not randomly 
moving (t=-4.15). That is, the time-series is stationary (i.e., tending to return to the mean in the 
long run).  
39 In many cases, both AR(1) and ARMA(1,1) can be used for statistical analysis. While AIC 





ot k t i t tY X Y 1tα λ α β ε θε− −= + + + + − − , (i=0,1,…,4), 
where kλ  represents an intercept change by SECOND, and INAUGURATION, 
jX represents other independent variables, 0 1tYβ −  represents AR(1) term, and 
1tθε −  represents MA(1) term.  
 Table 10 shows that there are noticeable changes between the ARMA (1,1) 
model and the baseline OLS model, while confirming that the independent 
variables are significantly associated with the approval rate in the ARMA (1,1) 
model, too. The results from Table 10 provide that the coefficient size of each 
variable is noticeably smaller than that of the OLS model, while showing that the 
ARMA model indicates the same overall tendencies between the variables as the 















                                                                                                                                     
model, in this study both AIC and SC (Schwatz Criterion) scores are minimized in the ARMA 
(1,1) model.  
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Table 10. Approval Rate as a Function of Control Variables (ARMA model) 
Dependent Variable= APPROVAL 
 ARMA  Model 1 
Variables Beta T-test 
Constant 56.077 22.255*** 
POSITIVE t 2.178 3.024*** 
 t-1        3.754 4.587*** 
 t-2 2.158 2.624*** 
 t-3 2.009 2.491** 
 t-4 0.804 1.123 
NEGATIVE t -1.750 -2.870*** 
 t-1        -1.266 -1.899** 
 t-2 -2.002 -2.816*** 
 t-3 -1.728 -2.573*** 
 t-4 -1.565 -2.582*** 
CPIt-1 -0.204 -2.490** 
UNEMPLOYt-1 -0.223 -0.340 
INAUGURATION 7.053 5.021*** 
SECOND 1.063 0.545 
WATERGATE -15.287 -4.443*** 
9/11 17.401 5.347*** 
AR(1) 0.924 45.842*** 
MA(1) -0.157 -2.995*** 
F-test  156.181*** 
Adjusted R2 .855 
-2 L.L.  
(log likelihood)  
2761.088 
Note. N=475, * p≤ .10, ** p≤.05, *** p≤.01 
 
 More specifically, while the ARMA Model 1 shows that the increases of 
two economic indexes are negatively associated with the approval rate (-.204 for 
CPI and –.223 for UNEMPLOY), only CPI is a statistically significant indicator 
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of the approval rate (p≤05). That is, as far as the economy is concerned, it is 
inflation (CPI) that guides public assessment of the incumbent president. Next, 
the result from the ARMA model show that the SECOND variable has no 
significant effect on the presidential approval, while the coefficient of 
INAUGURATION is still significant at .01 level in the model.  
The biggest change from the baseline OLS model to the ARMA model is 
that the ARMA model confirms that the occurrence of political events are 
significantly associated with the following approval rates. While the baseline OLS 
model demonstrates only the influence of positive political events, the ARMA 
(1,1) model shows that both positive and negative events are statistically 
significant indicators of the following approval rates. Interestingly, the coefficient 
of the POSITIVE t-i (i=0, 1,2, 3, 4) tends to decrease as the lagged term (i) becomes 
larger after it reached to the peak at the first lag. So that after four months, the 
occurrence of the positive events has almost no influence on the approval rate 
(b=.084). On the contrary, the coefficients of the NEGATIVE t-i (i=0,1, 2, 3, 4) tend to 
reach to the peak at the second lag and even after two months the influence does 
not die off. That means that when an important political event occurs, the way it 
induces change on the presidential approval rate varies according to the nature of 
the political event. When a positive event happens, its causal influence on the 
approval rate reaches to the peak at its instant moment and the effect becomes 
distilled as time passes on. But, in the case of a negative event, its causal 
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influence on the presidential rate does not reach the peak at its instant moment; 
instead the result of Table 7 shows that the efficient reaches to the peak two 
months after the negative event occurs and the influence stays longer than that of 
positive events. Noticeably, the adjusted R2 of the ARMA model is dramatically 
improved from the baseline OLS model to .855, and F-test shows that the overall 
model is significant at .01 level. 
 
ADDITIVE/SUBTRACTIVE EFFECT OF THE NYT STORIES ON THE APPROVAL 
RATE 
 
 Given that the overall relationship between the approval rate and the 
independent variables that this study includes as controls is indicated 
appropriately by the test of the ARMA(1,1) model, this study now presents the 
analysis of the effect of the NYT presentations of the poll results on the following 
approval rates while controlling those variables. The effect of the NYT stories on 
the approval rate is investigated in two ways: first, in order to test how the 
indication of the majority by the NYT has influenced the approval rate, a set of 
new test variables, HIGH and LOW, are added to the given model; second, to see 
the effect of the indication of the relative majority on the approval rates, a set of 
new test variables, INCLINING and DECLINING, is added to the given model. 
More specifically, the following ARMA (1,1) models test following variables: 
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Table 11. Description of the Test Variables in the ARMA model 
Test Variables Description 
HIGH 
The number of the NYT stories 
indicating more than 60% presidential 
approval rate in a month. 




The number of the NYT stories 
indicating less than 40% presidential 
approval rate in a month. 
INCLINING 
The number of the NYT stories 
indicating the presidential approval rate 
inclined since previous months in a 
month. 
When the NYT 
indicates  
Relative Majority 
(Change)  DECLINING 
The number of the NYT stories 
indicating the presidential approval rate 
declined since previous months in a 
month. 
 
Given that the mean of the presidential approval rate moves around 50%, 
this study limits the range of two variables of indicating majority opinion within 
over 60% and under 40% respectively. Any NYT stories reporting any approval 
rate from 41 to 59% are not considered as indicating clearly the majority opinion 
on evaluating presidential job performance. All test variables are lagged from one 
to three months in order to account for the delay before the effect of the stories 







Table 12. Approval Rates as a Function of Control and Test Variables (ARMA model) 
Dependent Variable = APPROVAL 
 ARMA model 2  (majority) 
ARMA model 3  
(relative majority) 
Variables Beta T-test Beta T-test 
Constant 55.908 23.580*** 56.294 21.560*** 
POSITIVE t 2.365 3.266*** 2.265 3.152*** 
 t-1 3.644 4.401*** 3.467 4.262*** 
 t-2 1.802 2.149** 1.775 2.161** 
 t-3 1.831 2.214** 1.989 2.461** 
 t-4 0.677 0.937 1.151 1.601 
NEGATIVE t -1.781 -2.904*** -1.770 -2.923*** 
 t-1 -1.277 -1.918* -1.113 -1.706** 
 t-2 -2.148 -3.017*** -1.877 -2.706*** 
 t-3 -1.845 -2.745*** -1.417 -2.133** 
 t-4 -1.551 -2.546** -1.434 -2.359** 
CPI t-1 -0.195 -2.390** -0.216 -2.684*** 
UNEMPLOY t-1 -0.219 -0.338 -0.256 -0.396 
INAUGURATION 7.056 5.008*** 6.999 4.970*** 
SECOND 1.230 0.634 0.915 0.475 
WATERGATE -14.7799 -4.268*** -15.342 -4.538*** 
9/11 16.923 5.190*** 17.081 5.246*** 
HIGH t-1 0.373 1.299 - - 
 t-2 0.495 1.593 - - 
 t-3 0.065 0.228 - - 
LOW t-1 -0.694 -1.531 - - 
 t-2 0.129 0.271 - - 
 t-3 -0.575 -1.264 - - 
INCLINING t-1 - - 0.659 1.984** 
 t-2 - - 0.296 0.822 
 t-3 - - 0.087 0.264 
DECLINING t-1 - - -0.912 -3.047*** 
 t-2 - - -0.032 -0.101 
 t-3 - - -0.273 -0.925 
AR(1) 0.919473 43.000*** 0.931 47.974*** 
MA(1) -0.165285 -3.063*** -0.203 -3.710*** 
F-test 118.091*** 120.737*** 
Adjusted R2 .855 .858 
-2 L.L. 2752.354 2743.358 




 Table 12 reports a modest support to the hypothesis B-1. Before 
discussing the additive/subtractive effect of the NYT stories, the upper lines of the 
table reconfirm the general trends between the occurrence of political events and 
the approval rate. As indicated by the earlier models, the impact of a positive 
event reaches to the peak at its instant moment and decreases later, while the 
impact of a negative event is most evident two months after its occurrence and 
stays longer. Also, the models in Table 12 make it evident again that inflation 
change (CPI) and the inauguration of a new president (INAUGURATION) are 
significant indicators of the approval rate.  
 As for testing the additive/subtractive effect of the news stories, the 
analysis shows that when the NYT stories indicated a majority of opinion, either 
approving majority (HIGH) or disapproving majority (LOW), the impact of the 
indication is only marginally significant at 0.1 level. More specifically, the result 
of the ARMA (1,1) Model 2 shows that the impact of the NYT stories indicating 
approving majority on following approval rates is marginal at .10 level only two 
months after the report (P=.111). The result also notes that when the NYT stories 
indicated that the majority of the public disapproves of the presidential job 
performance, the impact of the news stories on following approval rates becomes 
marginal at the .10 level only at its first lag (p=.123). Considering that the model 
improvement from the previous model to the ARMA (1,1) Model 2 is not 
significant, it is hard to conclude that the simple indication of the majority has an 
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additive or subtractive effect on the following opinion polls with these marginally 
significant results. But, the overall trends between the NYT stories and the 
following approval rates should be noted. That is, the result of the ARMA Model 
2 shows a trend that, after controlling the effect of other variables, the indication 
of an approving majority by the NYT stories is positively associated with the 
following approval rates, while the indication of a disapproving majority is, 
overall, negatively associated with the following rates.  
 The result from the ARMA (1,1) model 3 provides stronger support to the 
hypothesis B-1. The result from the ARMA Model 3 reports that when a NYT 
story indicated that the “relative majority” is approving the presidential job 
performance, .659 points of approving rates are added to the given approving rate 
in the following month (p≤ .05), after controlling other variables. The overall 
trend in the ARMA Model 3, when compared to the result of the ARMA Model 2, 
shows that the impact of the NYT stories is more immediate (that is, significant at 
the first time lag) and becomes smaller in the following months.  
And, as for the test of the subtractive effect of the NYT stories indicating 
the “relative majority” of disapproval of the president, the causal association of 
the NYT stories is more obvious (p≤ .01); that means when the NYT reported that 
the “relative majority” disapproves of the president, the NYT report tends to 
induce more subtraction to the given decreasing approval rate. The result also 
shows that the impact of the NYT story indicating the “relative majority” 
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disapproves of the presidential job performance, the impact of the stories is not 
only significant, but the magnitude of the impact is larger than that of the story 
indicating the approving “relative majority” (b=-.901). Given that the model 
improvement from the ARMA Model 1 to the ARMA Model 3 is significant (χ2 = 
17.730) at .05 level, it is possible to conclude that after controlling the effect of 
other variables, the indication of the “relative majority” by the NYT has an 
additional/subtractive effect on the following opinion polls.   
 
 
VOLATILITY OF THE APPROVAL RATE AND THE NYT STORIES ON THE 
APPROVAL RATE 
 
 Before investigating the association between the volatility of the approval 
rate and the NYT stories for the last 40 years, this study needs to confirm that the 
volatility of the approval rate has not been constant for the period of observation. 
While one of the simplest approaches to exploring this is to compare the standard 
deviations and the degrees of kurtosis across different periods, the method is not 
the best way to determine the volatility of approval rate because it does not 
control for the similarities and differences across different periods in any 
systematic way. Since, as confirmed earlier, the different political or economic 
context is causally associated with the approval rate, any test of volatility without 
considering these contexts is hard to provide any more than a simple trend on the 
volatility. And, another problem in this simple approach of using standard 
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deviations for measuring volatility is that the method cannot control the problem 
of auto-correlation among the volatility terms over time. As Engel (1982) 
proposes in his seminal work, for a time-series which has a propensity of AR(1), 
the volatility of the time-series needs to be measured by identifying the error 
variance ( 2σ ) conditioned on the time series, since the variances of the time-
series tends to be auto-correlated over time.        
Table 13. Variations in Approval Rates, 1963-2002 
Period High Point  Low Point Mean S.D. Kurtosis 
1963-1972 
(n=120) 
50 35 56.875 10.448 2.273 
1973-1982 
(n=120) 
70 23 45.616 11.235 2.400 
1983-1992 
(n=120) 
89 29 56.308 11.251 2.916 
1993-2002 
(n=120) 
90 37 58.141 10.256 4.267 
Overall 
(n=480) 
90 23 54.235 11.887 3.201 
 
 A more formal approach to test the volatility (i.e., changing variance) 
across different periods is to test variance with the ARCH (autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedacity) model (Engel, 1982). The ARCH model is often used 
for a financial time-series that is stationary in the long run but its volatility is 
clustered in specific periods of time. The presence of ARCH means the variance 
at any time is a function of the square of the residuals in the previous period. That 
is, ARCH (1) model represents that when iot i t i tY Xα α ε−= + +
i
t, ( X = independent 
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variables), the conditional variance (the volatility) of  follows a function of tY
2 2
0 1t t 1σ β β ε −= + 40.  
As discussed, one of the advantages of using this ARCH approach is that it 
enables one to test the changing variances of a time-series after controlling the 
effects of independent variables and auto-regression on the time-series. The 
presence of the ARCH can be tested by a relatively simple LM (Lagrange 
Multiplier) test (see, Hamilton, 1994, p.664)41. Applying this LM test to the 
baseline OLS model yields a 2χ (d.f. =1) of 268.37, which is significant at .01 
level, and thus rejects the null hypothesis of no ARCH(1) in the model. As the 
ARCH (1) confirmed, the conditional variance of the ARCH (1) model provides 
the following function as the volatility model for the last 40 years of the approval 
series (i.e., after controlling the effect of the independent variables and the first 

















                                                 
40 For full description of ARCH model, see Engel (1982). 
41 In the case of ARCH (1), when the squared error of the OLS model ( 2tε ) is regressed on a 
constant and its own first lagged term, (i.e., 2 20 1 1t t eε α α ε − t= + + ), the function of LM=T*R2  
follows the distribution of chi-square with 1 degree of freedom (T = the number of sample, R2 
from the regression).  
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As shown in Figure 12, the volatility of the presidential approval rates was 
relatively high in the 1970s and the early 80s, while the volatility of the mid 80s 
and the 90s was relatively low with a couple of exceptions (the Gulf War period 
and the September 11 period). Even after controlling the effects of political events 
and the auto-regressive conditional heteroskedacity, the volatility graph shows 
that volatility tends to be clustered around important political events such as the 
Watergate scandal (1972-1974), the hostage crisis in Iran (79-81), the Gulf War 
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(89-91), and the Sept.11 (2001-2002). The average level of the volatility in 
approval of the 1960s (1963-1972) is 4.505, the level slightly increased to 4.665 
and 4.559 during the 70s and the 80s, but later in the 90s the level is down to 
4.262.  
In order to test the relationship between the changing volatility and the 
number of the NYT stories reporting, this study estimates the causal association 
between them by using the ARCH(1)-m model. The ARCH-m model is an 
innovative approach to enable one to see the mean level of changes and the 
variance level of change in a time-series, which has an auto-regressive tendency, 
while controlling the auto-regressive tendency in the mean level and the variance 
level of the time-series.  
As this study hypothesized, the number of the NYT stories reporting the 
presidential approval rates is causally associated with the volatility of the 
approval series. This study included the variable of NUMOFNYT in the function 
of specification of the variance and it is lagged from one to three months in order 
to account for the delay before such information would be incorporated into the 
variance of the approval rate. Also, expecting that the presidential second term, 
which does not have significant effect in changing the approval rates in the mean 
level, have some influence on the variance of the approval series, this study added 




Table 14. The Changes in Approval Rates and Volatility (ARCH-m model) 
Variable Beta S.E. 
Mean Model (D.V.=APPROVAL) 
Constant 54.049*** 4.180 
POSITIVE t 1.734** 0.708 
 t-1 2.511*** 0.763 
 t-2 0.915 0.658 
 t-3 1.188** 0.600 
 t-4 0.231 0.575 
NEGATIVE t -1.364** 0.546 
 t-1 -0.603 0.566 
 t-2 -1.552*** 0.542 
 t-3 -1.091** 0.619 
 t-4 -1.063** 0.443 
CPI t-1 -0.163 0.108 
UNEMPLOY t-1 -1.050 0.884 
INAUGURATION 9.139*** 2.591 
SECOND 0.453 2.695 
WATERGATE  -23.294*** 8.214 
9/11  21.834*** 8.061 
AR(1)  0.9257*** 0.017 
MA(1)  -0.191*** 0.061 
Variance Model (D.V.= Volatility in Approval) 
Constant  12.130*** 2.406 
SECOND  -4.409* 2.711 
NUMOFNYT t-1 3.247** 1.494 
 t-2 -1.491 1.243 
 t-3 1.347 1.720 
ARCH(1)  0.363*** 0.138 
F-test 105.526 
Adjusted R2 .846 
-2 L.L. (log likelihood) 2723.268 





The results from Table 14 provide a good support to the hypothesis B-2. 
First, as expected, the result documents that the presidential approval rates has 
been less volatile when the president stays in his second term (p≤ .10). Although, 
statistically, marginally significant only at .10 level, the coefficient estimate 
indicates that public approval of the president is less volatile by 4.409 points 
during the second term. In addition, the model shows that the significant portion 
of the volatility (about 36%) in a month carries over into the next month. The 
coefficient of ARCH(1) is .363 and statistically significant at .01 level. 
Most importantly, the result shows that increases in the number of the NYT 
stories reporting the presidential approval rates are positively associated with 
increasing volatility. The coefficient of the NUMOFNYT is significant at .05 level 
at its first lag. When the NYT presents one news story on reporting the presidential 
approval rate, the volatility in the following month also increases by 3.247 points. 
This result tells that the NYT reports bring more changing variance in the 
following approval rate. The importance of this result is that it enables us to 
synthesize two directional effects, as confirmed in the previous part (i.e, additive 
and subtractive effects of the NYT stories on the following approval rate), so that 





SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The statistical tests confirm that there exists a reciprocal relation between 
the NYT reports and public evaluation of presidential performance, and the 
relation results in the intensification of majority opinion and the increased 
volatility of public opinion. First, this study found good evidence to support the 
hypotheses about the impact of convergence and change in public opinion on the 
NYT’s decision to report. The quadratic regression analysis showed that there 
exist U-shaped curvilinear relations between two testing variables of public 
opinion and the NYT reports. Increases in the degrees of convergence and in the 
margin of change are associated with an increasing number of the NYT reports. 
While showing the U-shaped relations, the tests also indicate that the overall 
slopes in the relation have negative values respectively; -2.872 (p<.05) for the 
relation between approval rates and the NYT reports, and –2.083 (p<.05) for the 
relation between the change in approval rates and the NYT reports. The negative 
slopes described that the NYT have been likely to report the presidential approval 
rate when the president stays in bad approval rates more than when the president 
enjoys high and inclining approval rates in general. The graphical displays, shown 
in Fig.9 and Fig.10, reinforced these results showing the U-shaped relation with 
overall negative slopes.  
Second, time-series analyses provided a divided support to the hypothesis 
about the additive/subtractive effect of the NYT reports on the subsequent 
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approval rates. Investigation of the effect of the indication of majority and relative 
majority in the NYT reports found that only the indication of relative majority in 
the reports has brought an additive/subtractive change in the subsequent approval 
rates. While the analysis did not find any statistically significant association 
between the indication of majority and the following approval rates, the results 
show that when the NYT presents a report on the approval rate which indicates the 
relative majority of that time is supporting the president, the report brings .659 
points addition to the given approval rate in the following month (p<.05). On the 
contrary, when the NYT presents a report on the approval rate that indicates the 
relative majority during that time disapproves of the president, the approval rate 
falls by -.912 points in the next month (p<.05). 
Third, this study found that volatility has increased over the last forty 
years of the presidential approval series. This finding concurs with Gronke & 
Brehm (2002), showing the variance of the residuals has increased on the whole 
but temporarily declined during the second terms of presidency (-4.409, p<.10). In 
addition, the test of volatility through ARCH-m model confirmed the hypothesis 
about the relation between the volatility and the NYT reports. The analysis 
confirmed that the series of residuals have a propensity of AR(1), that means the 
time-series model has ARCH (1)—auto-regressive conditional heteroskedacity. 
The ARCH-m model showed that the residual terms are auto-correlated and thus 
about 36% of the variance of the residual is carried over into the next month. 
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After controlling ARCH (1), the test confirmed that the increase of the NYT report 
is positively associated with the increase of volatility in the next month. The result 
showed that whenever the NYT presented one more report on the presidential 
approval rate, the volatility of the approval rate increased by 3.247 points in the 
next month (p<.05). 
Finally, in addition to the test variables, the analyses showed that the 
variances of control variables have statistically significant effects both on public 
opinion and the media reports. What this finding tells is that reality matters, too. 
Before people are affected by the media representation or other’s perception of 
the reality, those control variables describing the changes in the real world have 
significant effects on the public opinion of presidential performance. Among 
those control variables, especially the occurrences of political events are strongly 
associated with the dependent variables. While the effects of both positive events 
and negative events are statistically significant and strong, positive events are 
more likely to affect public evaluation of the president at their immediate 
moments. On the contrary, the impact of negative events stays longer and peaks a 
couple months after their occurrences. Noticeably, Watergate was the worst of 
political events to have negative effects on presidential approval rate; on the other 
hand, the Sept.11th terrorist attack was the most influential event in gaining 




Chapter.6.  Discussion and Implications 
 
 
[R]ationalism may mean very different things. It means one thing if we 
think of the kind rationalization the systematic thinker performs on the 
image the world; an increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of 
increasingly precise and abstract concepts. Rationalism means another 
thing if we think of the methodological attainment of a definitely given 
and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of 
adequate means. 




It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two 
meanings of the word subject: subject to some else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience of self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and 
makes subject to. 




IMPLICATION TO THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE 
This study began with the idea that public opinion is formulated in the 
cyclical process between public opinion itself and the media coverage of the 
public opinion (see, Stevenson et al., 1994). Theoretically, this study expected 
that the spiral of silence might provide an explanation for the cyclical relation that 
results in the intensification of the majority opinion and the increased volatility of 
the whole opinion series. Social-psychological concepts of the spiral of silence 
suggest that the social perception of presidential performance be formulated not 
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just by people’s perception of presidential performance but also their perception 
of other’s opinion. In general, the result of this study is consistent with the spiral 
of silence theory, showing that the media presentation of the presidential approval 
rate has an effect of raising the variance of the subsequent approval rates, and the 
variance is directionally congruent with the given change in the approval rates. It 
is obvious that the theory of the spiral of silence offers this study an insightful 
framework for explaining the dynamic process of formulating public opinion on 
presidential performance. But, in a particular sense, the spiral of silence is a 
somewhat unfinished project. As many studies, and Noelle-Neumann herself 
acknowledge, the dynamic of the spiral of silence is not always observed in all 
public opinion formulations; rather it is more likely to be defined as an issue-
specific tendency that works with the issues of some ethical and social importance 
(Glynn & McLeod, 1985; Rimmer & Howard, 1990). In order to make sense of 
this result, closer inspection of some concepts is required.  
In agenda-setting research, the varying degree of issues’ importance has 
been speculated under the concept of issue salience. Unlike the spiral of silence, 
agenda-setting research found issue salience to the media and to the public as a 
variable which are, to some extent, influenced by each other. They point out that 
the salience of an issue to the public is not naturally given but moved up and 
down under the influence of the media. Applying some concepts of agenda-setting 
research, this study proposed that the salience of presidential approval rates to the 
media has not been constant; rather the media attention to them has significantly 
varied according to the given degrees of two attributes, convergence and change, 
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in public opinion on presidential performance. The findings of this study provided 
a qualified support for the argument that the varying degrees of convergence and 
change in presidential approval rates play a dynamic role upon the media 
coverage of the approval rates. In other words, the research findings support the 
notion that the high degrees of convergence and change in the presidential 
approval polls raise the salience of the approval rates to the media. Obviously, 
this study tested only the case of presidential approval rates and the NYT reports, 
and it is hard to generalize the findings to other issues without supporting studies 
that argue the salience of an issue is always highly raised when public opinion on 
the issue converges or changes radically. But, this study still implies that a certain 
condition of public opinion on an issue has a direct effect on the likeliness for the 
media to report the issue; i.e. public opinion on an issue is a significant factor of 
changing the salience of the issue. If this is the case, this may help the original 
insistence of the spiral of silence to explain why the fear of isolation is deeply 
related with the climate of opinion. In regards to individuals’ fear of isolation, it 
can be argued that, even though there is no conclusive evidence that a certain 
climate of opinion has a direct effect of raising one’s fear of isolation (see 
Kennamer, 1990), individuals find the climate of opinion threatening to their 
willingness to speak out when the salience of the opinion is raised high enough to 
draw significant attention from the media and the public.    
 
One obvious question, though, that must be addressed is why the spiral of 
silence is observed only in the case of relative majority rather than simple 
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majority. The results of this study showed that the indication of simple majority 
by the NYT does not have significant influence on the subsequent rates but that the 
indication of relative majority has an effect on the spiral of silence. If the news 
media provided unambiguous information (i.e., a result of an opinion poll) that 
showed accurately the current distribution in the climate of opinion, then why 
would the indication of simple majority by the news media have almost no effect 
of shifting subsequent public opinion, while the indication of relative majority 
had significant effect of increasing the gap between the majority and the minority 
opinions? Perhaps this result confirms the notion that our statistical perception of 
climate of opinion is not scientifically accurate in nature; and thus, we are more 
likely to rely on heuristic information in assessing the given data (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). In a statistical sense, no matter how objective or accurate the 
information each news story presents regarding a series of events, we can hardly 
expect that individuals will get the most accurate perception of the events from 
the information. Regardless of the objectivity of each news story, we cannot 
estimate how accurately the news media represent the whole population of the 
series of events with a limited number of stories. In other words, since it is always 
possible that the news stories are a biased sample of the population, the indication 
of the objective data in the news stories itself cannot guarantee individuals get an 
accurate perception of the climate of opinion. In this sense, it is natural that 
individuals seek more information that can help them get a more complete 
perception of the climate of opinion. While it is obvious that further studies 
should attempt to investigate this more, the findings of this study may offer a 
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foundation for investigating the effect of media frames on individuals’ perception 
of the climate of opinion.  
In general, this study offers some insights about the cyclical process in 
shaping public opinion, providing qualified evidence of media effects in terms of 
the spiral of silence. The findings of this study can be summarized as following: 
First, media sensitivity to a given issue varies over time: the convergence (the 
extent of sharing a certain point of opinion) and change in public opinion raise the 
salience of the given issue; second, news selection does matter: news media 
provide unambiguous information but they are not an exact sample of the 
population; third, a simple cue makes a difference in individual statistical sense of 
the climate of public opinion. This study concludes that public opinion influences 
media attention, which, in turn, affects public opinion at a later date. While this 
study is not the first attempt to examine the cyclical process, it is still implicative 
that this study offers qualified empirical evidences of showing the cyclical 
process with a longitudinal series and confirms empirically that the cyclical 
process follows the spiral of silence.  
 
BEYOND OBJECTIVITY, SOMETHING MORE JOURNALISTS NEED TO DO  
 
According to Ulich Beck, German sociologist, modern rationalization 
means the reduction of any kind of random risks that humankind had had to live 
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with42. The rise of industrial production and the market economic system has 
reduced the unexpected risks that an individual might encounter in agricultural 
systems (such as the penalty of inclement weather conditions or other naturally 
occurring hazards on individuals’ existence). Also, later developed welfare state 
has reduced the cost of random misfortunes on individuals’ existence by engaging 
in once conceived private spheres with various governmental apparatuses. In the 
same sense, the development of the modern conceptual state apparatuses has 
decreased the possibilities of small conflicts and violent incidents within its 
territory. In short, systematic ways of calculating and controlling risks have been 
the essential nature of the modernity (Beck, 1992). This modern system of 
calculating and controlling risks is developed by assimilating private sectors of 
life into public arena. Replacing an individual’s personal decisions and actions for 
resolving given problems, the public values of ‘law and order’ has shrunk the 
range of uncertainties which an individual happened to come across. Once 
conceived as private spheres, such as nutrition, education, and livelihood, have 
rapidly been assimilated to the public managements of risks. The assimilation of 
private spheres to public risk management has taken two different faces: one is 
that private spheres was getting absorbed into the civil society, which is often 
                                                 
42 See U. Beck (1992/1986). Beck states “risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (p.21). He argues that 
modernity marks a transition from a human condition where naturally occurring hazards and 
socially determined fortunes define the fate of individuals to a new condition where individual’s 
fate is more likely decided by the our technological machineries to control nature.  
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represented as the public sphere; and the other face is being swallowed by the 
system world. The former represents the expansion of rationality (which does not 
necessarily mean logical ways of thinking, but rather rational ways of thinking 
earned from communicative interactions) among the members of a community so 
that the community frames private problems as collective concerns and attempts 
to manage them on the basis of community consensus. The latter way 
characterizes the growth of instrumental rationality in the forms of the routine and 
mechanistic practices for managing risks and the problems. While the former 
documents well the risk-management of the modernity, the latter shows the 
replacement of random risks with larger threats out of systematic hazards brought 
by the means of the modern machineries. In short, modernity has been the 
reduction of risks which may result of random personal misjudgments in decision-
making process, but it, on the other hand, has also had characteristics of 
increasing the danger of uncertainties which may result from systematic 
misjudgments. Beck points out that that the explosiveness of the world risk we 
have witnessed in many incidents such as Chernobyl or New York on September 
11th lies in the fact that our own systems represented in mass media, politics, and 
bureaucracy contradict the demands of rationality and responsibility in the 
contemporary society.  
In conducting this project, this study began with a concern about how 
journalism, especially objective journalism, functions in democracy: that is, this 
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study wanted to explore how the public and the media interact to meet the 
responsibility of formulating rational opinion for communal problems. As the 
findings of this study support the hypotheses of the spiral of silence, this study 
confirms the basic idea of the spiral of silence that the formulation of public 
opinion tends to follow a process of amplifying conformity in a society. As 
Schudson (1997)43 and others indicate, there are good numbers of scholars who 
believe that “conversation” is the central feature of democracy and the media need 
to provide the social space for the conversation whereby communicative 
rationality can be created. They call for incessant conversation in the space, i.e., 
the public sphere, not because conversation could lead to the discovery of 
universal knowledge about reality, but because only intersubjective conversation 
may lead to the increase of “solidarity” among participant subjects. That is, the 
conversational model of democracy sees intersubjective exchanges in the public 
sphere as a process of creating a public sharing where individuals with various 
perspectives can talk about collective problems, goals, ideals, and actions (Young, 
1996). Critics, however, often point out that this conversational model of 
democracy hardly works in American society; rather American society tends to 
present conversation as a process for producing “conformity” over any differences 
among different subjects. As this process of amplifying conformity may exclude 
certain minority opinions in the dialogical process, the majority opinion tends to 
                                                 
43 It should be noted that even though Shudson (1997) well summarize the conversational model 
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be easily transformed into the common good. When the public sphere functions to 
silence minority opinions and amplifying conformity, the conversation model of 
democracy can hardly sustain its purpose; rather the conversation itself becomes 
nothing but a machinery to impose the given majority opinion onto the public. 
Journalism, especially American journalism, has served people under the 
guiding principle of “objectivity.” The use of scientific opinion polls was an 
important part of the journalistic ethic of objectivity. While advocates of objective 
journalism believe that the ethical principle of objectivity can best serve as the 
rational deliberation of the public, critics often argue that journalistic objectivity, 
in fact, is far from rational deliberation and instead functions only as a tool for 
increasing efficiency and profit (Tuchman, 1978; Zelizer, 1990; Ognianova & 
Enderby, 1996). While journalism has used objectivity for its own efficiency and 
profit, the bigger problem, critics note, is that journalistic objectivity results in 
excluding minority opinions and legitimating the views of the dominant (Hackett, 
1984). In this sense, the findings of this study offer an empirical case for the 
argument that journalistic objectivity itself cannot guarantee the rational 
deliberation of the public by showing that the objective presentation of public 
opinion by the use of opinion polls is not automatically linked to the best rational 
evaluation of presidential performance.  
                                                                                                                                     
of democracy, he does not agree with the idea of the conversational model of democracy.   
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 Regarding the role of journalism in democracy, this study needs to 
propose that journalists do more beyond their ethical obligation of objectivity and 
take a new role of rhetor in maintaining the public sphere. Critics call for 
conversation as the central feature of democracy, not because conversation could 
lead to an undisputable consensus (majority opinion), but the deliberation process 
itself may lead to the increase of “solidarity” and “tolerance” among the 
participants. In this sense, the primary role of journalists is to maintain discursive 
and material coherence among different subjectivities. But it is important to note 
that the discursive and material coherence in the public sphere can be maintained 
only when rhetors can bring “differences” into the process of conversation. If 
rhetors fail to present “different” voices so that they remain “silent” voices, the 
inquiries of truth in the public are stymied, thus creating an “intellectual dead 
end” and causing the conversational model of democracy to fail. Given that 
opinion polls are deeply associated with public deliberation, as officials and 
journalists apply more and more polls for informing the public of policy proposals 
(Fuse, 2000; Gans, 2003), the results of this study highlight that besides objective 
presentation of the different voices, journalists should take a more active role of 





FOR FUTURE STUDIES  
 
This study is by no means conclusive. As with most macro-level studies 
on public opinion, the results of this study raised many questions which are 
perhaps best answered with supplemental micro-level analysis. Given that the 
results of this study can be replicated in different contexts, future research might 
explore, in a more detailed way, why the vulnerability of the public varies from 
time to time. An inherent weakness in a macro-level analysis is that the detailed 
mechanisms that create effects cannot be easily determined in the analysis (Smith, 
1987). In this sense, more research is needed at the psychological level that could 
examine the relationship between the news media coverage and public opinion. 
More work needs to be carried out to identify how individuals become sensitive to 
the climate of opinion under the influence of the media and other surroundings. 
Future studies should also note the limited boundary of the methodologies 
this study applied. One advantage of using time-series analysis is that it allows 
researchers to do a long-term analysis and, thus, show an interesting association 
between the media and public opinion beyond the chicken-or-egg debate (Wu et 
al., 2002). While time-series analysis offers a great potential for understanding the 
spiral dynamics of the media coverage and public attention to a certain issue, it is 
not easy to develop a necessary data set because not many surveys are conducted 
on a regular and consistent base. More longitudinal data sets could be developed 
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mainly by governments and other research institutions, and more academic 
attempts to take advantage of the given time-series data may encourage them to 
develop longitudinal data too. To advance our knowledge on the dynamics of 
public opinion, a more innovative approach to analyze the longitudinal data must 
be used along with other methodologies.  
As far as presidential approval rates is concerned, the evidence of this 
study confirms that political events are important factors of evaluating a 
president’s performance. The study also shows that the way political events affect 
public evaluation varies according to the characteristics of those political events. 
The findings of this study, however, are limited as this study investigates the 
varying effect of political events only within two categories, negative and positive, 
and, thus, could only provide symptomatic explanations on it. Given that political 
events can be categorized in more detailed ways (see Marra et al., 1990), future 
studies may find more interesting differences in the way political events influence 








This news story codebook is aimed at assessing news frame in the coverage of 
public opinion polls on presidential approval ratings by the New York Times. It 
examines how the NYT frame a specific result of opinion polls into one of five 
news frames. The following definitions are important in selecting and analyzing 
the content under study. 
 
News Story 
In this study, news stories are limited only to the New York Times stories that cite 
specific poll results on presidential approval ratings. This means that a story that 
included a reference to general atmosphere about a President without citing a 
particular approval figure was excluded. This study also excluded news stories 
that pertained only to some specific dimension of popularity (e.g., approval of 
president’s handling of foreign policy).  
 
Source of Opinion Polls 
A source of an opinion poll is usually an organization, which conduct a public 
opinion poll on presidential approval. Sources are explicitly identified when a 
news story credit a source, i.e. pollster, for the result of a public opinion poll.  
 
Presidential Approval Rating 
In this study, presidential approval rating is defined as general public evaluation 
of overall performance of the president in office. This means that a rating number 
by a specific group of people (such as Iowa farmers, Texas residents) is not 
counted as a presidential approval rating in this study. Presidential approval rating 
is often identified as a presidential popularity, approval of presidential 
performance, or approval of president’s job handling in office in the news story.   
 
News Frame 
In this study, a news frame is defined as the way the news story present certain 
rating number with a specific meaning of “inclining,” “remaining high,” 
“unchanged,” “remaining low,” or “declining.” Each frame is identified when a 
reporter organizes his/her discourse with a specific pattern of selection, emphasis, 
and exclusion. In this study, a news frame is identified by focusing on the news 
story’s selection, emphasis, exclusion of high/low attributes of a presidential 
approval rating number along with the use of key words denoting the status of 





How a certain number of approval rating is presented with the use of specific 
words denoting the status of the rating is key to identifying the news frame of 
each news story. In this study, the key words denoting the status of the rating are 
categorized as followings: 
1) Inclining frame: “all time high,” “climb,” “gain,” “hit new high point”, 
“highest ever,” “incline,” “increase,” “jump,” “lift,” “more than previous,” 
“rebound,” “rise,” “soar,” “up,” etc.   
2) Remaining high frame: “hover high,” “maintain high,” “match previous 
high,” “steady high,” “stable high,” “remain high,” “sustain high,” etc.  
3) Unchanged frame is identified by a) use of key words for remaining 
frame without any high/low specification, b) use of words such as “the 
same as,” “unchanged,” “no change,” “equal to previous,” etc., and/or c) 
no use of any inclining/declining key words.   
4) Remaining low frame: “hover low,” “maintain low,” “match previous 
low,” “steady low,” “stable low,” “remain low,” “sustain low,” “level off” 
etc. 
5) Declining frame: “all time low,” “dip,” “drop,” “decrease,” “decline,” 
“down,” “fall,” “hit new low,” “lose,” “less than previous,” “lowest,” 
“slip,” “sink,” “plunge,” “plummet,” etc.  
 
Attribution 
Attribution is identified when the news story credits a political or economical 
event (e.g., Lewinsky scandal, visit to a foreign country, or rise of oil price) for 
the current change or stability of presidential approval ratings. Attribution also 
may be made by connecting the current rating to the current status of an on-going 
political or economic situation (e.g., increase of war casualties, economic 
recession).   
  
 2. Coding Questions 
 
1. Story ID _____________ 
 
2. Story Day (month/day/year): ____/ ____/ _____ 
 
3. Is this news story published on the front page of the New York Times?44  
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
                                                 
44 The front page refers to the first page of the New York Times. If the story begins in the first 




4. Source of Opinion Polls45:  The source of opinion poll in this story is  
(1) Gallup Poll 
(2) Harris Poll 
(3) Rogers Poll 
(4) New York Times/CBS Poll 
(5) Other news media poll 
(6) Republic Party 
(7) Democratic Party 
(8) White House 
(9) Academic Institutions 
(0) Unknown/unavailable  
 








(8) G. Bush 
(9) Clinton 
(0) W. Bush 
 
6. What is the reported approval rating of the president in this news story?46: 
_________ 
 
7. What is the reported margin of approval change in this news story?47 
(from + 99 percent to – 99 percent ):   _________ 
 
8. Frame: The main frame of the news story is categorized as  
(1) inclining  
(2) remaining high 
(3) unchanged 
(4) remaining low 
(5) declining 
 
                                                 
45 If more than one source is used, check all that can be applied 
46 Code 99, if unavailable. 
47 Code 99, if unavailable. 
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9. Attribution of Change/ Stability: describe briefly the reported reason of 
change in the news story.  
(1) International conflict involving US 
(2) Diplomatic policy/ summit meetings/ visit to foreign countries 
(3) Personal image/ leadership/ political scandals 
(4) President health 
(5) Domestic issues (budget, crime, tax, environment, social security) 
(6) Economic condition/ economic policy 




(10) energy crisis/ oil price 
(11) Vietnam war 





Appendix B: Coding of Political Events48  
 
Date Event Coding 
5/63 Integration crisis in Alabama N 
5/65 Dominican Republic crisis P 
8/65 Vietnam draft doubled N 
4/66 Vietnam protests N 
8/66 Race riots in Chicago N 
9/66 Race violence in Atlanta N 
8/67 Race riots N 
11/67 Vietnam protest N 
2/68 Tet offensive N 
4/68 Johnson announces end to bombing P 
5/68 Campus protests N 
9/68 Soviets move into Czechoslovakia P 
11/68 Johnson halts bombing in Vietnam P 
12/68 Lowest unemployment in fifteen years P 
4/69 Campus protests about Vietnam N 
8/69 Successful moon launch P 
12/69 Huge anti-war rally N 
6/70 Kent State shooting N 
6/70  Cambodian invasion N 
2/71 Laos invasion N 
4/71 Anti-war demonstrations N 
9/71 Nixon imposes wage-price controls N 
                                                 
48 Following the Brace-Hinckley classification scheme, political events were coded as follows: 
P=positive predicted; and N=negative predicted. Events from 1/1963-5/1988 were adapted from 
Brace and Hinkley (1992) and events from 6/1988-12/1998 were adapted from Gronke & Brehm 
(2002). Events from 1/1999-12/2002 were coded by the author.  
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2/72 Vietnam peace proposal announced P 
4/72 Increase in war and bombing N 
1/73 Vietnam peace accord P 
2/73 Watergate burglars convicted N 
3/73 McCord letter Sirica N 
5/73 Ervin Committee begins N 
6/73 Price freeze announced N 
7/73 Dean testifies N 
8/73 Agnew investigation revealed N 
9/73 Enrichman, Liddy, and other indicted N 
10/73 Saturday night massacre N 
11/73 Gap in tape revealed N 
4/74 House judiciary hearings begin N 
4/74 Nixon ordered to pay back taxes N 
5/74 Judiciary hearings continue N 
8/74 US v. Nixon announced  N 
8/74 Articles of impeachment voted N 
10/74 Ford pardons Nixon N 
5/75 Cambodian falls N 
6/75 Mayaguez incident P 
9/78 Camp David Accords signed P 
12/79 Hostages first seized in Iran P 
1/80 Soviets invade Afghanistan P 
2/80  Inflation sets new record high N 
4/80  Helicopter rescue plan fails N 
5/80 Race rioting N 
3/81 Assassination attempt on Reagan P 
3/83 Soviets attack Korean airliner P 
10/83 Grenada invasion P 
3/84 Record deficit balance of payments N 
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4/84 Bombing of Nicaraguan harbors N 
1/85 Cabinet shakeup N 
4/85 Bitburg controversy N 
7/85 Hostage incident  P 
8/85 Reagan surgery  P 
1/86 Space shuttle explodes P 
4/86 Libyan hostilities P 
5/86 Air strike on Libya P 
11/86 First Iran-Contra revelation N 
12/86 Reagan claims Iran-Cotra ignorance N 
3/87 Tower Committee report N 
3/87 Donald Reagan resigns N 
5/87 Iran-Contra hearings  N 
5/87 Persian Gulf attack on US P 
6/87 Iran-Contra hearings continue N 
6/87 US escorts Kuwaiti tankers P 
10/87 Stock market plunges N 
11/87 Iran-Contra hearings continue N 
12/87 US-USSR treaty signed P 
1/88 Meese investigation N 
4/88 Justice Department investigated N 
4/88 Marines enter Panama P 
5/88 Senate ratifies INF treaty P 
3/89 Senate rejects Tower nomination N 
5/89 North convicted by Federal Jury N 
10/89 Dow Jones drops 190, 2nd largest in history N 
12/89 Bush announces end of Cold War P 
12/89 US invades Panama P 
4/90 Poindexter convicted N 
8/90 Iraq invades Kuwait, US P 
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11/90 Treaty on nuke weapons in Europe P 
1/91 Desert Storm P 
3/91 No fly zone Iraq, shoot down plane P 
7/91 START treaty signed P 
9/91 Unilateral reduction in tactical nukes P 
10/91 Thomas hearings, Hill revelations N 
11/91 Wofford beats Thornburgh for PA senate N 
4/92 LA riots N 
1/93 START II signed P 
1/93 US attack on Iraqi missle/radar stations P 
2/93 Trade center Bombing P 
4/93 Waco siege and fire N 
5/93 Travelgate N 
6/94 US attacks Somali warlord P 
4/95 Oklahoma City bombing  N 
6/95 O’Grady shot down in Bosnia P 
11/95 Government shutdown, 770,000 sent home N 
12/95 Government shutdown continues N 
6/96 Filegate, confidential FBI files N 
7/96 Olympic park bombing N 
9/96 US attacks Iraq P 
10/97 Asian crisis, Dow drops 554 points N 
7/98 Secret service testify, Lewinsky case  N 
8/98 US embassies in Africa bombed P 
8/98 Lewinsky case, Clinton admits relationship N 
9/98 Starr presents impeachment case to House N 
10/98 House votes to impeach N 
12/98 US air strike against Iraq P 
1/99 Senate opens impeachment trial N 
2/99 Senate votes to acquit P 
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4/99 Columbine high school shooting  N 
4/01 Collision b/w US & Chinese air crafts, US aircrews detained N 
9/01 9/11 terrorist attacks in NY & DC P 
10/01 Air strikes in Afghanistan P 
12/01 Enron files bankruptcy N 
4/02 Israel/Palestine conflict intensifies N 
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